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The PhilPapers Surveys
Preliminary Survey results
(
Back to contents
)
Note: set response grain to "fine" for details on "other" responses.
Population
AOS
Response details
All respondents
Target faculty
Philosophy faculty or PhD
Philosophy faculty/PhD, non-target
Philosophy graduate student
Philosophy undergraduate
No philosophy affiliation listed
All respondents
17th/18th Century Philosophy
19th Century Philosophy
20th Century Philosophy
Aesthetics
African/Africana Philosophy
Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy
Applied Ethics
Arts and Humanities
Asian Philosophy
Cognitive Sciences
Continental Philosophy
Decision Theory
Epistemology
Formal Sciences
General Philosophy of Science
Logic and Philosophy of Logic
Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy
Meta-Ethics
Metaphilosophy
Metaphysics
Natural Sciences
Normative Ethics
Philosophy of Action
Philosophy of Biology
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Philosophy of Computing and Information
Philosophy of Gender, Race, and Sexuality
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Law
Philosophy of Mathematics
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Physical Science
Philosophy of Probability
Philosophy of Religion
Philosophy of Social Science
Philosophy of the Americas
Philosophy, General Works
Philosophy, Introductions and Anthologies
Professional Areas
Social and Political Philosophy
Social Sciences
Teaching Philosophy
coarse
medium
fine
A priori knowledge: yes or no?
Accept: yes
112 / 191 (58.6%)
Lean toward: yes
34 / 191 (17.8%)
Lean toward: no
14 / 191 (7.3%)
Accept: no
14 / 191 (7.3%)
The question is too unclear to answer
9 / 191 (4.7%)
Agnostic/undecided
3 / 191 (1.6%)
Accept an intermediate view
2 / 191 (1.0%)
Accept another alternative
1 / 191 (0.5%)
Skip
1 / 191 (0.5%)
Other
1 / 191 (0.5%)
Abstract objects: Platonism or nominalism?
Accept: Platonism
42 / 191 (22.0%)
Lean toward: Platonism
40 / 191 (20.9%)
Lean toward: nominalism
35 / 191 (18.3%)
Accept: nominalism
27 / 191 (14.1%)
Agnostic/undecided
12 / 191 (6.3%)
Accept another alternative
8 / 191 (4.2%)
Reject both
8 / 191 (4.2%)
Accept an intermediate view
7 / 191 (3.7%)
The question is too unclear to answer
4 / 191 (2.1%)
Insufficiently familiar with the issue
3 / 191 (1.6%)
There is no fact of the matter
3 / 191 (1.6%)
Other
1 / 191 (0.5%)
Skip
1 / 191 (0.5%)
Aesthetic value: objective or subjective?
Lean toward: objective
46 / 191 (24.1%)
Lean toward: subjective
43 / 191 (22.5%)
Accept: objective
29 / 191 (15.2%)
Accept: subjective
28 / 191 (14.7%)
Accept an intermediate view
13 / 191 (6.8%)
The question is too unclear to answer
9 / 191 (4.7%)
Insufficiently familiar with the issue
7 / 191 (3.7%)
Agnostic/undecided
6 / 191 (3.1%)
Accept both
5 / 191 (2.6%)
Accept another alternative
3 / 191 (1.6%)
Skip
1 / 191 (0.5%)
There is no fact of the matter
1 / 191 (0.5%)
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes or no?
Accept: yes
76 / 191 (39.8%)
Lean toward: yes
51 / 191 (26.7%)
Accept: no
28 / 191 (14.7%)
Lean toward: no
26 / 191 (13.6%)
The question is too unclear to answer
4 / 191 (2.1%)
Agnostic/undecided
3 / 191 (1.6%)
Accept another alternative
2 / 191 (1.0%)
Accept an intermediate view
1 / 191 (0.5%)
Epistemic justification: internalism or externalism?
Lean toward: externalism
50 / 191 (26.2%)
Accept: externalism
38 / 191 (19.9%)
Lean toward: internalism
25 / 191 (13.1%)
Accept: internalism
25 / 191 (13.1%)
Accept an intermediate view
20 / 191 (10.5%)
Agnostic/undecided
7 / 191 (3.7%)
The question is too unclear to answer
6 / 191 (3.1%)
Accept both
5 / 191 (2.6%)
Accept another alternative
5 / 191 (2.6%)
Reject both
3 / 191 (1.6%)
Insufficiently familiar with the issue
3 / 191 (1.6%)
Skip
2 / 191 (1.0%)
There is no fact of the matter
1 / 191 (0.5%)
Other
1 / 191 (0.5%)
External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism?
Accept: non-skeptical realism
137 / 191 (71.7%)
Lean toward: non-skeptical realism
30 / 191 (15.7%)
Accept another alternative
6 / 191 (3.1%)
Lean toward: skepticism
4 / 191 (2.1%)
Accept: skepticism
3 / 191 (1.6%)
Reject all
2 / 191 (1.0%)
The question is too unclear to answer
2 / 191 (1.0%)
Other
2 / 191 (1.0%)
Lean toward: idealism
1 / 191 (0.5%)
Agnostic/undecided
1 / 191 (0.5%)
Accept: idealism
1 / 191 (0.5%)
There is no fact of the matter
1 / 191 (0.5%)
Accept an intermediate view
1 / 191 (0.5%)
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism, or no free will?
Accept: compatibilism
68 / 191 (35.6%)
Lean toward: compatibilism
49 / 191 (25.7%)
Lean toward: no free will
14 / 191 (7.3%)
Accept: no free will
14 / 191 (7.3%)
Lean toward: libertarianism
12 / 191 (6.3%)
Agnostic/undecided
11 / 191 (5.8%)
Accept: libertarianism
9 / 191 (4.7%)
The question is too unclear to answer
4 / 191 (2.1%)
Accept another alternative
2 / 191 (1.0%)
Accept an intermediate view
2 / 191 (1.0%)
Insufficiently familiar with the issue
2 / 191 (1.0%)
Accept more than one
1 / 191 (0.5%)
There is no fact of the matter
1 / 191 (0.5%)
Skip
1 / 191 (0.5%)
Reject one, undecided between others
1 / 191 (0.5%)
God: theism or atheism?
Accept: atheism
132 / 191 (69.1%)
Lean toward: atheism
25 / 191 (13.1%)
Accept: theism
13 / 191 (6.8%)
Agnostic/undecided
7 / 191 (3.7%)
Skip
5 / 191 (2.6%)
Accept an intermediate view
3 / 191 (1.6%)
Lean toward: theism
2 / 191 (1.0%)
Accept another alternative
2 / 191 (1.0%)
Reject both
1 / 191 (0.5%)
The question is too unclear to answer
1 / 191 (0.5%)
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism, or invariantism?
Lean toward: invariantism
51 / 191 (26.7%)
Lean toward: contextualism
44 / 191 (23.0%)
Accept: invariantism
32 / 191 (16.8%)
Accept: contextualism
24 / 191 (12.6%)
Insufficiently familiar with the issue
15 / 191 (7.9%)
Agnostic/undecided
9 / 191 (4.7%)
The question is too unclear to answer
4 / 191 (2.1%)
Accept an intermediate view
3 / 191 (1.6%)
Reject one, undecided between others
2 / 191 (1.0%)
Accept another alternative
2 / 191 (1.0%)
There is no fact of the matter
1 / 191 (0.5%)
Other
1 / 191 (0.5%)
Lean toward: relativism
1 / 191 (0.5%)
Accept: relativism
1 / 191 (0.5%)
Reject all
1 / 191 (0.5%)
Knowledge: empiricism or rationalism?
Lean toward: empiricism
40 / 191 (20.9%)
Lean toward: rationalism
29 / 191 (15.2%)
Accept an intermediate view
26 / 191 (13.6%)
The question is too unclear to answer
23 / 191 (12.0%)
Accept: rationalism
23 / 191 (12.0%)
Accept: empiricism
21 / 191 (11.0%)
Accept both
17 / 191 (8.9%)
Reject both
7 / 191 (3.7%)
Accept another alternative
5 / 191 (2.6%)
Laws of nature: Humean or non-Humean?
Accept: non-Humean
64 / 191 (33.5%)
Lean toward: non-Humean
62 / 191 (32.5%)
Lean toward: Humean
22 / 191 (11.5%)
Agnostic/undecided
16 / 191 (8.4%)
Accept: Humean
10 / 191 (5.2%)
Insufficiently familiar with the issue
10 / 191 (5.2%)
The question is too unclear to answer
2 / 191 (1.0%)
Accept another alternative
2 / 191 (1.0%)
Skip
1 / 191 (0.5%)
Accept both
1 / 191 (0.5%)
There is no fact of the matter
1 / 191 (0.5%)
Logic: classical or non-classical?
Accept: classical
56 / 191 (29.3%)
Lean toward: classical
48 / 191 (25.1%)
Lean toward: non-classical
18 / 191 (9.4%)
Insufficiently familiar with the issue
17 / 191 (8.9%)
Agnostic/undecided
15 / 191 (7.9%)
Accept: non-classical
15 / 191 (7.9%)
Accept both
11 / 191 (5.8%)
There is no fact of the matter
5 / 191 (2.6%)
The question is too unclear to answer
2 / 191 (1.0%)
Accept an intermediate view
2 / 191 (1.0%)
Skip
1 / 191 (0.5%)
Other
1 / 191 (0.5%)
Mental content: internalism or externalism?
Accept: externalism
71 / 191 (37.2%)
Lean toward: externalism
37 / 191 (19.4%)
Accept: internalism
21 / 191 (11.0%)
Accept both
17 / 191 (8.9%)
Accept an intermediate view
15 / 191 (7.9%)
Lean toward: internalism
13 / 191 (6.8%)
Accept another alternative
9 / 191 (4.7%)
Reject both
2 / 191 (1.0%)
Agnostic/undecided
2 / 191 (1.0%)
There is no fact of the matter
2 / 191 (1.0%)
Other
1 / 191 (0.5%)
The question is too unclear to answer
1 / 191 (0.5%)
Meta-ethics: moral realism or moral anti-realism?
Accept: moral realism
62 / 191 (32.5%)
Lean toward: moral realism
58 / 191 (30.4%)
Lean toward: moral anti-realism
23 / 191 (12.0%)
Accept: moral anti-realism
19 / 191 (9.9%)
Insufficiently familiar with the issue
9 / 191 (4.7%)
Accept an intermediate view
7 / 191 (3.7%)
Agnostic/undecided
6 / 191 (3.1%)
The question is too unclear to answer
3 / 191 (1.6%)
Accept another alternative
2 / 191 (1.0%)
Skip
1 / 191 (0.5%)
There is no fact of the matter
1 / 191 (0.5%)
Metaphilosophy: naturalism or non-naturalism?
Accept: naturalism
89 / 191 (46.6%)
Lean toward: naturalism
24 / 191 (12.6%)
The question is too unclear to answer
22 / 191 (11.5%)
Accept: non-naturalism
20 / 191 (10.5%)
Lean toward: non-naturalism
14 / 191 (7.3%)
Agnostic/undecided
6 / 191 (3.1%)
Insufficiently familiar with the issue
6 / 191 (3.1%)
Skip
3 / 191 (1.6%)
Accept an intermediate view
2 / 191 (1.0%)
Reject both
2 / 191 (1.0%)
Accept another alternative
2 / 191 (1.0%)
Accept both
1 / 191 (0.5%)
Mind: physicalism or non-physicalism?
Accept: physicalism
81 / 191 (42.4%)
Lean toward: physicalism
36 / 191 (18.8%)
Accept: non-physicalism
28 / 191 (14.7%)
Lean toward: non-physicalism
14 / 191 (7.3%)
The question is too unclear to answer
14 / 191 (7.3%)
Accept another alternative
5 / 191 (2.6%)
Accept an intermediate view
5 / 191 (2.6%)
Agnostic/undecided
4 / 191 (2.1%)
Reject both
2 / 191 (1.0%)
Skip
1 / 191 (0.5%)
There is no fact of the matter
1 / 191 (0.5%)
Moral judgment: cognitivism or non-cognitivism?
Accept: cognitivism
73 / 191 (38.2%)
Lean toward: cognitivism
55 / 191 (28.8%)
Lean toward: non-cognitivism
27 / 191 (14.1%)
Accept an intermediate view
9 / 191 (4.7%)
Accept: non-cognitivism
8 / 191 (4.2%)
Insufficiently familiar with the issue
5 / 191 (2.6%)
Accept another alternative
4 / 191 (2.1%)
Agnostic/undecided
3 / 191 (1.6%)
The question is too unclear to answer
3 / 191 (1.6%)
Skip
2 / 191 (1.0%)
Accept both
2 / 191 (1.0%)
Moral motivation: internalism or externalism?
Lean toward: internalism
45 / 191 (23.6%)
Lean toward: externalism
32 / 191 (16.8%)
Accept: internalism
31 / 191 (16.2%)
Insufficiently familiar with the issue
28 / 191 (14.7%)
Accept: externalism
28 / 191 (14.7%)
Agnostic/undecided
9 / 191 (4.7%)
The question is too unclear to answer
9 / 191 (4.7%)
Accept an intermediate view
3 / 191 (1.6%)
Accept both
3 / 191 (1.6%)
Skip
2 / 191 (1.0%)
Reject both
1 / 191 (0.5%)
Newcomb's problem: one box or two boxes?
Insufficiently familiar with the issue
52 / 191 (27.2%)
Accept: two boxes
34 / 191 (17.8%)
Agnostic/undecided
29 / 191 (15.2%)
Lean toward: one box
20 / 191 (10.5%)
Lean toward: two boxes
20 / 191 (10.5%)
Accept: one box
18 / 191 (9.4%)
Skip
10 / 191 (5.2%)
The question is too unclear to answer
3 / 191 (1.6%)
Accept another alternative
2 / 191 (1.0%)
Other
1 / 191 (0.5%)
Reject both
1 / 191 (0.5%)
There is no fact of the matter
1 / 191 (0.5%)
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism, or virtue ethics?
Lean toward: deontology
33 / 191 (17.3%)
Lean toward: consequentialism
33 / 191 (17.3%)
Lean toward: virtue ethics
23 / 191 (12.0%)
Accept more than one
19 / 191 (9.9%)
Agnostic/undecided
15 / 191 (7.9%)
Accept: consequentialism
14 / 191 (7.3%)
Accept: deontology
13 / 191 (6.8%)
Accept an intermediate view
9 / 191 (4.7%)
Accept: virtue ethics
8 / 191 (4.2%)
Accept another alternative
6 / 191 (3.1%)
Insufficiently familiar with the issue
6 / 191 (3.1%)
Reject all
5 / 191 (2.6%)
Skip
3 / 191 (1.6%)
The question is too unclear to answer
1 / 191 (0.5%)
Other
1 / 191 (0.5%)
Reject one, undecided between others
1 / 191 (0.5%)
There is no fact of the matter
1 / 191 (0.5%)
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism, or sense-datum theory?
Accept: representationalism
44 / 191 (23.0%)
Lean toward: representationalism
38 / 191 (19.9%)
Lean toward: qualia theory
23 / 191 (12.0%)
Accept: disjunctivism
19 / 191 (9.9%)
Lean toward: disjunctivism
14 / 191 (7.3%)
Accept: qualia theory
10 / 191 (5.2%)
Accept another alternative
10 / 191 (5.2%)
Accept more than one
6 / 191 (3.1%)
Reject all
5 / 191 (2.6%)
Accept: sense-datum theory
4 / 191 (2.1%)
Lean toward: sense-datum theory
4 / 191 (2.1%)
Agnostic/undecided
3 / 191 (1.6%)
The question is too unclear to answer
3 / 191 (1.6%)
Skip
2 / 191 (1.0%)
Reject one or two, undecided between others
2 / 191 (1.0%)
Insufficiently familiar with the issue
2 / 191 (1.0%)
Accept an intermediate view
1 / 191 (0.5%)
Other
1 / 191 (0.5%)
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view, or further-fact view?
Lean toward: psychological view
38 / 191 (19.9%)
Accept: psychological view
33 / 191 (17.3%)
Lean toward: biological view
24 / 191 (12.6%)
Accept: biological view
14 / 191 (7.3%)
Lean toward: further-fact view
13 / 191 (6.8%)
Agnostic/undecided
12 / 191 (6.3%)
There is no fact of the matter
10 / 191 (5.2%)
Accept an intermediate view
9 / 191 (4.7%)
Accept more than one
7 / 191 (3.7%)
Accept another alternative
7 / 191 (3.7%)
Accept: further-fact view
7 / 191 (3.7%)
Reject all
6 / 191 (3.1%)
Insufficiently familiar with the issue
5 / 191 (2.6%)
The question is too unclear to answer
3 / 191 (1.6%)
Reject one, undecided between others
3 / 191 (1.6%)
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism, or libertarianism?
Lean toward: egalitarianism
45 / 191 (23.6%)
Insufficiently familiar with the issue
25 / 191 (13.1%)
Lean toward: communitarianism
23 / 191 (12.0%)
Accept: egalitarianism
22 / 191 (11.5%)
Lean toward: libertarianism
18 / 191 (9.4%)
Agnostic/undecided
9 / 191 (4.7%)
Accept more than one
8 / 191 (4.2%)
The question is too unclear to answer
8 / 191 (4.2%)
Skip
8 / 191 (4.2%)
Accept: communitarianism
5 / 191 (2.6%)
Reject all
5 / 191 (2.6%)
Accept another alternative
4 / 191 (2.1%)
Accept an intermediate view
4 / 191 (2.1%)
Reject one, undecided between others
4 / 191 (2.1%)
Accept: libertarianism
3 / 191 (1.6%)
Proper names: Fregean or Millian?
Accept: Millian
39 / 191 (20.4%)
Lean toward: Millian
38 / 191 (19.9%)
Lean toward: Fregean
34 / 191 (17.8%)
Accept: Fregean
33 / 191 (17.3%)
Accept an intermediate view
11 / 191 (5.8%)
Accept another alternative
8 / 191 (4.2%)
Reject both
5 / 191 (2.6%)
Insufficiently familiar with the issue
5 / 191 (2.6%)
The question is too unclear to answer
5 / 191 (2.6%)
Agnostic/undecided
4 / 191 (2.1%)
Accept both
4 / 191 (2.1%)
There is no fact of the matter
2 / 191 (1.0%)
Skip
2 / 191 (1.0%)
Other
1 / 191 (0.5%)
Science: scientific realism or scientific anti-realism?
Accept: scientific realism
107 / 191 (56.0%)
Lean toward: scientific realism
53 / 191 (27.7%)
Accept: scientific anti-realism
6 / 191 (3.1%)
Lean toward: scientific anti-realism
5 / 191 (2.6%)
Agnostic/undecided
4 / 191 (2.1%)
The question is too unclear to answer
4 / 191 (2.1%)
Accept an intermediate view
3 / 191 (1.6%)
Reject both
3 / 191 (1.6%)
Insufficiently familiar with the issue
2 / 191 (1.0%)
Accept another alternative
2 / 191 (1.0%)
Other
1 / 191 (0.5%)
Accept both
1 / 191 (0.5%)
Teletransporter (new matter): survival or death?
Lean toward: survival
46 / 191 (24.1%)
Accept: death
46 / 191 (24.1%)
Lean toward: death
36 / 191 (18.8%)
Accept: survival
31 / 191 (16.2%)
There is no fact of the matter
8 / 191 (4.2%)
Agnostic/undecided
7 / 191 (3.7%)
The question is too unclear to answer
6 / 191 (3.1%)
Insufficiently familiar with the issue
5 / 191 (2.6%)
Accept another alternative
2 / 191 (1.0%)
Accept an intermediate view
1 / 191 (0.5%)
Reject both
1 / 191 (0.5%)
Accept both
1 / 191 (0.5%)
Other
1 / 191 (0.5%)
Time: A-theory or B-theory?
Insufficiently familiar with the issue
49 / 191 (25.7%)
Accept: B-theory
41 / 191 (21.5%)
Agnostic/undecided
27 / 191 (14.1%)
Lean toward: A-theory
24 / 191 (12.6%)
Accept: A-theory
15 / 191 (7.9%)
Lean toward: B-theory
15 / 191 (7.9%)
Skip
8 / 191 (4.2%)
Accept both
4 / 191 (2.1%)
Accept an intermediate view
2 / 191 (1.0%)
The question is too unclear to answer
2 / 191 (1.0%)
Accept another alternative
2 / 191 (1.0%)
Reject both
1 / 191 (0.5%)
There is no fact of the matter
1 / 191 (0.5%)
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch or don't switch?
Accept: switch
95 / 191 (49.7%)
Lean toward: switch
48 / 191 (25.1%)
Agnostic/undecided
11 / 191 (5.8%)
Lean toward: don't switch
8 / 191 (4.2%)
Insufficiently familiar with the issue
5 / 191 (2.6%)
The question is too unclear to answer
5 / 191 (2.6%)
Accept: don't switch
4 / 191 (2.1%)
Other
4 / 191 (2.1%)
There is no fact of the matter
3 / 191 (1.6%)
Skip
3 / 191 (1.6%)
Reject both
2 / 191 (1.0%)
Accept an intermediate view
1 / 191 (0.5%)
Accept both
1 / 191 (0.5%)
Accept another alternative
1 / 191 (0.5%)
Truth: correspondence, deflationary, or epistemic?
Accept: correspondence
67 / 191 (35.1%)
Lean toward: correspondence
56 / 191 (29.3%)
Lean toward: deflationary
23 / 191 (12.0%)
Accept: deflationary
14 / 191 (7.3%)
Lean toward: epistemic
5 / 191 (2.6%)
Accept more than one
4 / 191 (2.1%)
Reject all
4 / 191 (2.1%)
Agnostic/undecided
4 / 191 (2.1%)
Insufficiently familiar with the issue
3 / 191 (1.6%)
The question is too unclear to answer
3 / 191 (1.6%)
Accept another alternative
3 / 191 (1.6%)
Accept: epistemic
2 / 191 (1.0%)
Reject one, undecided between others
2 / 191 (1.0%)
Skip
1 / 191 (0.5%)
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible, or metaphysically possible?
Accept: conceivable but not metaphysically possible
51 / 191 (26.7%)
Lean toward: conceivable but not metaphysically possible
40 / 191 (20.9%)
Accept: inconceivable
25 / 191 (13.1%)
Lean toward: inconceivable
22 / 191 (11.5%)
Accept: metaphysically possible
21 / 191 (11.0%)
Lean toward: metaphysically possible
14 / 191 (7.3%)
The question is too unclear to answer
6 / 191 (3.1%)
Reject all
4 / 191 (2.1%)
Agnostic/undecided
4 / 191 (2.1%)
Accept another alternative
3 / 191 (1.6%)
Insufficiently familiar with the issue
1 / 191 (0.5%)
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