Linked bibliography for the SEP article "The Ethics and Rationality of Voting" by Jason Brennan

This is an automatically generated and experimental page

If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.

This experiment has been authorized by the editors of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The original article and bibliography can be found here.

  • Achen, C. and Bartels, L., 2016, Democracy for Realists, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
  • Ackerman, B. and Fishkin, J.S., 2005, Deliberation Day, New Haven: Yale University Press. (Scholar)
  • Althaus, S., 1998, “Information Effects in Collective Preferences”, American Political Science Review, 92: 545–58. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2003, Collective Preferences in Democratic Politics, New York: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
  • Bartels, L., 2010, Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
  • Beerbohm, E., 2012, In Our Name: The Ethics of Democracy, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
  • Birch, S., 2009, Full Participation: A Comparative Study of Compulsory Voting, Manchester: Manchester University Press. (Scholar)
  • Brennan, G. and Lomasky, L., 1993, Democracy and Decision: The Pure Theory of Electoral Preference, New York: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
  • Brennan, J., 2009, “Polluting the Polls: When Citizens Should Not Vote”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 87: 535–549. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2011a, The Ethics of Voting, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2011b, “The Right to a Competent Electorate”, Philosophical Quarterly, 61: 700–724. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2013, “Epistocracy within Public Reason”, in Democracy in the Twenty First Century: Problems and Prospects, A. Cudd and S. Scholz (ed.), Berlin: Springer. (Scholar)
  • Brennan, J. and L. Hill, 2014, Compulsory Voting: For and Against, New York: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
  • Brennan, J. and P.M. Jaworski, 2015, Markets without Limits, New York: Routledge Press. (Scholar)
  • Brighouse, H. and M. Fleurbaey, 2010, “Democracy and Proportionality”, Journal of Political Philosophy, 18: 137–155. (Scholar)
  • Buchanan, J. and G. Tullock, 1962, The Calculus of Consent, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. (Scholar)
  • Campbell, A., G. Gurin and W.E. Miller, 1954, The Voter Decides, Evanston, Ill: Row, Peterson, and Co. (Scholar)
  • Caplan, B., 2007, The Myth of the Rational Voter, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
  • Christiano, T., 1996, The Rule of the Many: Fundamental Issues in Democratic Theory, Boulder, CO: Westview Press. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2006, “Democracy”, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2006 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <Democracy/" target="other">https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2006/entries/Democracy/>. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2008, The Constitution of Authority, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
  • Dahl, R.A., 1990a, After the Revolution? Authority in a Good Society, New Haven: Yale University Press. (Scholar)
  • –––, 1990b, “The Myth of the Presidential Mandate”, Political Science Quarterly, 105: 355–72. (Scholar)
  • Delli Carpini, M.X. and S. Keeter, 1996, What Americans Know about Politics and Why It Matters, New Haven: Yale University Press. (Scholar)
  • Dovi, S., 2007, The Good Representative, New York: Wiley-Blackwell Publishing. (Scholar)
  • Downs, A., 1957, An Economic Theory of Democracy, New York: Harper and Row. (Scholar)
  • Edlin, A., A. Gelman, and N. Kaplan, 2007, “Voting as a Rational Choice: Why and How People Vote to Improve the Well-Being of Others”, Rationality and Society, 19: 219–314. (Scholar)
  • Engelen B., 2007, “Why Compulsory Voting Can Enhance Democracy”, Acta Analytica, 42: 23–39. (Scholar)
  • Estlund, D., 2003, “Why Not Epistocracy”, in Desire, Identity and Existence. Essays in Honor of T.M. Penner, ed. Naomi Reshotko, pp. 53–69, New York: Academic Printing & Publishing. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2007, Democratic Authority, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
  • Evans, J., 2003, Voters and Voting, Thousand Oaks: Sage. (Scholar)
  • Freiman, C., 2014, “Vote Markets”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 92: 759–774. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2020. Why It’s OK to Ignore Politics, New York: Routledge Press. (Scholar)
  • Galston, W., 2011, “Telling Americans to Vote, or Else”, New York Times, 6 November 2011, SR9. (Scholar)
  • Gilens, M., 2012, Affluence and Influence: Economic Inequality and Political Power in America, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
  • Goldman, A., 1999, “Why Citizens Should Vote: A Causal Responsibility Approach”, Social Philosophy and Policy, 16: 201–217. (Scholar)
  • Goodin, R.E., 2007, “Enfranchising All Affected Interests, and Its Alternatives”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 35: 40–68. (Scholar)
  • Gosseries, A., 2005, “Publicity”, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2005 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <Publicity/" target="other">https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2005/entries/Publicity/>. (Scholar)
  • Guerrero, A.A., 2010, “The Paradox of Voting and the Ethics of Political Representation”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 38: 272–306. (Scholar)
  • Haefele, E., 1971, “A Utility Theory of Representative Government”, American Economic Review, 61: 350–65. (Scholar)
  • Haidt, J., 2012, The Righteous Mind, New York: Pantheon. (Scholar)
  • Hasen, R.L., 2000, “Vote Buying”, California Law Review, 88: 1323–1371 (Scholar)
  • Highton, B. and R.E. Wolfinger, 2001, “The Political Implications of Higher Turnout”, British Journal of Political Science, 31(1): 179–223. (Scholar)
  • Hill, L., 2002, “On the Reasonableness of Compelling Citizens to Vote: The Australian Case”, Political Studies, 50: 80–101. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2006, “Low Voter Turnout in the United States: Is Compulsory Voting a Viable Solution?”, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 18: 207–32. (Scholar)
  • Hong, L., and Page, S., 2004, “Groups of Diverse Problem Solvers Can Outperform Groups of High-Ability Problem Solvers”, Proceedings of the National Academy of the Sciences of the United States of America, 101: 16385–9. (Scholar)
  • Kinder, D.R., and Kalmoe, N.P., 2017, Neither Liberal nor Conservative: Ideological Innocent in the American Public, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
  • Landemore, H., 2012, Democratic Reason, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
  • Leighley, J.E. and J. Nagler, 1992, “Individual and Systematic Influences on Voter Turnout: 1984”, Journal of Politics, 54: 718–40. (Scholar)
  • Lijphart, A., 1997, “Unequal Participation: Democracy’s Unresolved Dilemma”, American Political Science Review, 91: 1–14. (Scholar)
  • List, C., 2013, “Social Choice Theory”, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/social-choice/>. (Scholar)
  • List, C. and R. Goodin, 2001, “Epistemic Democracy: Generalizing the Condorcet Jury Theorem”, Journal of Political Philosophy, 9: 277–306. (Scholar)
  • Lodge, M. and C. Taber, 2013, The Rationalizing Voter, New York: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
  • Lomasky, L. and G. Brennan, 2000, “Is There a Duty to Vote?”, Social Philosophy and Policy, 17: 62–82. (Scholar)
  • López-Guerra, C., 2005, “Should Expatriates Vote?”, Journal of Political Philosophy, 13(2): 216–34. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9760.2005.00221.x (Scholar)
  • –––, 2014, Democracy and Disenfranchisement, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
  • MacAskill, W., 2015, Doing Good Better, New York: Avery. (Scholar)
  • Mackie, Gerry, 2010, “Why It’s Rational to Vote”, University of California, San Diego, unpublished manuscript. (Scholar)
  • Maloberti, N., 2018, “Markets in votes: Alienability, Strict Secrecy, and Political Clientelism”, Politics, Philosophy, and Economics, 18: 192–215. (Scholar)
  • Maskivker, J., 2019, The Duty to Vote, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
  • Mason, L., 2017, Uncivil Agreement: How Politics Become Our Identity, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
  • Mill, J.S., 1861, Considerations on Representative Government, Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1991. (Scholar)
  • Mueller, D., 1973, “Constitutional Democracy and Social Welfare”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87: 61–79. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2003, Public Choice III, New York: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
  • Mulligan, T., 2015, “On the Compatibility of Epistocracy and Public Reason”, Social Theory and Practice, 41: 458–76. (Scholar)
  • Noel, H., 2010, “Ten Things Political Scientists Know that You Don’t”, The Forum, 8(3): article 12. doi:10.2202/1540-8884.1393 (Scholar)
  • Owen, D., 2012, “Constituting the Polity, Constituting the Demos: On the Place of the All Affected Interests Principle in Democratic Theory and in Resolving the Democratic Boundary Problem”, Ethics & Global Politics, 5: 129–152. (Scholar)
  • Pacuit, E., 2011, “Voting Methods”, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/voting-methods/>>. (Scholar)
  • Philipson, T. and J. Snyder, 1996, “Equilibrium and Efficiency in an Organized Vote Market”, Public Choice, 89: 245–65. (Scholar)
  • Ron, Amit. 2017, “Affected Interests and Their Institutions”, Democratic Theory, 4: 66–81. (Scholar)
  • Sandel, M., 2012, What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets, New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux. (Scholar)
  • Satz, D., 2010, Why Some Things Should Not Be for Sale, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
  • Schwitzgebel, E. and J. Rust, 2010, “Do Ethicists and Political Philosophers Vote More Often than Other Professors?”, Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 1: 189–199. (Scholar)
  • Singh, S. P., 2015, “Compulsory Voting and the Turnout Decision Calculus”, Political Studies, 63: 548–568. (Scholar)
  • Sheehy, P., 2002, “A Duty Not to Vote”, Ratio (new series), 15: 46–57. (Scholar)
  • Somin, I., 2013, Democracy and Political Ignorance, Stanford: Stanford University Press. (Scholar)
  • Song, S., 2009, “Democracy and Noncitizen Voting Rights?”, Citizenship Studies, 13: 607–20. (Scholar)
  • Tetlock, P., 2000, “ Coping with Trade-Offs: Psychological Constraints and Political Implications”, Elements of Reason: Cognition, Choice, and the Bounds of Rationality, ed. A. Lupia, M.D. McCubbins, and S.L. Popkin, New York: Cambridge University Press (Scholar)
  • Thompson, A., 2014, “ Does Diversity Trump Ability? An Example of the Misuse of Mathematics in the Social Sciences”, Notices of the American Mathematical Society, 61: 1024–30. (Scholar)
  • Tuck, R., 2008, Free Riding, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
  • Vallier, K. and F. D’Agostino, 2013, “Public Justification”, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/justification-public/>. (Scholar)
  • Walzer, M., 1984, Spheres of Justice, New York: Basic Books. (Scholar)
  • Westen, D., 2008, The Political Brain, New York: Perseus Books. (Scholar)
  • Westen, D., P.S. Blagov, K. Harenski, C. Kilts, and S Hamann, 2006, “The neural basis of motivated reasoning: An fMRI study of emotional constraints on political judgment during the U.S. Presidential election of 2004”, The Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 18(11): 1947–1958. doi:10.1162/jocn.2006.18.11.1947 (Scholar)

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