Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Voting Methods" by Eric Pacuit

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  • Brams, S. and Sanver, M. R., “Voting systems that combine approval and preference,” in The Mathematics of Preference, Choice, and Order: Essays in Honor of Peter C. Fishburn, S. Brams, W. Gehrlein, and F. Roberts (eds.), pp. 215–237, Berlin: Springer. (Scholar)
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  • Conitzer, V. and Wash, T., 2016, “Barriers to manipulation in voting,” Chapter 6 in Handbook of Computational Social Choice, 127–145, New York: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
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  • Endriss, U., 2011, “Logic and social choice theory,” in Logic and Philosophy Today, J. van Benthem and A. Gupta (eds.), London: College Publications. (Scholar)
  • Endriss, U. (editor), 2017, Trends in Computational Social Choice, Amsterdam: AI Access Publishers. (Scholar)
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