Primary literature

• 1933a, “The A Priori Argument for Subjectivism,” The Monist, 43(2): 173–202. (Scholar)
• 1933b, “Ethics as Pure Postulate,” Philosophical Review, 42(4): 399–411. (Scholar)
• 1934a, “The Inductive Argument for Subjectivism,” The Monist, 44(1): 80–107. (Scholar)
• 1934b, “The Argument for Realism,” The Monist, 44(2): 186–209. (Scholar)
• 1938, “The Realistic Analysis of Scientific Sentences,” Erkenntnis, 7: 169–178, 375–82. (Scholar)
• 1947, The Ground of Induction, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
• 1951, “The Myth of Passage,” Journal of Philosophy, 48(15): 457–472 (reprinted in American Philosophers at Work: The Philosophic Scene in the United States, S. Hook (ed.), New York: Criterion Books, pp 315–331). (Scholar)
• 1952, “Professor Carnap’s Philosophy of Probability,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 13(1): 103–21. (Scholar)
• 1953, “On the Direct Probability of Inductions,” Mind, 62(248): 465–83. (Scholar)
• 1958, “Form and Matter,” Philosophical Review, 67(3): 291–312, 499–521. (Scholar)
• 1959, “Philosophy and Psychoanalysis,” in Psychoanalysis, Scientific Method, and Philosophy; a Symposium, S. Hook (ed.), New York: New York University Press. pp. 157–79. [Williams 1959 available online] (Scholar)
• 1962, “Dispensing With Existence,” Journal of Philosophy, 59(23): 748–62. (Scholar)
• 1963, “Necessary Facts,” The Review of Metaphysics, 16(4): 601–26. (Scholar)
• 1966, Principles of Empirical Realism: Philosophical Essays, H. Ruja (ed.), Springfield, Illinois: C. C. Thomas. [Seventeen selected essays covering the period 1932–1959. Contains a comprehensive Bibliography for Williams’ work covering 1923–1965.]
• 1986, “Universals and Existents,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 64(1): 1–14. (Scholar)
• 2018, The Elements and Patterns of Being: Essays in Metaphysics, A.R.J. Fisher (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Twelve selected essays including the previously unpublished “Universal Concepts and Particular Processes” (1962), “The Duty of Philosophy” (c. 1965), “The Nature of Time” (1966), “The Shape of Time” (1968), “How Reality is Reasonable” (1974) and “The Bugbear of Fate” (1974), with a comprehensive introduction.] (Scholar)

The Donald Williams papers, containing a substantial quantity of unpublished material, are in the archives of Harvard University. They include most of the text of a treatise on Logic, in the tradition of J. M. Keynes, expounding the various species of judgment and inference, rather than the systematic axiomatizations of deductive inference, and the metalogic, which superseded that tradition.

Secondary Literature

• Armstrong, David Malet, 1978, Universals and Scientific Realism (I: Nominalism and Realism), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
• –––, 1989, Universals, An Opinionated Introduction, Boulder, CO: Westview Press. (Scholar)
• –––, 2005, “Four Disputes about Properties,” Synthese, 144: 309–320. (Scholar)
• Cameron, Ross, 2006, “Tropes, Necessary Connections, and Non-Transferability,” Dialectica, 60: 99–113. (Scholar)
• Campbell, Keith, 1981, “The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars,” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy VI: The Foundations of Analytical Philosophy, P. French et al. (eds.), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp 477–88 (Scholar)
• –––, 1990, Abstract Particulars Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (Scholar)
• Campbell, Scott, 2001, “Fixing a Hole in the Ground of Induction,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 79: 553–563. (Scholar)
• Campbell, Scott and James Franklin, 2004, “Randomness and the Justification of Induction,” Synthese, 138: 79–99. (Scholar)
• Casullo, Albert, 1988, “A Fourth Version of Bundle Theory,” Philosophical Studies, 54: 125–139. (Scholar)
• Daly, Christopher, 1997, “Tropes,” in D. H. Mellor & A. Oliver (eds.), Properties, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Denkel, Arda, 1997, “On the Compresence of Tropes,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 57: 599–606 (Scholar)
• Edwards, Paul, 1949, “Russell’s Doubts About Induction,” Mind, 58: 141–163. (Scholar)
• Ehring, D., 2011, Tropes: Properties, Objects, and Mental Causation, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Firth, Roderick, Robert Nozick, and W. V. Quine, 1983, “Memorial minute of Donald Cary Williams,” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 57: 245–248. (Scholar)
• Fisher, A.R.J., 2015, “David Lewis, Donald C. Williams, and the History of Metaphysics in the Twentieth Century,” Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 1(1): 3–22. (Scholar)
• –––, 2017, “Donald C. Williams’s Defence of Real Metaphysics,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 25: 332–355. (Scholar)
• Hochberg, H., 1988, “A Refutation of Moderate Nominalism,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 66: 188–207. (Scholar)
• Hakkarainen, J. and M. Keinänen, 2017, “The Ontological Form of Tropes – Refuting Douglas Ehring’s Main Argument Against Standard Trope Nominalism,” Philosophia, 45: 647–658. (Scholar)
• Labossiere, Michael, 1993, “Swapped Tropes,” The Personalist, 74: 258–264. (Scholar)
• Lange, Marc, 2011, “Hume and the Problem of Induction,” in Handbook of the History of Logic, vol. 10: Inductive Logic, D.M. Gabbay, J. Woods and S. Harmann (eds.), Amsterdam: North Holland, pp 43–92, section 10. (Scholar)
• Lewis, David, 1983, “New Work for a Theory of Universals,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61: 343–377. (Scholar)
• Maher, P., 1996, “The Hole in the Ground of Induction,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74: 423–432. (Scholar)
• Martin, Charles Burton, 1980, “Substance Substantiated,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 58: 3–10. (Scholar)
• Maurin, Anna-Sofia, 2002, If Tropes, Dordrecht: Kluwer. (Scholar)
• –––, 2005, “Same but different,” Metaphysica, 6: 131–146. (Scholar)
• –––, 2010, “Trope theory and the Bradley Regress,” Synthese, 175: 311–326. (Scholar)
• McGrew, Timothy, 2003, “Direct Inference and the Problem of Induction,” in Probability is the Very Guide of Life: the philosophical uses of chance, H. E. Kyburg and M. Thalos (eds.), Peru, IL: Open Court, pp 33–60. (Scholar)
• Moreland, J. P., 1985, Universals, Qualities, and Quality-Instances: A Defense of Realism, Lanham: University Press of America. (Scholar)
• –––, 2001, Universals, Chesham: Acumen. (Scholar)
• O’Leary-Hawthorne, John and J. A. Cover, 1998, “A World of Universals,” Philosophical Studies, 91: 205–219. (Scholar)
• Oliver, Alex, 1996, “The Metaphysics of Properties,” Mind, 105: 1–80. (Scholar)
• Popper, Karl, 1959, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, London: Hutchinson. (Scholar)
• Reichenbach, Hans, 1945, “Reply to Donald C. Williams’ Criticism of the Frequency Theory of Probability,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 5: 508–512. (Scholar)
• Russell, Bertrand, 1912, The Problems of Philosophy, London: Williams and Norgate, pp 93–108. (Scholar)
• Schaffer, Jonathan, 2001, “The Individuation of Tropes,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 79: 247–257. (Scholar)
• –––, 2003, “The Problem of Free Mass: Must Properties Cluster?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 66: 125–38. (Scholar)
• Simons, Peter, 1994, “Particulars in Particular Clothing: Three Trope Theories of Substance,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 54: 553–575. (Scholar)
• Stove, D. C., 1986, The Rationality of Induction, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
• Strawson, P. F., 1952, “The ‘Justification’ of Induction,” in Introduction to Logical Theory, New York: Wiley & Sons, pp. 248–263. (Scholar)
• Will, Frederick L., 1948, “Donald Williams’ Theory of Induction,” Philosophical Review, 57: 231–47. (Scholar)