Abstract
In this paper we seek to clarify the question of what exactly is meant by an “autonomous” decision or act by focusing on the most fundamental personal condition for deciding or acting autonomously. This basic personal requirement has often been overlooked in recent debates; where it has been seen, it is characterized in ways that are too demanding. What is meant here is an individual form of self-relation that seems to be constitutive for leading a life as a human and is likely to be acquired (or not) very early in life. This significant personal self-relation has three essential aspects: a primal sense of “self-confidence”, a basic form of “self-assertiveness”, and a fundamental form of “self-esteem”. We will call this the “triple S condition” for autonomy. Our main thesis is that any decision or action which is not based on this triple S condition cannot be called “autonomous”.
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Notes
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This elementary form of self-esteem should not be confused with more demanding forms of qualified self-relations which are occasionally termed “self-esteem” (for example, Honneth 1996, chapter 5), but which are only realized when the (adult) person knows she is recognized as a fully adequate member of the social community.
- 3.
This suggestion is similar to Joel Anderson’s and Axel Honneth’s “recognitional account of autonomy” (Anderson and Honneth 2005; cf. Honneth 1996; Mackenzie 2000). This approach goes too far in two respects, however. Firstly, the conviction of both authors may be debatable that “full autonomy” presupposes not only fundamental self-confidence, but also moral-legal self- respect, as well as socially conveyed self-esteem, namely with regard to an ethical autonomy-ideal of the good life. It would, however, be asking too much to want this demanding self-relation to be regarded as a prerequisite for autonomous action. Secondly, this suggestion seems to demand that every autonomous person have “undistorted” or “non-pathological” relationships to her social environment. This would mean that persons who do not consider themselves integrated in such acknowledged relationships are thus not able to make any autonomous decisions, which leads to the reproach of perfectionism susceptible to paternalism.
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In the psychological respect, we will refer essentially to the psychoanalytical “object-relations theory”, as well as to the tradition of “psycho-historical I-psychology” according to Erik H. Erikson. We are not able to elaborate on the tensions between these two traditions here. For an initial overview: Mitchell and Black 1995. Concerning socialization, we base ourselves especially on “symbolic interactionism” according to Georg H. Mead see Abels 2010.
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As an introduction to research on infants, still very worth reading: Dornes 1993.
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Trust and mistrust do not exclude each other in the world of a child since each child has temporary experiences of sometimes adequate and sometimes inadequate care. Psychologically decisive for the process of maturing is whether it is fundamental social trust or fundamental mistrust that remains.
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For the biographical consequences of disturbances in early relationships, see the groundbreaking work by John Bowlby (for example, Bowlby 1982).
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Consideration should be given to whether moral or even motor abilities are also important for the genesis of the capability for autonomous action, for example.
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See also the eight-step model for “psycho-historical development ”: Erikson 1977.
- 12.
For clarification of the socio-philosophical term in pathology in connection with Axel Honneth, see: Pollmann 2005, 30–37.
- 13.
See the fascinating analysis: Benjamin 1988.
- 14.
There are also non-social adversities, for example, the failure of great hopes or a serious illness. However, we blank out any non-social negative experiences since we want to indicate the extent to which these thoughts have normative or moral consequences and that moral consequences are only the result if other people are involved in a demanding or hurtful way.
- 15.
“Encroachments” or “assaults” on a person do not at all necessarily lead to partial or complete loss of triple S factors. Whether this loss comes about depends greatly on how stable the self-relation concerned is. Consequently, the more stable a self-relation is, the graver, more far-reaching, and more aggressive the offence has to be if the person suffers lasting damage.
- 16.
- 17.
See the relevant articles in: Pollmann 2010.
- 18.
See also articles in: Pollmann 2010.
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Ach, J.S., Pollmann, A. (2022). Self-Confidence, Self-Assertiveness, and Self-Esteem: The Triple S Condition of Personal Autonomy. In: Childress, J.F., Quante, M. (eds) Thick (Concepts of) Autonomy. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 146. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-80991-1_4
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