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Accidens Secundum Species: Bonaventure’s Solution to the Problem of the Accidens Sine Subiecto

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The Metaphysics and Theology of the Eucharist

Part of the book series: Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action ((HSNA,volume 10))

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Abstract

This paper deals with Bonaventure’s stand on the separability of accidents discussed within the framework of the theology of the Eucharist, in his Commentarium in Sententias, IV, d. 12, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1. Since an accident was traditionally defined as ens in alio, the existence of accidents apart from any subject in the Eucharist was considered philosophically challenging. The Franciscan theologian has been credited with having distinguished, for the first time (Bakker PJJM. La raison et le miracle: les doctrines eucharistiques (c. 1250 – c.1400): contribution à l’étude des rapports entre philosophie et théologie. s.n., Nijmegen, 1999; Vijgen J. The status of Eucharistic accidents “sine subiecto”: An historical survey up to Thomas Aquinas and selected reactions. München: Akademie Verlag, 2013), between the relation of accident to subject secundum aptitudinem, and the relation of accident to subject secundum actum, while sustaining that only the relation to subject secundum aptitudinem constitutes the accident’s proper definition, a view that Aquinas would subscribe to and develop further, relying on Avicenna’s idea of the real distinction between essence and existence. The chapter will discuss Bonaventure’s rather different reasons for refusing to accept actual being in alio as the accident’s essence. Bonaventure does not appeal to a distinction between being and essence but draws on the common essence of accidents in individualized substances vs. accidents as universals, or accidents secundum species sive differentias speciales.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    In Sent. IV, d. 8-d. 13 (IV, 179a-314b).

  2. 2.

    See Burr (1984), 2.

  3. 3.

    In Sent. IV, d. 10, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1, resp. (IV, 217b).

  4. 4.

    See Bakker (1999); Vijgen (2013). In a recent paper, Marcia Colish refers to Bonaventure’s solution to the problem of accidents with no substance, without putting forward the reasons that support it: See Colish (2020)

  5. 5.

    See Vijgen (2013), 52.

  6. 6.

    See Burr (1984), 8–15.

  7. 7.

    In Sent. IV, d. 12, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1, contra 1 (IV, 270a): “Per miraculum non potest separari definitum a definitione vel a partibus definitionis: unde non potest fieri quod aliquid sit homo et non sit animal rationale et mortale; sed accidens habet definiri per subiectum: ergo non potest per miraculum esse sine subiecto.”

  8. 8.

    In Sent. IV, d. 12, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1, contra 2 (IV, 270a): “Item, accidens habet definiri per comparationem ad subiectum et in comparatione ad suam operationem, et constat quod prior est comparatio accidentis ad subiectum quam ad operationem, quia ab illo recipit esse. Sed non potest aliquod accidens separari a definitione in comparatione ad actum per miraculum; unde non potest fieri quod sit albedo et quod non sit color digregativus visus: ergo nec a definitione per subiectum potest separari per miraculum.” This objection takes operation as a synonym of act. As we shall see, Bonaventure’s response will, in some measure, rely on a twofold account of operation: as act and as aptitude.

  9. 9.

    In Sent. IV, d. 12, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1, contra 3 (IV, 270a): “Item, sicut se habet esse ad ens, ita inesse ad inhaerens, quia accidentis esse est inesse; sed esse non posset separari ab ente ut sit ens et non sit: ergo nec inesse ab inhaerente: ergo, cum accidens sit inhaerens, impossibile est quod sit et non sit.”

  10. 10.

    In Sent. IV, d. 12, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1, contra 4 (IV, 270b): “Item, quod facere quod aliquid non participans rationem alicuius fiat participans, est hoc transmutare in illud; sed ratio substantiae est ens per se: si ergo accidentia per miraculum fiant entia per se, hoc est facere quod sint substantiae: ergo species illae fiunt substantiae: cum ergo sint accidentia, illud constat, simul ergo sunt substantiae et accidentia, quod nequaquam potest capere intellectus.”

  11. 11.

    In Sent. IV, d. 12, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1, contra 5 (IV, 270b): “Item, eadem est oppositio distantium specierum quae est differentiarum, sicut patet, quia quae est oppositio hominis ad asinum, eadem est rationalis ad irrationale; rursus, sicut opponitur rationali; unde sicut non potest fieri quod idem sit homo et asinus, ita nec quod sit asinus et sit rationalis: ergo a simili, immo multo fortius, non potest fieri quod idem sit accidens et ens per se, sicut nec quod sit substancia et accidens.”

  12. 12.

    In Sent. I, d. 8, p. 1, dub. 8 (I, 164a): “Accidens enim dicitur quod inest sujecto […].” In the same place, however, Bonaventure does point out to an alternative definition of accident, or at least a specification of the accident’s definition as what is apt to be in alio: “Dicendum, quod accidens dicit quid natum in alio esse […].”

  13. 13.

    In Sent. IV, d. 12, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1, resp. (IV, 271a): “Potest tamen dici aliter quod accidens et est accidens et iterum est accidens secundum species sive differentias speciales. Nam in quantum comparatur ad subiectum, habet dici accidens; in quantum ad operationem, habet dici hoc.” The English translation is based on Johnson (2017), 299, with minor revision.

  14. 14.

    It is not the aim of this paper to establish the correlation between the different meanings of species. On this issue, see Urs von Balthasar (1984), 301–302.

  15. 15.

    Bonaventure in fact argues that species is said, not of the particular forms embedded in matter, but of the “form of the whole” [forma totius], which is the author’s terminology for the universal forms. In Sent. III, d. 2, a. 2, q. 3, resp. (III, 48b): “Dicendum quod species dicit formam, et non quaecumque, sed formam totius, hoc est formam complectentem totum esse.” On the distinction between particular and universal forms, see van Buren (2021).

  16. 16.

    In Sent. IV, d. 8, p. 2, a. 1, q. 1–2 (IV, 189a-195b).

  17. 17.

    In Sent. I, d. 27, p. 2, dub. 1 (I, 491a).

  18. 18.

    In Sent. II, d. 7, p. 2, a. 2, q. 1, arg. 4 (II, 197a): “[…] forma non est hoc aliquid […].” Despite the fact that Bonaventure refutes the argument which convenes this idea, the Franciscan author does not question the truth of this particular premise.

  19. 19.

    In Sent. II, d. 3, p. 1, a. 2, q. 3, resp. (II, 109b-110a): “[…] dicendum, quod individuum est hoc aliquid. Quod sit hoc, principalius habet a materia, ratione cuius forma habet positionem in loco et tempore. Quod sit aliquid, habet a forma.” On the principle of individuation in Bonaventure’s thought, see King (1994), 141–172; da Altari (1961), 264–286; Pini (2012), 79–115.

  20. 20.

    In Sent. II, d. 3, p. 1, a. 2, q. 3, ad 1–3 (II, 110b).

  21. 21.

    Bonaventure expresses his critiques to the Platonic view of the universals, evoking Aristotle’s third man argument in In Sent. II, d. 1, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1, resp. (II, 16b). See van Buren (2021), 197–200.

  22. 22.

    In Sent. III, d. 6, a. 1, q. 1, resp. (III, 149b): “Planum enim est, quod illa, quorum unum de altero praedicatur, invicem non numerantur, quamvis formaliter distinguantur, utpote si dicatur: ‘Petrus est musicus’: musicus et Petrus non sunt duo, quamvis inter Petrum, et musicam suam, sit distinctio.” On this particular example, see Quinn (1973), 168–170; van Buren (2021), 210.

  23. 23.

    In Sent. IV, d. 6, p. 1, a. 1. q. 3, ad 4 (IV, 142a-b).

  24. 24.

    Bonaventure refuses the theory according to which substances are individuated by accidents. On the contrary, accidents become individuated by the substances in which they inhere. See In Sent. II, d. 3, p. 1, a. 2, q. 2, resp. (II, 106a-b).

  25. 25.

    In Sent. II, d. 18, a. 1, q. 3 (II, 439a-443b). See van Buren (2021), 203.

  26. 26.

    In Sent. II, d. 3, p. 1, a. 2, q. 3, ad 1–3 (II, 110b): “[…] forma nulla est individua, nisi propter coniunctionem sui cum materia. Et universalia similiter, quia dicunt formas, non concernunt materiam nisi rationem suorum individuorum […].”

  27. 27.

    In Sent. II, d. 18, a. 1, q. 3, resp. (II, 441a-b): “Forma igitur universalis non est aliud quam forma totius, quae, cum de se nata sit esse in multis, universalis est.” We follow King’s translation in King (1994), 151. Peter King’s translation clearly suits our purpose as it explicitly expounds universal’s aptitudinal mode of being. His account of Bonaventure’s theory of universals focuses precisely on the aptitudinal character of universal predication. Nevertheless, the expression ‘apt to be in many’ is rendering the expression ‘natum esse ub multis’, and not ‘aptum esse in multis’. The different terminology must not, however, divert us from our line of reasoning, for in the very same question on the possibility of accidents without a subject, Bonaventure treats ‘aptum’ and ‘natum’ as synonyms. See In Sent. IV, d. 12, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1, resp. (IV, 271a): “Sic dicendum quod comparatio accidentis ad subiectum secundum aptitudinem est essentialis; et haec nunquam privatur ab accidente ab illis speciebus: verum est enim dicere quod sunt natae esse in subiecto.” Also, Bonaventure develops a thesis on aptitudinal predication or predication secundum esse aptitudinale. For instance, when one says that “man is an animal”, one predicates animal of man according to actual being, for man exists. But if one says “dinosaurs are animals”, one predicates animal of dinosaurs according to aptitudinal being, for there are no dinosaurs. Still, “dinosaurs are animals” is a true proposition, given that it has a true correspondence with (aptitudinal) being, given that if there were a dinosaur, it would also be an animal. So, when the subject of predication is in act, the form of the predicate is attributed to the subject secundum esse actuale. But when the subject of predication is not in act, nor is it the form of the predicate attributed to the subject, the form of the predicate is attributed to the subject secundum esse aptitudinale. Now, we easily see that universal predication is essentially predication secundum esse aptitudinale, for its truth value is not dependent on the actuality of its subject but indifferent to the actuality of the subject and the predicate. See In Sent. III, d. 22, a. 1, q. 1, resp. (III, 451b). In fact, Peter King makes an interesting point, recalling Bonaventure’s example of the single man in In Sent. III, d. 2, a. 2, q. 3, resp. (III, 49a), which states that if there were only one man, the term ‘man’ would still be a universal predicate, although it would only be actually predicated of one thing, for it would have the aptitude to be predicated of other men, if they existed. See King (1994), 164, n. 6.

  28. 28.

    In Sent. II, d. 18, a. 1, q. 3, resp. (II, 442b): “[…] si forma universalis dicatur proprie, secundum quam res est ordinabilis in genere, quam metaphysicus habet considerare, ratio seminalis non est forma universalis: si autem dicatur forma universalis, forma existens secundum esse incompletum in materia, et indifferens et possibilis ad multa producenda, sic potest dici ratio seminalis forma universalis.”

  29. 29.

    See In Sent. I, d. 8, p. 2, a. 1, q. 3, ad 1–2 (I, 171b-172a); In Sent. II, d. 13, a. 2, q. 1, arg. 2 (II, 319a); In Sent. II, d. 15, a. 1, q. 2, contra 3 (II, 377b).

  30. 30.

    In Sent. IV, d. 12, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1, resp. (IV, 271b): “Notandum igitur quod sicut comparatio accidentis ad operationem est dupliciter, scilicet secundum actum et secundum aptitudinem, ita etiam ad subiectum. Comparatio vero accidentis ad propriam operationem secundum aptitudinem est essentialis et inseparabilis; unde non potest esse quod sit albedo et non sit digregativa. Comparatio secundum actum consequitir essentiam; unde posset accidens separari ab actuali operatione; unde albedo non semper digregat.”

  31. 31.

    In Sent. II, d. 3, p. 1, a. 2, q. 3, resp. (II, 109b-110a). On the relation between form and esse, see Klubertanz (1946), 178–181; Roudaut (2020).

  32. 32.

    In Sent. II, d. 18, a.1, q. 3, resp. (II, 441b): “Hanc autem dicimus essentiam, et haec est universalis forma, ut dicit Avicenna. Dicit enim quod essentia nihil aliud est quam quidditas rei universalis.”

  33. 33.

    In Sent. IV, d. 12, a. 1, q. 1, resp. (IV, 270b): “Dicendum quod per miraculum potest fieri quod accidentia sint sine subiecto sive substantia. Cum enim differant per essentiam, potest Deus sine inconvenientia per virtutem suam illa separare.”

  34. 34.

    In Sent. IV, d. 12, a. 1, q. 1, arg. (IV, 270a): “Basilius, in Hexaemeron: ‘Cum enim Deus possit plus facere, quam intellectus intelligere’, et intellectus intelligat accidens praeter subiectum; ergo Deus potest hoc facere quod accidens sit sine subiecto.”

  35. 35.

    In Sent. II, d. 18, a. 1, q. 3, resp. (II, p. 440b).

  36. 36.

    In Sent. IV, d. 12, a. 1, q. 1, ad 1–2 (IV, 271a-b).

  37. 37.

    In Sent. IV, d. 12, a. 1, q. 1, ad 1–2 (IV, 271b).

  38. 38.

    In Sent. IV, d. 12, a. 1, q. 1, ad 3 (IV, 271b).

  39. 39.

    In Sent. IV, d. 12, a. 1, q. 1, ad 4 (IV, 271b).

  40. 40.

    In Sent. IV, d. 12, a. 1, q. 1, ad 5 (IV, 271b).

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  1. Centre of Philosophy of the University of Lisbon, Lisbon, Portugal

    Filipa Afonso

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  1. Department of Philosophy, Fordham University, New York, NY, USA

    Gyula Klima

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Afonso, F. (2023). Accidens Secundum Species: Bonaventure’s Solution to the Problem of the Accidens Sine Subiecto. In: Klima, G. (eds) The Metaphysics and Theology of the Eucharist. Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action, vol 10. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-40250-0_5

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