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Asymmetrical Analogical Arguments

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Abstract

Analogies must be symmetric. If a is like b, then b is like a. So if a has property R, and if R is within the scope of the analogy, then b (probably) has R. However, analogical arguments generally single out, or depend upon, only one of a or b to serve as the basis for the inference. In this respect, analogical arguments are directed by an asymmetry. I defend the importance of this neglected – even when explicitly mentioned – feature in understanding analogical arguments.

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Acknowledgement

For helpful comments, I am grateful to Dan Boone, Trudy Govier and referees for Argumentation.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, Brooklyn College and the Graduate School, CUNY, Brooklyn, NY, 11210, USA

    J. E. Adler

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  1. J. E. Adler
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Correspondence to J. E. Adler.

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Adler, J.E. Asymmetrical Analogical Arguments. Argumentation 21, 83–92 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-007-9041-3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-007-9041-3

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