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The PhilPapers Surveys
Preliminary Survey results
(
Back to contents
)
Note: set response grain to "fine" for details on "other" responses.
Population
AOS
Response details
All respondents
Target faculty
Philosophy faculty or PhD
Philosophy faculty/PhD, non-target
Philosophy graduate student
Philosophy undergraduate
No philosophy affiliation listed
All respondents
17th/18th Century Philosophy
19th Century Philosophy
20th Century Philosophy
Aesthetics
African/Africana Philosophy
Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy
Applied Ethics
Arts and Humanities
Asian Philosophy
Cognitive Sciences
Continental Philosophy
Decision Theory
Epistemology
Formal Sciences
General Philosophy of Science
Logic and Philosophy of Logic
Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy
Meta-Ethics
Metaphilosophy
Metaphysics
Natural Sciences
Normative Ethics
Philosophy of Action
Philosophy of Biology
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Philosophy of Computing and Information
Philosophy of Gender, Race, and Sexuality
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Law
Philosophy of Mathematics
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Physical Science
Philosophy of Probability
Philosophy of Religion
Philosophy of Social Science
Philosophy of the Americas
Philosophy, General Works
Philosophy, Introductions and Anthologies
Professional Areas
Social and Political Philosophy
Social Sciences
Teaching Philosophy
coarse
medium
fine
A priori knowledge: yes or no?
Accept: yes
13 / 31 (41.9%)
Lean toward: yes
7 / 31 (22.6%)
The question is too unclear to answer
3 / 31 (9.7%)
Lean toward: no
3 / 31 (9.7%)
Accept: no
2 / 31 (6.5%)
Agnostic/undecided
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Insufficiently familiar with the issue
1 / 31 (3.2%)
There is no fact of the matter
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Abstract objects: Platonism or nominalism?
Lean toward: nominalism
11 / 31 (35.5%)
Lean toward: Platonism
6 / 31 (19.4%)
Accept: nominalism
4 / 31 (12.9%)
Insufficiently familiar with the issue
3 / 31 (9.7%)
Accept: Platonism
3 / 31 (9.7%)
Agnostic/undecided
2 / 31 (6.5%)
Accept another alternative
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Reject both
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Aesthetic value: objective or subjective?
Lean toward: subjective
11 / 31 (35.5%)
Lean toward: objective
8 / 31 (25.8%)
Accept: subjective
6 / 31 (19.4%)
Insufficiently familiar with the issue
1 / 31 (3.2%)
There is no fact of the matter
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Accept: objective
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Accept another alternative
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Accept an intermediate view
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Agnostic/undecided
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes or no?
Accept: yes
12 / 31 (38.7%)
Lean toward: yes
9 / 31 (29.0%)
Lean toward: no
6 / 31 (19.4%)
Accept: no
3 / 31 (9.7%)
Accept an intermediate view
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Epistemic justification: internalism or externalism?
Lean toward: externalism
11 / 31 (35.5%)
Lean toward: internalism
4 / 31 (12.9%)
Accept: internalism
4 / 31 (12.9%)
Accept an intermediate view
3 / 31 (9.7%)
Accept: externalism
2 / 31 (6.5%)
Accept both
2 / 31 (6.5%)
Insufficiently familiar with the issue
2 / 31 (6.5%)
There is no fact of the matter
1 / 31 (3.2%)
The question is too unclear to answer
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Skip
1 / 31 (3.2%)
External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism?
Accept: non-skeptical realism
23 / 31 (74.2%)
Lean toward: non-skeptical realism
5 / 31 (16.1%)
Accept: skepticism
2 / 31 (6.5%)
Lean toward: skepticism
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism, or no free will?
Accept: compatibilism
14 / 31 (45.2%)
Lean toward: compatibilism
9 / 31 (29.0%)
Lean toward: no free will
3 / 31 (9.7%)
Reject one, undecided between others
2 / 31 (6.5%)
Accept: libertarianism
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Accept: no free will
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Lean toward: libertarianism
1 / 31 (3.2%)
God: theism or atheism?
Accept: atheism
24 / 31 (77.4%)
Lean toward: theism
2 / 31 (6.5%)
Agnostic/undecided
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Accept: theism
1 / 31 (3.2%)
There is no fact of the matter
1 / 31 (3.2%)
The question is too unclear to answer
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Lean toward: atheism
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism, or invariantism?
Lean toward: contextualism
7 / 31 (22.6%)
Lean toward: invariantism
5 / 31 (16.1%)
Agnostic/undecided
5 / 31 (16.1%)
Insufficiently familiar with the issue
5 / 31 (16.1%)
Accept: relativism
2 / 31 (6.5%)
Accept: invariantism
2 / 31 (6.5%)
There is no fact of the matter
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Reject one, undecided between others
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Accept: contextualism
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Skip
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Lean toward: relativism
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Knowledge: empiricism or rationalism?
Accept: empiricism
9 / 31 (29.0%)
The question is too unclear to answer
6 / 31 (19.4%)
Lean toward: empiricism
3 / 31 (9.7%)
Accept: rationalism
2 / 31 (6.5%)
Accept another alternative
2 / 31 (6.5%)
Accept both
2 / 31 (6.5%)
Insufficiently familiar with the issue
2 / 31 (6.5%)
Lean toward: rationalism
2 / 31 (6.5%)
Accept an intermediate view
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Reject both
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Agnostic/undecided
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Laws of nature: Humean or non-Humean?
Lean toward: Humean
9 / 31 (29.0%)
Lean toward: non-Humean
7 / 31 (22.6%)
Accept: non-Humean
6 / 31 (19.4%)
Accept: Humean
6 / 31 (19.4%)
Agnostic/undecided
2 / 31 (6.5%)
Skip
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Logic: classical or non-classical?
Accept: classical
11 / 31 (35.5%)
Lean toward: classical
5 / 31 (16.1%)
Accept: non-classical
4 / 31 (12.9%)
Accept both
4 / 31 (12.9%)
There is no fact of the matter
2 / 31 (6.5%)
Lean toward: non-classical
2 / 31 (6.5%)
Agnostic/undecided
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Insufficiently familiar with the issue
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Skip
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Mental content: internalism or externalism?
Lean toward: externalism
10 / 31 (32.3%)
Accept: externalism
7 / 31 (22.6%)
Lean toward: internalism
4 / 31 (12.9%)
Accept: internalism
3 / 31 (9.7%)
Insufficiently familiar with the issue
2 / 31 (6.5%)
The question is too unclear to answer
2 / 31 (6.5%)
Accept an intermediate view
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Accept both
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Skip
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Meta-ethics: moral realism or moral anti-realism?
Lean toward: moral realism
9 / 31 (29.0%)
Accept: moral anti-realism
8 / 31 (25.8%)
Accept: moral realism
6 / 31 (19.4%)
Lean toward: moral anti-realism
5 / 31 (16.1%)
Agnostic/undecided
2 / 31 (6.5%)
Reject both
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Metaphilosophy: naturalism or non-naturalism?
Accept: naturalism
16 / 31 (51.6%)
Lean toward: naturalism
4 / 31 (12.9%)
Accept: non-naturalism
3 / 31 (9.7%)
The question is too unclear to answer
3 / 31 (9.7%)
Lean toward: non-naturalism
3 / 31 (9.7%)
Skip
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Insufficiently familiar with the issue
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Mind: physicalism or non-physicalism?
Accept: physicalism
19 / 31 (61.3%)
Lean toward: physicalism
8 / 31 (25.8%)
Accept: non-physicalism
2 / 31 (6.5%)
The question is too unclear to answer
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Lean toward: non-physicalism
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Moral judgment: cognitivism or non-cognitivism?
Accept: cognitivism
10 / 31 (32.3%)
Lean toward: cognitivism
7 / 31 (22.6%)
Lean toward: non-cognitivism
4 / 31 (12.9%)
Accept: non-cognitivism
3 / 31 (9.7%)
Accept an intermediate view
2 / 31 (6.5%)
Insufficiently familiar with the issue
2 / 31 (6.5%)
The question is too unclear to answer
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Accept another alternative
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Accept both
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Moral motivation: internalism or externalism?
Accept: internalism
8 / 31 (25.8%)
Insufficiently familiar with the issue
7 / 31 (22.6%)
Lean toward: externalism
6 / 31 (19.4%)
Lean toward: internalism
5 / 31 (16.1%)
Accept: externalism
2 / 31 (6.5%)
The question is too unclear to answer
2 / 31 (6.5%)
Agnostic/undecided
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Newcomb's problem: one box or two boxes?
Accept: two boxes
13 / 31 (41.9%)
Accept: one box
7 / 31 (22.6%)
Lean toward: two boxes
6 / 31 (19.4%)
Other
2 / 31 (6.5%)
Agnostic/undecided
2 / 31 (6.5%)
Lean toward: one box
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism, or virtue ethics?
Accept: consequentialism
9 / 31 (29.0%)
Lean toward: consequentialism
9 / 31 (29.0%)
Lean toward: virtue ethics
3 / 31 (9.7%)
Lean toward: deontology
2 / 31 (6.5%)
Accept: deontology
2 / 31 (6.5%)
Accept an intermediate view
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Reject all
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Accept more than one
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Agnostic/undecided
1 / 31 (3.2%)
There is no fact of the matter
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Accept another alternative
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism, or sense-datum theory?
Insufficiently familiar with the issue
9 / 31 (29.0%)
Lean toward: representationalism
6 / 31 (19.4%)
Lean toward: qualia theory
3 / 31 (9.7%)
Agnostic/undecided
3 / 31 (9.7%)
Accept: representationalism
2 / 31 (6.5%)
Reject one or two, undecided between others
2 / 31 (6.5%)
Accept more than one
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Skip
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Accept: qualia theory
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Lean toward: sense-datum theory
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Accept: sense-datum theory
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Reject all
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view, or further-fact view?
Lean toward: psychological view
11 / 31 (35.5%)
There is no fact of the matter
3 / 31 (9.7%)
Lean toward: biological view
3 / 31 (9.7%)
Accept: biological view
3 / 31 (9.7%)
Accept: psychological view
2 / 31 (6.5%)
Accept: further-fact view
2 / 31 (6.5%)
Agnostic/undecided
2 / 31 (6.5%)
Insufficiently familiar with the issue
2 / 31 (6.5%)
Accept an intermediate view
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Accept more than one
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Skip
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism, or libertarianism?
Lean toward: egalitarianism
7 / 31 (22.6%)
Insufficiently familiar with the issue
6 / 31 (19.4%)
Accept: egalitarianism
4 / 31 (12.9%)
Reject all
3 / 31 (9.7%)
Accept an intermediate view
2 / 31 (6.5%)
Accept more than one
2 / 31 (6.5%)
Lean toward: libertarianism
2 / 31 (6.5%)
Accept another alternative
2 / 31 (6.5%)
Lean toward: communitarianism
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Reject one, undecided between others
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Agnostic/undecided
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Proper names: Fregean or Millian?
Lean toward: Millian
6 / 31 (19.4%)
Insufficiently familiar with the issue
6 / 31 (19.4%)
Lean toward: Fregean
5 / 31 (16.1%)
Accept: Fregean
3 / 31 (9.7%)
Accept: Millian
2 / 31 (6.5%)
Reject both
2 / 31 (6.5%)
Accept both
2 / 31 (6.5%)
Agnostic/undecided
2 / 31 (6.5%)
Accept another alternative
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Accept an intermediate view
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Skip
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Science: scientific realism or scientific anti-realism?
Accept: scientific realism
13 / 31 (41.9%)
Lean toward: scientific realism
11 / 31 (35.5%)
Lean toward: scientific anti-realism
3 / 31 (9.7%)
Accept an intermediate view
2 / 31 (6.5%)
Insufficiently familiar with the issue
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Accept another alternative
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Teletransporter (new matter): survival or death?
Lean toward: survival
6 / 31 (19.4%)
There is no fact of the matter
6 / 31 (19.4%)
Accept: survival
5 / 31 (16.1%)
Accept: death
4 / 31 (12.9%)
Lean toward: death
4 / 31 (12.9%)
Insufficiently familiar with the issue
2 / 31 (6.5%)
Skip
2 / 31 (6.5%)
Agnostic/undecided
1 / 31 (3.2%)
The question is too unclear to answer
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Time: A-theory or B-theory?
Insufficiently familiar with the issue
10 / 31 (32.3%)
Accept: B-theory
8 / 31 (25.8%)
Skip
3 / 31 (9.7%)
Lean toward: B-theory
2 / 31 (6.5%)
Agnostic/undecided
2 / 31 (6.5%)
Accept: A-theory
2 / 31 (6.5%)
Accept an intermediate view
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Reject both
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Accept both
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Other
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch or don't switch?
Accept: switch
20 / 31 (64.5%)
Lean toward: switch
4 / 31 (12.9%)
There is no fact of the matter
2 / 31 (6.5%)
The question is too unclear to answer
2 / 31 (6.5%)
Lean toward: don't switch
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Agnostic/undecided
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Insufficiently familiar with the issue
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Truth: correspondence, deflationary, or epistemic?
Accept: correspondence
8 / 31 (25.8%)
Lean toward: deflationary
8 / 31 (25.8%)
Lean toward: correspondence
7 / 31 (22.6%)
Lean toward: epistemic
2 / 31 (6.5%)
Accept: deflationary
1 / 31 (3.2%)
The question is too unclear to answer
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Accept more than one
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Accept: epistemic
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Other
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Agnostic/undecided
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible, or metaphysically possible?
Accept: conceivable but not metaphysically possible
9 / 31 (29.0%)
Lean toward: inconceivable
6 / 31 (19.4%)
Lean toward: conceivable but not metaphysically possible
6 / 31 (19.4%)
Accept: metaphysically possible
2 / 31 (6.5%)
Insufficiently familiar with the issue
2 / 31 (6.5%)
The question is too unclear to answer
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Reject one, undecided between others
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Accept: inconceivable
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Lean toward: metaphysically possible
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Other
1 / 31 (3.2%)
Agnostic/undecided
1 / 31 (3.2%)
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