7 found
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  1. Rational updating at the crossroads.Silvia Milano & Andrés Perea - 2024 - Economics and Philosophy 40 (1):190-211.
    In this paper we explore the absentminded driver problem using two different scenarios. In the first scenario we assume that the driver is capable of reasoning about his degree of absentmindedness before he hits the highway. This leads to a Savage-style model where the states are mutually exclusive and the act-state independence is in place. In the second we employ centred possibilities, by modelling the states (i.e. the events about which the driver is uncertain) as the possible final destinations indexed (...)
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  2. On Loss Aversion in Bimatrix Games.Bram Driesen, Andrés Perea & Hans Peters - 2010 - Theory and Decision 68 (4):367-391.
    In this article three different types of loss aversion equilibria in bimatrix games are studied. Loss aversion equilibria are Nash equilibria of games where players are loss averse and where the reference points—points below which they consider payoffs to be losses—are endogenous to the equilibrium calculation. The first type is the fixed point loss aversion equilibrium, introduced in Shalev (2000; Int. J. Game Theory 29(2):269) under the name of ‘myopic loss aversion equilibrium.’ There, the players’ reference points depend on the (...)
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  3. A one-person doxastic characterization of Nash strategies.Andrés Perea - 2007 - Synthese 158 (2):251-271.
    Within a formal epistemic model for simultaneous-move games, we present the following conditions: belief in the opponents’ rationality, stating that a player believes that every opponent chooses an optimal strategy, self-referential beliefs, stating that a player believes that his opponents hold correct beliefs about his own beliefs, projective beliefs, stating that i believes that j’s belief about k’s choice is the same as i’s belief about k’s choice, and conditionally independent beliefs, stating that a player believes that opponents’ types choose (...)
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  4. A Model of Minimal Probabilistic Belief Revision.Andrés Perea - 2009 - Theory and Decision 67 (2):163-222.
    In the literature there are at least two models for probabilistic belief revision: Bayesian updating and imaging [Lewis, D. K. (1973), Counterfactuals, Blackwell, Oxford; Gärdenfors, P. (1988), Knowledge in flux: modeling the dynamics of epistemic states, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA]. In this paper we focus on imaging rules that can be described by the following procedure: (1) Identify every state with some real valued vector of characteristics, and accordingly identify every probabilistic belief with an expected vector of characteristics; (2) For (...)
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  5.  35
    Introduction to the Special Issue on Logic and the Foundations of Game and Decision Theory.Giacomo Bonanno, Wiebe van der Hoek & Andrés Perea - 2019 - Studia Logica 107 (3):451-455.
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    Introduction to the Special Issue on Logic and the Foundations of Game and Decision Theory (LOFT12).Andrés Perea, Wiebe Hoek & Giacomo Bonanno - 2019 - Studia Logica 107 (3):451-455.
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  7.  20
    Plausibility orderings in dynamic games.Andrés Perea - 2014 - Economics and Philosophy 30 (3):331-364.