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Free Speech Fallacies as Meta-Argumentative Errors

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Abstract

Free speech fallacies are errors of meta-argument. One commits a free speech fallacy when one argues that since there are apparent restrictions on one’s rights of free expression, procedural rules of critical exchange have been broken, and consequently, one’s preferred view is dialectically better off than it may otherwise seem. Free speech fallacies are meta-argumentative, since they occur at the level of assessing the dialectical situation in terms of norms of argument and in terms of meta-evidential principles of interpreting how and why people follow (or fail to follow) argumentative rules. Our plan here is to begin with a brief explanation of meta-argument and meta-argumentative fallacy. We will then turn to the variety of forms of the free speech fallacy, which we will explain as meta-argumentatively erroneous.

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Notes

  1. For a different perspective on the purpose of arguments see Aikin and Casey (2022a)

  2. For more on the concept of a meta-argumentative fallacy, see Aikin and Casey (forthcoming).

  3. See Aikin and Casey (2022b) for a full account of the straw man fallacy as a meta-argumentative error.

  4. See Aikin and Casey (2022c) for an account of the bothsiderist fallacy as a meta-argumentative error.

  5. A version of this argument is described in Cohen (2001)

  6. See Godden (2014) for an evaluation of this form of error as an equivocation on ‘entitlements’ to opinion.

  7. See Aikin and Casey (2019) for complete analyses of the Palin and West cases, emphasizing the fact that the speakers in these cases take the discomfort they feel with being the targets of criticism to be the point of the criticism.

  8. See Neil Levy’s (2019) for the case for no-platforming on the basis of the meta-evidential considerations for platforming—namely, that doing so generates higher-order evidence for claims that are indefensible on the first order. (Aikin and Casey 2022a, b, c) argue that gaining a place at the dialectical table is a key feature of bothsiderist arguing, since the appearance of there being a debate is sufficient for some to moderate their view.

  9. A similar case can be made for bothsiderism and the straw man (Aikin and Casey 2022a, b, c).

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Correspondence to John Casey.

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Aikin, S.F., Casey, J. Free Speech Fallacies as Meta-Argumentative Errors. Argumentation 37, 295–305 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-023-09601-0

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