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Terence Horgan and John Tienson, Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology

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References

  • Aizawa, K. (1994), ‘Representations without Rules, Connectionism, and the Syntactic Argument’, Synthese 101, pp. 465–492.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, Centenary College, Shreveport, LA, 71134, U.S.A. E-mail

    Kenneth Aizawa

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  1. Kenneth Aizawa
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Aizawa, K. Terence Horgan and John Tienson, Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology. Minds and Machines 9, 270–273 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008306400697

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