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Other Important Works

• Anomaly, Jonathan, 2008. “Internal Reasons and the Ought-Implies-Can Principle”, Philosophical Forum, 39: 469–83. (Scholar)
• Bradley, Ben, 2006. “Two Concepts of Intrinsic Value”, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 9: 111–130. (Scholar)
• Broome, John, 1997. “Is Incommensurability vagueness?”, in R. Chang (ed.), Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reasoning, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, pp. 67–89. (Scholar)
• Bykvist, Krister, 2009. “No Good Fit: Why the Fitting-Attitude Analysis of Value Fails”, Mind, 118: 1–30. (Scholar)
• Carlson, Erik, 1995. Consequentialism Reconsidered, Dordrecht: Kluwer. (Scholar)
• Chang, Ruth, 1997. “Introduction”, in R. Chang (ed.), Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reasoning, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 1–34. (Scholar)
• Crisp, Roger, 2005. “Value, Reasons, and the Structure of Justification: How to Avoid Passing the Buck”, Analysis, 65: 80–85. (Scholar)
• Dancy, Jonathan, 2003. “Are there Organic Unities?” Ethics, 113: 629–650. (Scholar)
• D’Arms, Justin, and Daniel Jacobson, 2000. “Sentiment and Value”, Ethics, 110: 722–748. (Scholar)
• –––, 2000b. “The Moralistic Fallacy: On the ‘Appropriateness’ of Emotions”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 61: 65–90. (Scholar)
• Dorsey, Dale, 2012. “Intrinsic Value and the Supervenience Principle”, Philosophical Studies, 157: 267–285. (Scholar)
• Dreier, James, 1993. “The Structure of Normative Theories”, The Monist, 76: 22–40. (Scholar)
• –––, 2004. “Why Ethical Satisficing Makes Sense and Rational Satisficing Doesn’t”, in Michael Byron (ed.), Satisficing and Maximizing, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 131–154. (Scholar)
• Fletcher, Guy, 2008. “Mill, Moore, and Intrinsic Value”, Social Theory and Practice, 34: 517–532. (Scholar)
• Heathwood, Chris, 2008. “Fitting Attitudes and Welfare”, Oxford Studies in Metaethics, 3: 47–73. (Scholar)
• Hurka, Tom, 2010. “Asymmetries in Value”, Noûs, 44: 199–223. (Scholar)
• Kagan, Shelly, 1989. The Limits of Morality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Kamm, Frances, 1989. “Harming Some to Save Others”, Philosophical Studies, 57: 227–260. (Scholar)
• Kant, Immanuel, 1785. Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, Mary Gregor, trans. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. (Scholar)
• Kraut, Richard, 2007. What is Good and Why: The Ethics of Well-Being, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
• Langton, Rae, 2007. “Objective and Unconditioned Value”, Philosophical Review, 116: 157–185. (Scholar)
• Lemos, Noah, 1994. Intrinsic Value, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
• Louise, Jennie, 2004. “Relativity of Value and the Consequentialist Umbrella”, Philosophical Quarterly, 54: 518–536. (Scholar)
• Nagel, Thomas, 1970. The Possibility of Altruism, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
• Olson, Jonas, 2009. “Fitting Attitudes Analyses of Value and the Partiality Challenge”, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 12: 365–378. (Scholar)
• Parfit, Derek, 1984. Reasons and Persons, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Pettit, Philip, 1997. “The Consequentialist Perspective”, in Baron, Pettit, and Slote, Three Methods of Ethics, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 92–174. (Scholar)
• Perry, R.B., 1926. General Theory of Value, New York: Longmans, Green & Co. (Scholar)
• Rabinowicz, Wlodek, 2008. “Value Relations”, Theoria, 74: 18–49. (Scholar)
• Raz, Joseph, 1999. Engaging Reason: On the Theory of Value and Action, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Ross, W.D., 1930. The Right and The Good, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Stocker, Michael, 1990. Plural and Conflicting Values, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Thomson, Judith Jarvis, 2001. Goodness and Advice, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
• Urmson, J.O., 1967. The Emotive Theory of Ethics, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Väyrynen, Pekka, 2006. “Resisting the Buck-Passing Account of Value”, Oxford Studies in Metaethics, 1: 295–324. (Scholar)
• Wedgwood, Ralph, 2009. “Intrinsic Values and Reasons for Action”, in Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva (eds.), Philosophical Issues, 19: 321–342. (Scholar)
• Zimmerman, Michael, 2001. The Nature of Intrinsic Value, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. (Scholar)