Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Voting Methods" by Eric Pacuit

This is an automatically generated and experimental page

If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.

This experiment has been authorized by the editors of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The original article and bibliography can be found here.

  • Anscombe, G. E. M., 1976, “On Frustration of the Majority by Fulfillment of the Majority's Will,” Analysis, 36(4): 161–168. (Scholar)
  • Arrow, K., 1963, Social Choice and Individual Values, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2nd edition. (Scholar)
  • Asan, G. and R. Sanver, 2002, “Another Characterization of the Majority Rule,” Economics Letters, 75(3): 409–413. (Scholar)
  • Balinski, M. and R. Laraki, 2007, “A theory of measuring, electing and ranking,” Proceeding of the National Academy of Sciences, 104(21): 8720–8725.
  • –––, 2010, Majority Judgement: Measuring, Ranking and Electing, Boston: MIT Press. (Scholar)
  • Bartholdi III, J.J., C. A. Tovey, and M.A. Trick, 1989, “The Computational Difficulty of Manipulating an Election,” Social Choice and Welfare, 6(3): 227–241. (Scholar)
  • –––, 1989, “Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election,” Social Choice and Welfare, 6(2): 157–165. (Scholar)
  • Borda, J.-C. de, 1784, “Mémoire sur les élections au scrutin par M. de Borda” in Mémoires de l'Académie Royale des Sciences année 1781, Paris: l'Imprimerie Royale, pp. 657–665; Translated in McClean and Urken 1995, pp. 83–89. (Scholar)
  • Brams, S., 2008, Mathematics and Democracy, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
  • Brams, S. and P. Fishburn, 2007 (2nd Edition), Approval Voting, New York: Springer. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2002, “Voting Procedures”, in Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, K. J. Arrow, A. K. Sen, and K. Suzumura (eds.), Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 173–236. (Scholar)
  • Brams, S., D. M. Kilgour D. M., and W. Zwicker, 1998, “The paradox of multiple elections,” Social Choice and Welfare, 15(2): 211–236. (Scholar)
  • Brams, S. and Sanver, M. R., “Voting Systems That Combine Approval and Preference,” in The Mathematics of Preference, Choice, and Order: Essays in Honor of Peter C. Fishburn, S. Brams, W. Gehrlein, and F. Roberts (eds.), Berlin: Springer, pp. 215–237. (Scholar)
  • Christiano, T., “Democracy”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <Democracy/">https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/Democracy/>. (Scholar)
  • Cohen, J., 1986, “An epistemic conception of democracy,” Ethics, 97(1): 26–38. (Scholar)
  • Coleman,J. and J. Ferejohn, 1986, “Democracy and social choice,” Ethics, 97(1): 6–25. (Scholar)
  • Condorcet, M.J.A.N. de C., Marque de, 1785, Essai sur l'application de l'analyse à la probabilitié des décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix, Paris: l'Imprimerie Royale; Translated in Mclean and Urken 1995, pp. 91–113. (Scholar)
  • Conitzer, V., T. Sandholm, and J. Lang, 2007, “When are Elections with Few Candidates Hard to Manipulate?,” Journal of the ACM, 54(3): Article 14. (Scholar)
  • Conitzer, V. and T. Sandholm, 2005, “Common Voting Rules as Maximum Likelihood Estimators” in Proceedings of the 21st Annual Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI-05), pp. 145–152. (Scholar)
  • Daudt, H. and D. W. Rae, 1976, “The Ostrogorski paradox: a peculiarity of compound majority decision,” European Journal of Political Research, 4(4): 391–399. (Scholar)
  • Dietrich, F., 2008, “The premises of Condorcet's jury theorem are not simultaneously justified,” Episteme – a Journal of Social Epistemology, 5(1): 56–73. (Scholar)
  • Dowding, K. and M. Van Hees, 2007, “In Praise of Manipulation,” British Journal of Political Science, 38(1): 1–15. (Scholar)
  • Endriss, U., 2011, “Logic and Social Choice Theory,” in Logic and Philosophy Today, J. van Benthem and A. Gupta (eds.), London: College Publications. (Scholar)
  • Faliszewski, P. and A. Procaccia, 2010, “AI's War on Manipulation: Are We Winning?”, AI Magazine, 31(4): 53–64. (Scholar)
  • Faliszewski, P., E. Hemaspaandra, and L. Hemaspaandra, 2010, “Using complexity to protect elections,” Communications of the ACM, 53(11): 74–82. (Scholar)
  • Felsenthal, D. and M. Machover, 1998, The Measurement of Voting Power: Theory and Practice, Problems and Paradoxes, Cheltenham Glos: Edward Elgar Publishing. (Scholar)
  • Fishburn, P. and S. Brams, 1983, “Paradoxes of Preferential Voting,” Mathematics Magazine, 56(4): 207–214. (Scholar)
  • Fishburn, P., 1974, “Paradoxes of Voting,” American Political Science Review, 68(2): 537–546. (Scholar)
  • –––, 1978, “Axioms for Approval Voting: Direct Proof,” Journal of Economic Theory, 19(1): 180–185. (Scholar)
  • Gaertner, W., 2006, A Primer in Social Choice Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
  • Gehrlein, W., 2006, Condorcet's Paradox, Berlin: Springer. (Scholar)
  • Gibbard, A., 1973, “Manipulation of voting schemes: A general result,” Econometrica, 41(4): 587–601. (Scholar)
  • Hansson, S. O. and Grüne-Yanoff, T., “Preferences”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <Preferences/">https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/Preferences/>. (Scholar)
  • Kelly, J.S., 1989, “The Ostrogorski's paradox,” Social Choice and Welfare, 6(1): 71–76. (Scholar)
  • Laslier, J.-F., 2011, “Lessons from in situ experiments during French elections,” in In Situ and Laboratory Experiments on Electoral Law Reform: French Presidential Elections, B. Dolez, B. Grofman and A. Laurent (eds.), Berlin: Springer, pp. 91–104. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2010, “Laboratory experiments about approval voting” in Handbook of Approval Voting, J.-F. Laslier and R. Sanver (eds.), Berlin: Springer, pp. 339–356. (Scholar)
  • Laslier, J.-F. and R. Sanver (eds.), 2010, Handbook on Approval Voting, Series: Studies in Choice and Welfare, Berlin: Springer. (Scholar)
  • Levin, J. and B. Naelbuff, 1995, “An introduction to vote-counting schemes,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9(1): 3–26. (Scholar)
  • List, C., 2006, “The Discursive Dilemma and Public Reason”, Ethics, 116(2): 362–402. (Scholar)
  • List, C. and R. Goodin, 2001, “Epistemic Democracy: Generalizing the Condorcet Jury Theorem,” Journal of Political Philosophy, 9(3): 277–306. (Scholar)
  • Mackie, G., 2003, Democracy Defended, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
  • Malinas, G. and J. Bigelow, “Simpson's Paradox”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/paradox-simpson/>. (Scholar)
  • Maskin, E., 1995, “Majority rule, social welfare functions and game forms,” in Choice, Welfare and Development: A Festschrift in Honour of Amartya K. Sen, K. Basu, P. Pattanaik, K. Suzumura (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 100–109. (Scholar)
  • May, K., 1952, “A set of independent necessary and sufficient conditions for simply majority decision,” Econometrica, 20(4): 680–684.
  • McClean, I. and A. Urken (eds.), 1995, Classics of Social Choice, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. (Scholar)
  • Myerson, R., 1995, “Axiomatic derivation of scoring rules without the ordering assumption,” Social Choice and Welfare, 12(1): 59–74. (Scholar)
  • Nitzan, S., 2010, Collective Preference and Choice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
  • Nitzan, S. and A. Rubinstein, 1981, “A further characterization of Borda ranking method,” Public Choice, 36(1): 153–158. (Scholar)
  • Nurmi, H., 1987, Comparing Voting Systems, Dordrecht: D. Reidel. (Scholar)
  • –––, 1999, Voting Paradoxes and How to Deal with Them, Berlin: Springer-Verlag. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2010, “Voting Theory,” in e-Democracy: A Group Decision and Negotiation Perspective, D. R. Insua and S. French (eds.), Berlin: Springer, pp. 101–124. (Scholar)
  • Ostorogorski, M., 1902, Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties, London: Macmillan. (Scholar)
  • Pigozzi, G., 2005, “Two aggregation paradoxes in social decision making: the Ostrogorski paradox and the discursive dilemma,” Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology, 2(2): 33–42.
  • Poundstone, W., 2008, Gaming the Vote: Why Elections aren't Fair (and What We Can Do About It), New York: Hill and Wang Press. (Scholar)
  • Regenwetter, M., B. Grofman, A.A.J. Marley, A.A.J. and I. Tsetlin, 2006, Behavioral Social Choice: Probabilistic Models, Statistical Inference, and Applications, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
  • Regenwetter, M., B. Grofman, A. Popova, W. Messner, C. Davis-Stober, and D. Cavagnaro, 2009, “Behavioural Social Choice: A Status Report”, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 364(1518): 833–843. (Scholar)
  • Riker, W., 1982, Liberalism against Populism: A Confrontation between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice, San Francisco: W. H. Freeman & Co. (Scholar)
  • Saari, D., 1989, “A dictionary of voting paradoxes,” Journal of Economic Theory, 48(2): 443–475.
  • –––, 1995, Basic Geometry of Voting, Berlin: Springer. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2001, Decisions and Elections: Explaining the Unexpected, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2000, “Mathematical Structure of Voting Paradoxes: II. Positional Voting,” Economic Theory, 15(1): 55–102. (Scholar)
  • Satterthwaite, M., 1975, “Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions,” Journal of Economic Theory , 10(2): 198–217. (Scholar)
  • Taylor, A., 2005, Social Choice and the Mathematics of Manipulation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
  • Tsetlin, I., M. Regenwetter, and B. Grofman, 2003, “The impartial culture maximizes the probability of majority cycles,” Social Choice and Welfare, 21(3): 387–398. (Scholar)
  • Wagner, C., 1983, “Anscombe's Paradox and the Rule of Three-Fourths,” Theory and Decision, 15(3): 303-308. (Scholar)
  • –––, 1984, “Avoiding Anscombe's Paradox,” Theory and Decision, Volume 16(3): 233–238. (Scholar)
  • Woeginger, G., 2003, “A new characterization of the majority rule”, Economic Letters, 81(1): 89–94.
  • Young, H.P., 1995, “Optimal Voting Rules,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9(1): 51–64. (Scholar)
  • –––, 1975, “Social Choice Scoring Functions,” SIAM Journal of Applied Mathematics, 28(4): 824–838. (Scholar)

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