Ground and Cause (1922)

Abstract

This chapter is about logic and the relationship between truth/thought (or science) and reality (or fact). The specific concern is the relation between ground and cause. On one view, the ground of an inference is identical with the respective cause. But there are cases where the ground is not some physical event, but rather something non-causal, as in judgements about similarity among objects in intrinsic respects. It is argued that cause is logically prior to ground. The world as a system is founded on vast webs of causal relations, and these causal relations or larger causal structure have a temporal component; hence time figures in the structuring base of reality and system. A view about judgement and inference is then developed: inference is the scientist’s tool, whereas judgements (propositions) are the material, just like the marble is the material from which the sculptor creates a statue. This leads to an objectivist theory of judgement.

From Samuel Alexander Papers, GB133, ALEX/A/2/2/72, John Rylands Library, University of Manchester. Courtesy of the University of Manchester Library. The first part was intended for a volume to be published by the University of Jerusalem, which never appeared. The first part was, in fact, typeset for publication, dated 4 January 1923 (Samuel Alexander Papers, GB133, ALEX/A/2/3/37, John Rylands Library, University of Manchester).