Abstract

Available from UMI in association with The British Library. Requires signed TDF. ;The past decade and a half has witnessed, in philosophical circles and in politics alike, the evolution of what many now call the neutrality debate. The justice of neutral political concern is quite possibly the most unpopular interpretation of political morality around today. Advocated by rather few theorists, as an attractive account of liberalism, it is much despised by writers from literally all quarters in political philosophy--not only by conservatives and communitarians, for instance, but even by some, perhaps most, liberals themselves. My aim is to defend this doctrine. For, as I try to show, I believe that the most important criticisms of political neutrality are misplaced, due either to a misinterpretation of just what this doctrine involves or to a misunderstanding of its moral force. ;I begin by distinguishing various ways of formulating the principle of neutral political concern. Drawing on the word of John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin and Bruce Ackerman, I move on to clarify precisely which version these liberals mean to elaborate and defend. The balance of this study sets out a defence of what I term "judgemental neutrality," and then considers various objections to it. Following Ronald Dworkin, I divide the criticisms of liberal neutrality into two kinds, according to which of the following questions they address: What are citizens' essential or most fundamental interests in life? And what follows, for politics, from supposing that each citizen's basic interests matter equally? Liberal neutrality has answers to both of these questions, and in the latter part of this study I examine and attempt to deflect objections to each of them in turn