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In defense of exclusionary reasons

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Abstract

Exclusionary defeat is Joseph Raz’s proposal for understanding the more complex, layered structure of practical reasoning. Exclusionary reasons are widely appealed to in legal theory and consistently arise in many other areas of philosophy. They have also been subject to a variety of challenges. I propose a new account of exclusionary reasons based on their justificatory role, rejecting Raz’s motivational account and especially contrasting exclusion with undercutting defeat. I explain the appeal and coherence of exclusionary reasons by appeal to commonsense value pluralism and the intermediate space of public policies, social roles, and organizations. We often want our choices to have a certain character or instantiate a certain value and in order to do so, that choice can only be based on a restricted set of reasons. Exclusion explains how pro tanto practical reasons can be disqualified from counting towards a choice of a particular kind without being outweighed or undercut.

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Notes

  1. Although we sometimes refer to a fact as the same reason across cases because it can be in more than one reason, I will avoid this; the reason is the relation between the fact, object, and agent, not the fact alone.

  2. Strikingly, Raz (1999, 186) notes that it would be lucky if the agent tried to do what she ought to do in the second-order sense and failed such that she did what she ought to do in the first-order sense.

  3. When issues aren’t so important, the independence condition is met and it is more important for us to decide for ourselves than it is to choose correctly (Raz 1986, 69).

  4. This misses some important features of the relationship between authority and subject and the sort of deference that authorities demand (Adams 2018).

  5. Thanks to a reviewer for pushing me to clarify this.

  6. The strongest cases against this, for example wanting a partner to help because they want to not because they are required to, seem to me to be better described as reasons to develop a certain character or virtue.

  7. Thanks to a reviewer for pointing out this parallel.

  8. I’ve purposely defined second-order practical reasons in such a way as to avoid needing to posit third- and higher-order reasons. Any reason which bears on another reason rather than directly on an act is second-order, even if it bears on another second-order reason. The ‘directly’ qualifier is necessary because a first-order reason could have an act that merely involves reasons in its object (Whiting 2017, 402).

  9. Raz (1999, 25) defines reasons conflict to constrain it to direct conflict.

  10. At the second-order level, though, weight may resolve conflicts between exclusionary and inclusionary reasons but not conflicts between exclusionary and intensifying reasons.

  11. Indirect defeat can come in degrees such that the defeated reason gives less support to its object than it otherwise would but still gives some support. I think this is true of both undercutting and exclusion (consider mechanical weighting procedures). But it will be easier to discuss the issues in more absolute terms, so I’ll focus on complete elision.

  12. So exclusion is not undercutting, contra, e.g., Levy (2015, 367).

  13. Thanks to two reviewers for pushing me to clarify this.

  14. Raz (1986, 42, 46, 61) discusses similar issues. As a reviewer rightly noted, a fuller account of exclusionary reasons requires further detailed explanation of these features.

  15. Raz (1999, 183) raises the interesting example of ascetic reasons.

  16. Dempsey (2013) and Herstein (2017) both argue that autonomy involves exclusionary permissions; in some circumstances, I get to choose whether to include or exclude your wishes or advice, for example.

  17. Thanks to a reviewer for noting the parallels to fairness in Rawls’ (1999, 118) veil of ignorance.

  18. This is why Colin’s promise counts as exclusionary on my view: it changes the choice from ‘decide about schooling’ to ‘decide about schooling under the constraints set by the promise’, rather than changing any features of the school or other matters of the context. Thanks to a reviewer for raising this question.

  19. Note that accounts of particular phenomena that rely on Raz’s notion of exclusion will often be able to rely on my alternative without alteration, since many do not appeal specifically to motivating reasons.

  20. This may also be a defense of what Perry (1988) calls “objective” exclusionary reasons, as opposed to Raz’s subjective account.

  21. This is what I take to be a standard approach to legitimate law, which I am assuming for this discussion. Thanks to a reviewer for pushing me to clarify this.

  22. Underlying this conviction may be the thought that every pro tanto practical reason counts for every decision.

  23. I take these to be generally sympathetic with Raz’s important work on values, pluralism, and practices.

  24. Such reasons are not cancelled; sometimes we should conform to them, as in emergencies.

  25. A reviewer helpfully observed that this bears similarities to the wrong kinds of reasons problems raised by Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2004). My appeal to context is not fully specified here, serving merely to indicate how I take exclusionary reasons to work. This does make exclusionary reasons rather context- and often even preference-sensitive on my account, but I take it this is consistent with the commonsense pluralism and autonomy considerations above.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA, USA

    N. P. Adams

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Adams, N.P. In defense of exclusionary reasons. Philos Stud 178, 235–253 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-020-01429-8

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