Abstract

The attempt to discuss Husserl's pure phenomenology in a dialectical spirit is particularly open to a suspicion of arbitrariness. Husserl's program aims at an “ontic sphere of absolute origins,” fully in view of that “organized spirit of contradiction” (organisierten Widerspruchsgeist), which Hegel once characterized as his procedure in a conversation with Goethe. The dialectic, as conceived by Hegel and subsequently turned against him, despite any similarities, is qualitatively different from the positive philosophies among which Hegel, as a system maker, is included. Even if Hegelian logic, like Kantian logic, may be “tied” to a transcendental subject, even if it may be an absolute idealism, it nevertheless points beyond itself as, according to Goethe's dialectical dictum, everything absolute (alles Vollkommene) does.