Mark Balaguer California State University, Los Angeles
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  • Faculty, California State University, Los Angeles
  • PhD, City University of New York, 1992.

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  1. M. Balaguer (forthcoming). Can We Know That Platonism is True? Philosophical Forum.
    ? Mark BALAGUER Philosophical forum 34:3-43-4, 459-475, Blackwell, 2003.
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  2. Mark Balaguer (2014). Anti‐Metaphysicalism, Necessity, and Temporal Ontology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1).
    This paper argues for a certain kind of anti-metaphysicalism about the temporal ontology debate, i.e., the debate between presentists and eternalists over the existence of past and future objects. Three different kinds of anti-metaphysicalism are defined—namely, non-factualism, physical-empiricism, and trivialism. The paper argues for the disjunction of these three views. It is then argued that trivialism is false, so that either non-factualism or physical-empiricism is true. Finally, the paper ends with a discussion of whether we should endorse non-factualism or physical-empiricism. (...)
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  3. Mark Balaguer, Elaine Landry, Sorin Bangu & Christopher Pincock (2013). Structures, Fictions, and the Explanatory Epistemology of Mathematics in Science. Metascience 22 (2):247-273.
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  4. Mark Balaguer (2012). Replies to McKenna, Pereboom, and Kane. Philosophical Studies (1):1-22.
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  5. M. Balaguer (2011). Effective Intentions: The Power of Conscious Will. Philosophical Review 120 (3):447-452.
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  6. M. Balaguer (2011). Reply to Armour-Garb. Philosophia Mathematica 19 (3):345-348.
    Hermeneutic non-assertivism is a thesis that mathematical fictionalists might want to endorse in responding to a recent objection due to John Burgess. Brad Armour-Garb has argued that hermeneutic non-assertivism is false. A response is given here to Armour-Garb's argument.
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  7. Mark Balaguer (2011). Is There a Fact of the Matter Between Direct Reference Theory and (Neo-)Fregeanism? Philosophical Studies 154 (1):53-78.
    It is argued here that there is no fact of the matter between direct reference theory and neo-Fregeanism. To get a more precise idea of the central thesis of this paper, consider the following two claims: (i) While direct reference theory and neo-Fregeanism can be developed in numerous ways, they can be developed in essentially parallel ways; that is, for any (plausible) way of developing direct reference theory, there is an essentially parallel way of developing neo-Fregeanism, and vice versa. And (...)
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  8. Mark Balaguer (2010). Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem. Mit Press.
    In this largely antimetaphysical treatment of free will and determinism, Mark Balaguer argues that the philosophical problem of free will boils down to an open ...
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  9. Mark Balaguer (2009). Fictionalism, Theft, and the Story of Mathematics. Philosophia Mathematica 17 (2):131-162.
    This paper develops a novel version of mathematical fictionalism and defends it against three objections or worries, viz., (i) an objection based on the fact that there are obvious disanalogies between mathematics and fiction; (ii) a worry about whether fictionalism is consistent with the fact that certain mathematical sentences are objectively correct whereas others are incorrect; and (iii) a recent objection due to John Burgess concerning “hermeneuticism” and “revolutionism”.
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  10. Mark Balaguer (2009). The Metaphysical Irrelevance of the Compatibilism Debate (and, More Generally, of Conceptual Analysis). Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (1):1-24.
    It is argued here that the question of whether compatibilism is true is irrelevant to metaphysical questions about the nature of human decision-making processes—for example, the question of whether or not humans have free will—except in a very trivial and metaphysically uninteresting way. In addition, it is argued that two other questions—namely, the conceptual-analysis question of what free will is and the question that asks which kinds of freedom are required for moral responsibility—are also essentially irrelevant to metaphysical questions about (...)
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  11. Mark Balaguer (2009). Why There Are No Good Arguments for Any Interesting Version of Determinism. Synthese 168 (1):1 - 21.
    This paper considers the empirical evidence that we currently have for various kinds of determinism that might be relevant to the thesis that human beings possess libertarian free will. Libertarianism requires a very strong version of indeterminism, so it can be refuted not just by universal determinism, but by some much weaker theses as well. However, it is argued that at present, we have no good reason to believe even these weak deterministic views and, hence, no good reason—at least from (...)
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  12. Mark Balaguer, Fictionalism in the Philosophy of Mathematics. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Mathematical fictionalism (or as I'll call it, fictionalism) is best thought of as a reaction to mathematical platonism. Platonism is the view that (a) there exist abstract mathematical objects (i.e., nonspatiotemporal mathematical objects), and (b) our mathematical sentences and theories provide true descriptions of such objects. So, for instance, on the platonist view, the sentence ‘3 is prime’ provides a straightforward description of a certain object—namely, the number 3—in much the same way that the sentence ‘Mars is red’ provides a (...)
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  13. Mark Balaguer (2008). Mathematical Platonism. In Bonnie Gold & Roger Simons (eds.), Proof and Other Dilemmas: Mathematics and Philosophy. Mathematical Association of America. 179--204.
     
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  14. Mark Balaguer, Platonism in Metaphysics. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Platonism is the view that there exist such things as abstract objects — where an abstract object is an object that does not exist in space or time and which is therefore entirely non-physical and nonmental. Platonism in this sense is a contemporary view. It is obviously related to the views of Plato in important ways, but it is not entirely clear that Plato endorsed this view, as it is defined here. In order to remain neutral on this question, the (...)
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  15. M. Balaguer, S. Benferhat, Y. Ben-Menahem, J. F. Bonnefon, G. Brewka, J. Cat, J. Comesana, R. da Silva Neves, R. de Clercq & J. Dilworth (2005). Adams, EW, 129. Synthese 146:491.
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  16. Mark Balaguer (2005). Indexical Propositions and de Re Belief Ascriptions. Synthese 146 (3):325 - 355.
    I develop here a novel version of the Fregean view of belief ascriptions (i.e., sentences of the form ‘S believes that p’) and I explain how my view accounts for various problem cases that many philosophers have supposed are incompatible with Fregeanism. The so-called problem cases involve (a) what Perry calls essential indexicals and (b) de re ascriptions in which it is acceptable to substitute coreferential but non-synonymous terms in belief contexts. I also respond to two traditional worries about what (...)
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  17. Mark Balaguer (2003). Realistic Rationalism [1998]: Can We Know That Platonism is True? Philosophical Forum 34 (3-4):459–476.
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  18. Mark Balaguer (2002). A Coherent, Naturalistic, and Plausible Formulation of Libertarian Free Will. Noûs 36 (3):379-406.
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  19. Mark Balaguer (2002). Review: Stewart Shapiro, Thinking About Mathematics. The Philosophy of Mathematics. [REVIEW] Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 8 (1):89-91.
  20. S. Shapiro & Mark Balaguer (2002). REVIEWS-Thinking About Mathematics. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 8 (1):89-90.
     
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  21. Mark Balaguer (2001). A Theory of Mathematical Correctness and Mathematical Truth. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 82 (2):87–114.
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  22. Mark Balaguer (2000). Reply to Dieterle. Philosophia Mathematica 8 (3):310-315.
    In this paper, I respond to an objection that Jill Dieterle has raised to two arguments in my book, Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics. Dieterle argues that because I reject the notion of metaphysical necessity, I cannot rely upon the notion of supervenience, as I in fact do in two places in the book. I argue that Dieterle is mistaken about this by showing that neither of the two supervenience theses that I endorse requires a notion of metaphysical necessity.
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  23. Mark Balaguer (1999). Critical Studies / Book Reviews. Philosophia Mathematica 7 (1):108-126.
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  24. Mark Balaguer (1999). Libertarianism as a Scientifically Respectable View. Philosophical Studies 93 (2):189-211.
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  25. Mark Balaguer (1999). Review of P. Maddy, Naturalism in Mathematics. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 66 (3):502-.
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  26. Mark Balaguer & J. M. Dieterle (1999). Reviews-Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (4):775-780.
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  27. Mark Balaguer (1998). Attitudes Without Propositions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):805-26.
    This paper develops a novel version of anti-platonism, called semantic fictionalism. The view is a response to the platonist argument that we need to countenance propositions to account for the truth of sentences containing `that'-clause singular terms, e.g., sentences of the form `x believes that p' and `σ means that p'. Briefly, the view is that (a) platonists are right that `that'-clauses purport to refer to propositions, but (b) there are no such things as propositions, and hence, (c) `that'-clause-containing sentences (...)
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  28. Mark Balaguer (1998). Indexical Senses. Theoria 41 (4):31-54.
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  29. Mark Balaguer (1998). Non-Uniqueness as a Non-Problem. Philosophia Mathematica 6 (1):63-84.
    A response is given here to Benacerraf's (1965) non-uniqueness (or multiple-reductions) objection to mathematical platonism. It is argued that non-uniqueness is simply not a problem for platonism; more specifically, it is argued that platonists can simply embrace non-uniqueness—i.e., that one can endorse the thesis that our mathematical theories truly describe collections of abstract mathematical objects while rejecting the thesis that such theories truly describe unique collections of such objects. I also argue that part of the motivation for this stance is (...)
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  30. Mark Balaguer (1998). Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics. Oxford University Press.
    In this book, Balaguer demonstrates that there are no good arguments for or against mathematical platonism. He does this by establishing that both platonism and anti-platonism are defensible views. Introducing a form of platonism ("full-blooded platonism") that solves all problems traditionally associated with the view, he proceeds to defend anti-platonism (in particular, mathematical fictionalism) against various attacks, most notably the Quine-Putnam indispensability attack. He concludes by arguing that it is not simply that we do not currently have any good argument (...)
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  31. Mark Balaguer (1996). A Fictionalist Account of the Indispensable Applications of Mathematics. Philosophical Studies 83 (3):291 - 314.
  32. Mark Balaguer (1996). Towards a Nominalization of Quantum Mechanics. Mind 105 (418):209-226.
  33. Mark Balaguer (1995). A Platonist Epistemology. Synthese 103 (3):303 - 325.
    A response is given here to Benacerraf's 1973 argument that mathematical platonism is incompatible with a naturalistic epistemology. Unlike almost all previous platonist responses to Benacerraf, the response given here is positive rather than negative; that is, rather than trying to find a problem with Benacerraf's argument, I accept his challenge and meet it head on by constructing an epistemology of abstract (i.e., aspatial and atemporal) mathematical objects. Thus, I show that spatio-temporal creatures like ourselves can attain knowledge about mathematical (...)
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  34. Mark Balaguer (1995). Review: Jody Azzouni, Metaphysical Myths, Mathematical Practice. The Ontology and Epistemology of the Exact Sciences. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 60 (4):1312-1314.
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  35. Mark Balaguer (1994). Against (Maddian) Naturalized Platonism. Philosophia Mathematica 2 (2):97-108.
    It is argued here that mathematical objects cannot be simultaneously abstract and perceptible. Thus, naturalized versions of mathematical platonism, such as the one advocated by Penelope Maddy, are unintelligble. Thus, platonists cannot respond to Benacerrafian epistemological arguments against their view vias Maddy-style naturalization. Finally, it is also argued that naturalized platonists cannot respond to this situation by abandoning abstractness (that is, platonism); they must abandon perceptibility (that is, naturalism).
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