Fletcher (2016a) is an excellent introduction to the philosophy of well-being; for a very clear overview, see Hooker (2015). Some significant recent works are Griffin (1986) and Finnis (2011), which present different objective lists; Goldman (2018), which develops a view of well-being as consisting in the fulfillment of rational desire, Sobel 2016, which defends a broadly subjective view of well-being; Feldman (2004) and Crisp (2006), which defend hedonism; Sumner (1996), which rejects many current options and advocates a theory of well-being based on the idea of ‘life-satisfaction’; Kraut (2007), which develops a broadly Aristotelian account; and Haybron (2008), Tiberius (2008), and Alexandrova (2017) which address issues that arise in contemporary psychological research on happiness. A collection of extremely useful essays is Fletcher (2016b). See also Nussbaum and Sen (1993).

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