Michiru Nagatsu University of Helsinki, Tallinn University of Technology
blank
About me
I am a postdoc researcher at TINT, Finnish Centre of Excellence in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences, University of Helsinki. My focus is on behavioural and experimental economics and cognitive science. I'm interested in the foundations of human rationality, sociality and morality, and in how these issues can be informed by science and philosophy. I'm philpapers' 'philosophy of social science' category editor since September 2010.
My works
6 items found.
Sort by:
  1. M. Godman, M. Nagatsu & M. Salmela (2014). The Social Motivation Hypothesis for Prosocial Behavior. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 44 (5):563-587.
    Existing economic models of prosociality have been rather silent in terms of proximate psychological mechanisms. We nevertheless identify the psychologically most informed accounts and offer a critical discussion of their hypotheses for the proximate psychological explanations. Based on convergent evidence from several fields of research, we argue that there nevertheless is a more plausible alternative proximate account available: the social motivation hypothesis. The hypothesis represents a more basic explanation of the appeal of prosocial behavior, which is in terms of anticipated (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Michiru Nagatsu (2013). Experimental Philosophy of Economics. Economics and Philosophy 29 (2):263-76.
    This article is a prelude to an experimental study of the preference concept in economics. I argue that a new empirical approach called experimental philosophy of science is a promising approach to advance the philosophy of economics. In particular, I discuss two debates in the field, the neuroeconomics controversy and the commonsensible realism debate, and suggest how experimental and survey techniques can generate data that will inform these debates. Some of the likely objections from philosophers and economists are addressed, and (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Michiru Nagatsu (2013). The Limits of Unification for Theory Appraisal: A Case of Economics and Psychology. Synthese 190 (2):2267-2289.
    In this paper I examine Don Ross’s application of unificationism as a methodological criterion of theory appraisal in economics and cognitive science. Against Ross’s critique that explanations of the preference reversal phenomenon by the ‘heuristics and biases’ programme is ad hoc or ‘Ptolemaic’, I argue that the compatibility hypothesis, one of the explanations offerd by this programme, is theoretically and empirically well-motivated. A careful examination of this hypothesis suggests several strengths of a procedural approach to modelling cognitive processes underlying individual (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Michiru Nagatsu (2011). Philosophy of the Social Sciences: Philosophical Theory and Scientific Practice, Edited by C. Mantzavinos. Cambridge University Press, 2009. Ix + 333 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 27 (1):75-83.
  5. Michiru Nagatsu (2010). Beyond Circularity and Normativity: Measurement and Progress in Behavioral Economics. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 40 (2):265-290.
    This article assesses two major conceptual arguments against theories of choice.The first argument concerns the circularity of belief-desire psychology, on which decision theory is based. The second argument concerns the normativity arising from the concept of rationality. Each argument is evaluated against experimental practice in economics and psychology, and it is concluded that both arguments fail to establish their skeptical conclusion that there can be no science of intentional human actions.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Michiru Nagatsu (2010). Function and Mechanism: The Metaphysics of Neuroeconomics. Journal of Economic Methodology 17 (2):197-205.
    In this paper, I examine metaphysical aspects in the neuroeconomics debate. I propose that part of the debate can be better understood by supposing two metaphysical stances, mechanistic and functional. I characterize the two stances, and discuss their relations. I consider two models of framing, in order to illustrate how the features of mechanistic and functional stances figure in the practice of the sciences of individual decision making.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
Is this list right?