Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Weakness of Will" by Sarah Stroud and Larisa Svirsky

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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.

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Adler, J. E., 2002, “Akratic Believing?,” Philosophical Studies, 110(1): 1–27. (Scholar)
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book VII, Chs. 1–10.
Arpaly, N., 2000, “On Acting Rationally Against One’s Better Judgment,” Ethics, 110: 488–513. (Scholar)
Audi, R., 1979, “Weakness of Will and Practical Judgment,” Noûs, 13: 173–196. (Scholar)
–––, 1990, “Weakness of Will and Rational Action,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 68: 270–281. (Scholar)
Austin, J. L., 1956/7, “A Plea for Excuses,” in Austin 1979, pp. 175–204. (Scholar)
–––, 1979, Philosophical Papers, 3^rd ed., J. O. Urmson and G. J. Warnock (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Bennett, J., 1974, “The Conscience of Huckleberry Finn,” Philosophy, 49: 123–134. (Scholar)
Bobonich, C., and Destrée, P. (eds.), 2007, Akrasia in Greek Philosophy: From Socrates to Plotinus, Leiden, Boston: Brill. (Scholar)
Bratman, M., 1979, “Practical Reasoning and Weakness of the Will,” Noûs, 13: 153–171. (Scholar)
Buss, S., 1997, “Weakness of Will,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 78: 13–44. (Scholar)
Charles, D., 2011, “Akrasia: The Rest of the Story?,” in Moral Psychology and Human Action in Aristotle, M. Pakaluk and G. Pearson (eds.), New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 187–210. (Scholar)
Charlton, W., 1988, Weakness of Will, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (Scholar)
Coates, A., 2012, “Rational Epistemic Akrasia,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 49: 113–124. (Scholar)
Davidson, D., 1970, “How Is Weakness of the Will Possible?,” in Davidson 1980, pp. 21–42. (Scholar)
–––, 1978, “Intending,” in Davidson 1980, pp. 83–102. (Scholar)
–––, 1980, Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1982, “Paradoxes of Irrationality,” in Davidson 2004, pp. 169–187. (Scholar)
–––, 2004, Problems of Rationality, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
Dodd, D., 2009, “Weakness of Will as Intention-Violation,” European Journal of Philosophy, 17: 45–59. (Scholar)
Dunn, R., 1987, The Possibility of Weakness of Will, Indianapolis: Hackett. (Scholar)
Feldman, R., 2005, “Respecting the Evidence,” Philosophical Perspectives, 19: 95–119. (Scholar)
Fleming, Patrick, 2010, “Hume on Weakness of Will,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 18: 597–609. (Scholar)
Gosling, J., 1990, Weakness of the Will, London and New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
Greco, D., 2014, “A Puzzle about Epistemic Akrasia,” Philosophical Studies, 167(2): 201–219. (Scholar)
Hare, R. M., 1952, The Language of Morals, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1963, Freedom and Reason, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2001, “Weakness of Will,” in The Encyclopedia of Ethics, 2^nd ed., L. Becker and C. Becker (eds.), New York: Routledge, pp. 1789–1792. (Scholar)
Heather, N., 2016, “Addiction as a Form of Akrasia,” in N. Heather and G. Segal (eds.), Addiction and Choice: Rethinking the Relationship, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 133–148. (Scholar)
Henden, E., 2016, “Addiction, Compulsion, and Weakness of the Will: A Dual-Process Perspective,” in N. Heather and G. Segal (eds.), Addiction and Choice: Rethinking the Relationship, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 116–131. (Scholar)
Hill, T., 1986, “Weakness of Will and Character,” in Hill 1991, pp. 118–137. (Scholar)
–––, 1991, Autonomy and Self-Respect, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Hinchman, E., 2013, “Rational Requirements and ‘Rational’ Akrasia,” Philosophical Studies, 166: 529–552. (Scholar)
Hoffmann, T. (ed.), 2008, Weakness of Will from Plato to the Present, Washington: Catholic University of America Press. (Scholar)
Holton, R., 1999, “Intention and Weakness of Will,” Journal of Philosophy, 96: 241–262. (Scholar)
–––, 2003, “How is Strength of Will Possible?,” in Stroud and Tappolet 2003, pp. 39–67. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, Willing, Wanting, Waiting, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
Holton, R., and May, J., 2012, “What in the World is Weakness of Will?,” Philosophical Studies, 157: 341–360. (Scholar)
Horowitz, S., 2014, “Epistemic Akrasia,” Noûs, 48(4): 718–744. (Scholar)
Hurley, S., 1989, Natural Reasons, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Jackson, F., 1984, “Weakness of Will,” Mind, 93: 1–18. (Scholar)
Jones, K., 2003, “Emotion, Weakness of Will, and the Normative Conception of Agency,” in A. Hatzimoysis (ed.), Philosophy and the Emotions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 181–200. (Scholar)
Kalis, A., 2011, Failures of Agency: Irrational Behavior and Self-Understanding, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. (Scholar)
Kennett, J., 2001, Agency and Responsibility: A Common-Sense Moral Psychology, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
Lasonen-Aarnio, M., 2020, “Enkrasia or Evidentialism? Learning to Love Mismatch,” Philosophical Studies, 177: 597–632. (Scholar)
–––, 2014, “Higher-Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 88(2): 314–345. (Scholar)
Lazar, A., 1999, “Akrasia and the Principle of Continence or What the Tortoise Would Say to Achilles,” in L. E. Hahn (ed.), The Philosophy of Donald Davidson (Library of Living Philosophers, Vol. 27), Chicago: Open Court, pp. 381–401. (Scholar)
Levy, N., 2004, “Epistemic Akrasia and the Subsumption of Evidence: A Reconsideration,” Croatian Journal of Philosophy, 4(10): 149–156. (Scholar)
Marshall, Eugene, 2010, “Spinoza on the Problem of Akrasia,” European Journal of Philosophy, 18: 41–59. (Scholar)
McIntyre, A., 1990, “Is Akratic Action Always Irrational?,” in Identity, Character, and Morality, O. Flanagan and A. Rorty (eds.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 379–400. (Scholar)
–––, 2006, “What Is Wrong With Weakness of Will?,” Journal of Philosophy, 103: 284–311. (Scholar)
Mele, A., 1987, Irrationality, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1991, “Akratic Action and the Practical Role of Better Judgment,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 72: 33–47. (Scholar)
–––, 2002, “Akratics and Addicts,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 39: 153–167. (Scholar)
–––, 2012, Backsliding: Understanding Weakness of Will, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Natali, C. (ed.), 2009, Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Book VII, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Owens, D., 2002, “Epistemic Akrasia,” The Monist, 85(3): 381–397. (Scholar)
Pears, D., 1984, Motivated Irrationality, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
Plato, Protagoras, in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, E. Hamilton and H. Cairns (eds.), Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961, pp. 308–352.
Ribeiro, B., 2011, “Epistemic Akrasia,” International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 1: 18–25. (Scholar)
Rorty, A., 1980, “Where Does the Akratic Break Take Place?,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 58: 333–347. (Scholar)
Saarinen, R., 1994, Weakness of the Will in Medieval Thought: From Augustine to Buridan, Leiden, New York: Brill. (Scholar)
Smith, M., 2003, “Rational Capacities, or: How to Distinguish Recklessness, Weakness, and Compulsion,” in Stroud and Tappolet 2003, pp. 17–38. (Scholar)
Stocker, M., 1979, “Desiring the Bad: An Essay in Moral Psychology,” Journal of Philosophy, 76: 738–753. (Scholar)
Stroud, S., 2003, “Weakness of Will and Practical Judgement,” in Stroud and Tappolet 2003, pp. 121–146. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “Irrationality,” in A Companion to Donald Davidson, E. Lepore and K. Ludwig (eds.), Oxford: John Wiley & Sons, pp. 489–505. (Scholar)
Stroud, S., and Tappolet, C. (eds.), 2003, Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
Tappolet, C., 2003, “Emotions and the Intelligibility of Akratic Action,” in Stroud and Tappolet 2003, pp. 97–120. (Scholar)
Tenenbaum, S., 1999, “The Judgment of a Weak Will,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 59: 875–911. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, Appearances of the Good: An Essay on the Nature of Practical Reason, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Thero, D., 2006, Understanding Moral Weakness, Amsterdam, New York: Rodopi. (Scholar)
Walker, A., 1989, “The Problem of Weakness of Will,” Noûs, 23: 653–676. (Scholar)
Wallace, R. J., 1999, “Addiction as Defect of the Will: Some Philosophical Reflections,” Law and Philosophy, 18: 621–654. (Scholar)
Watson, G., 1977, “Skepticism About Weakness of Will,” Philosophical Review, 86: 316–339. (Scholar)
Weatherson, B., 2019, Normative Externalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Wedgwood, R., 2011, “Justified Inference,” Synthese, 189(2): 1–23. (Scholar)
Wiggins, D., 1979, “Weakness of Will, Commensurability, and the Objects of Deliberation and Desire,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 79: 251–277. (Scholar)
Wilkerson, T. E., 1997, Irrational Action: A Philosophical Analysis, Aldershot: Ashgate. (Scholar)

Generated Mon May 12 08:33:54 2025

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