Abstract
While advancing the idea that morality is a universal human phenomenon, Kwasi Wiredu suggests that human reason, rather than the will of God, grounds morality and determines what is good in traditional Akan society. I note in this chapter that while Wiredu’s rationalism deviates from the traditional African theistic view that God is the source of morality, his appeal to reason rather than divine authority is consistent with his religious philosophy. This religious philosophy accommodates what I call the limited God view in the African philosophy of religion. I compare Wiredu’s humanistic moral framework with the moral framework sustained by traditional African theism and argue that from a practical standpoint, both moral frameworks are attractive, as they enhance the dignity of the human being.
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Notes
- 1.
It can be argued that the inherent rational capacity of the human being to discover and pursue moral values does not require the existence of any kind of deity, perfect or limited. The point will now be that it does not make any difference positing the existence of a limited God in the context under consideration since an entirely humanistic moral framework that makes no reference to God adequately accounts for the phenomenon of morality. This is true, and there is, in fact, a sceptical and even atheistic dimension of Wiredu’s limited God perspective, given that Wiredu concedes that the actual existence of the Akan God is a legitimate question for African philosophy (see Wiredu 1996: 54). Nevertheless, he recognises that the Akan generally believe in God and suggests that the practical application of moral principles can be influenced by belief in (a limited) God. In theory, Wiredu’s stance does not require the existence of a God, whether limited or perfect, for morality to be possible, but in practice belief in God can make a difference by providing additional ground for compliance with rational moral principles. That is, belief in a deity can invoke the force of divine authority that compels moral compliance. Wiredu acknowledges this point when he notes that: “The prospect of punishment from God or some lesser being may concentrate the mind on the narrow path of virtue, but it is not this that creates the sense of moral obligation” (Wiredu 2010: 195). Accordingly, the element of divinity does make a difference, at least for those who believe in God.
- 2.
While it can be argued that these African theistic scholars were not simply transplanting Christian theistic categories into African thought and that they were, to some extent, struggling to philosophically capture a certain transcendental conception of God embedded in traditional African worldviews (see Agada 2022a), the suggestion of foreign Christian influence has some merit as a number of the traditional African theistic scholars were Christian theologians.
- 3.
- 4.
Ani is arguing that the human origin of moral rules does not necessarily imply that the Akan are nonreligious, as Wiredu asserts. However, since Ani concedes that God is the author or giver of reason and since he conceives religiosity in terms of obedience, awe, and adoration of God, it is possible for the religious to disregard the human factor in the constitution of moral rules and ground morality in God’s will. See Section “Introduction” of this chapter.
- 5.
The world is conceived as the manifestation of divine vitality by African philosophers of the vitalistic orientation (see Tempels 1959; Gyekye 1995; Molefe 2018; Agada 2022b). God is the source of this vitality. The possession of this quality makes the human being an image or fragment of God that deserves dignified treatment. Wiredu seems to endorse this point when he observes that for the Akan human beings are unique by reason of their possession of the God-endowed okra.
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Agada, A. (2023). Wiredu on the Humanistic Orientation of Akan Morality. In: Molefe, M., Allsobrook, C. (eds) Human Dignity in an African Context. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-37341-1_13
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