Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

A strategic foundation for the cooperator's advantage

  • Published:
Theory and Decision Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Orbell and Dawes develop a non-game theoretic heuristic that yields a ‘cooperator's advantage’ by allowing players to project “their own ‘cooperate-defect’ choices onto potential partners” (1991, p. 515). With appropriate parameter values their heuristic yields a cooperative environment, but the cooperation “depends, simply, on optimism about others' behavior” (1991, p. 526). In earlier work, Dawes (1989) established a statistical foundation for such optimism. In this paper, I adapt some of the concerns of Dawes (1989) and develop a game theoretic model based on a modification of the Harsanyi structure of games with incomplete information (1967–1968). I show that the commonly made conjecture that strategic play is incompatible with cooperation and the cooperator's advantage is false.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

REFERENCES

  • Ainsworth, Scott and Itai Sened (1993), The role of lobbyists: Entrepreneurs with two audiences, American Journal of Political Science 37: 834-866.

    Google Scholar 

  • Axelrod, Robert (1984), The evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Axelrod, Robert and W.D. Hamilton (1981), The evolution of cooperation, Science 211: 1390-1396.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dawes, Robyn M. (1989), Statistical criteria for establishing a truly false consensus effect, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 25: 1-17.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dawkins, R. (1989), The Selfish Gene. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • DeGroot, Moris H. (1970), Optimal Statistical Decisions. New York: McGraw-Hill.

    Google Scholar 

  • Grafstein, Robert (1991), An evidential theory of turnout, American Journal of Political Science 35: 989-1010.

    Google Scholar 

  • Harsanyi, John C. (1967-1968), Games with incomplete information played by 'Bayesian' players, Management Science 14: 159-182, 320-334, 486-502.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mackie, J.L. (1978), The law of the jungle: moral alternatives and principles of evolution, Philosophy 53: 455-464.

    Google Scholar 

  • Maynard-Smith, John (1982), Evolution and the theory of games. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • McLean, Iain (1981), The social contract in Leviathan and the Prisoner'sDilemma supergame, Political Studies 29: 339-351.

    Google Scholar 

  • McLean, Iain (1991), What should rational cognitive misers do?, American Political Science Review 85: 1417-1418.

    Google Scholar 

  • Orbell, John and Robyn M. Dawes (1991), A 'cognitive miser' theory of cooperators' advantage, American Political Science Review 85: 515-528.

    Google Scholar 

  • Vanberg, Victor J. and Roger D. Congleton (1992), Rationality, morality, and exit, American Political Science Review 86: 418-431.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Political Science, Franklin College of Arts and Sciences, University of Georgia, Baldwin Hall, Athens, GA, 30602–1615, USA Phone

    Scott H. Ainsworth

Authors
  1. Scott H. Ainsworth
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Ainsworth, S.H. A strategic foundation for the cooperator's advantage. Theory and Decision 47, 101–110 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005084823048

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005084823048

Search

Navigation