In October 2022, the International Association of Bioethics announced that the 17th World Congress of Bioethics (WCB) 2024 would be held in Doha, Qatar. The International Network on Feminist Approaches to Bioethics (FAB) traditionally holds its World Congress jointly with the WCB. As part of the ongoing debate about the ethics of bioethics conferencing, the FAB provided a detailed statement discussing concerns about choosing Qatar as the site for a feminist bioethics conference. In order to explore possible approaches towards the (...) FABs decision, the German Feminist Perspectives in Medical Ethics and Bioethics working group (FME) dedicated one of its meetings to the topic. In this commentary, we present two aspects that we consider particularly important for this current debate: (1) the participation of LGBTQIA+ people in the conference and (2) the possibility of racist and anti-Muslim bias in the evaluation of Qatar as the site for the WCB 2024. As members of the FME, we aim to contribute to an exchange of various perspectives within the international feminist bioethics community. (shrink)

Empowerment in healthcare is becoming increasingly popular, including in obstetrics, because of its benefits for both individual health and health promotion. Many authors and organizations, such as the World Health Organization, advocate it as a means of engaging communities in the adoption of health-promoting behaviors and fostering patient-centered care. It aims to enable patients to assert their decisions and choices while respecting their personal values. This desire to respect the uniqueness and autonomy of each individual echoes a number of ethical (...) principles and theories. In this article, the authors aim to answer the question, How can the concept of empowerment in healthcare contribute to bioethics? They argue that it has important links with feminist bioethics, notably the theory of relational autonomy, as well as with the capability theory of economist and philosopher Amartya Sen. (shrink)

Conscientious refusal involves decisions by healthcare workers, on grounds of their conscience, to refuse to provide legal, professionally permissible and safe health interventions to patients. Conscientious provision involves decisions by healthcare workers, also on grounds of conscience, to provide safe and beneficial healthcare to patients that is prohibited by law or policy. Some bioethicists believe that the moral issues governing both are identical, and that if one permits conscientious refusals, one should also permit conscientious provisions. This article argues that this (...) assumption of symmetry is incorrect. To demonstrate this, it does the following: first, it establishes why it matters that we understand the difference between them; second, it describes three recent cases of conscientious provision in Canadian healthcare to help characterize its nature and scope; third, it situates these cases in a socio-economically nuanced analysis of the role of the conscientious provider under conditions or privilege and oppression; finally, it applies insights from the cases and the intersectional analysis to common criticisms of conscientious refusal to reinforce the fundamental asymmetries between conscientious refusal and conscientious provision. (shrink)

The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders classifies “anorexia nervosa” as a mental disorder, yet individuals with anorexia often characterize it as an identity. The author describes the identity of being an anorectic and compares it with what it takes to have anorexia in the diagnostic sense. This furthers the existing scholarship on anorexia and identity, most notably by revealing a disconnect between being an anorectic and having anorexia: Some individuals inhabit the identity of being an anorectic but do (...) not have anorexia because they do not have a significantly low body weight. The author explores whether expanding the diagnostic criteria for anorexia would be beneficial for anorectics by examining the implications of classifying the identitive phenomenon of being an anorectic in terms of a medical concept of mental disorder. In the short term, the answer depends on whether being an anorectic calls for interventions that require a diagnosis. Either way, it would be beneficial to develop nonmedical frameworks for understanding anorexia that facilitate interventions that do not require a diagnosis. Understanding being an anorectic as an identity lays the scaffolding for a nonmedical way of conceptualizing anorexia that illuminates innovative approaches to assisting anorectics. (shrink)

This article builds on existing feminist literature on obstetric violence in the context of childbirth to argue that there is a continuum of obstetric violence that also includes that perpetuated in relation to pregnancy prevention and termination, as well as antenatal healthcare and birth. This structural violence is highlighted in relation to conscientious objection, the reporting of people suspected of illegal abortions by their healthcare providers, and contraceptive coercion. Recognizing the limitations of criminal and human rights approaches to obstetric violence, (...) this article takes Martha Fineman’s vulnerability theory as the foundation for the transformative structural change of healthcare institutions. (shrink)