Abstract
Indian psychology scholars have primarily focused on developing triguṇa-based personality models. However, triguṇa-based personality models are not epistemologically consistent with Sāṁkhya. This article offers a bhāva-based conception of personality that is epistemologically consistent with Sāṁkhya. It proposes svabhāva as a personality-like construct that refers to individual-specific arrangements of prākṛtika and vaikṛtika bhava. This article contributes to both Indian psychology and Sāṁkhya scholarship.
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svabhāva prabhavair guṇaiḥ — “their own nature born of by the modes of material nature” BG (XVIII.41) (Prabhupada, 1989). The term sāttvika would mean “predominantly caused by sattva.” The terms rājasika and tāmasika may be understood similarly.
The BG commentarial tradition typically represents different schools of the Vedānta system. These commentaries generally focus on the term svabhāva to determine the meaning of the term adhyātma (e.g., G. S. S. Shastri, 1936). Śaṁkara and his followers interpreted sva as pratyagātma – parabrahma or the Supreme Consciousness conditioned by individual bodies, the Indwelling Self, thereby defining adhyātma as the Knower presiding over individual bodies (G. S. S. Shastri, 1936). Madhva and his followers interpreted sva as jīva or Individual Self (G. S. S. Shastri, 1936). He held that the word bhāva indicates unchanging existence which is applicable only for jīva rather than for any of the karaṇa. Rāmānuja considered svabhāva as prakṛti such that adhyātma becomes the Non-Self that is associated with the Self (G. S. S. Shastri, 1936).
Sāṁkhya has a different point of departure in this regard. The term sva — self is meaningful only if there is any para — other. As per the YD (SK.35), like all other experiences, sva or sense of self has to be a pratyaya or ascertained experience that presupposes the functioning of karaṇa (Wezler & Motegi, 1998). Therefore, a Sāṁkhya interpretation of svabhāvao’dhyātmam ucyate would focus on the term adhyātma to determine the meaning of the term svabhāva. Focus on the term adhyātma indicates that sva can neither be attributed to adhibhūta or subjects of karaṇa functioning (Dvivedin, 1918) nor be attributed to puruṣa (the Knower) that, as per the SK (19) (J. Shastri, 2010), is sākṣī (witness) and dṛṣṭā (observer) of karaṇa. Therefore, sva or sense of self must be attributed to karaṇa per se rather than to puruṣa. Because karaṇa is admittedly anātma or Non-Self, the term svabhāva in Sāṁkhya would give the sense of svakīya bhāvaḥ — belonging to Self or puruṣa. This is the exact sense of the term adhyātma in Sāṁkhya (Dvivedin, 1918).
Karaṇa belong to the vyakta aspect of prakṛti. In this sense, considering svabhāva as karaṇa may be consistent with the position of Rāmānuja. Madhva’s objection regarding changing nature does not preclude the use of the term bhāva for karaṇa. Karaṇa, as the effects of prakṛti, can be considered to have continuous existence as per the principle of satkārya (SK.9).
As this concept is leveraged further in this article, it may be useful to present a summary of it based on the commentaries of Vyāsa and Vācaspati on the YS (2.12–14, 3.18, 4.8–11) (Agashe, 1904). Each action and experience modify the principal karaṇa in a certain way. Such modifications are of the form of impressions that remain latent and manifest on occasions. These impressions are called saṁskāra. Saṁskāra and actions reciprocally cause each other in a beginningless causal series (Mishra, 1953).
Saṁskāra are of two kinds: karmāśaya and vāsanā. Karmāśaya refers to the impressions formed due to the actions and experiences, whereas vāsanā refers to the impressions formed due to experiences of effects of karmāśaya (Āraṇya, 1983). In that sense, vāsanā pertains to an infinite series of past lives up to the present. Karmāśaya has two kinds of effects: dṛṣṭajanma vedanīya (manifesting during the present lifetime) and adṛṣṭajanma vedanīya (manifesting during some future lifetime). Dṛṣṭajanma vedanīya effects may be of two kinds: āyu (leading to an increase or decrease of present life span) and bhoga (pleasurable or unpleasant experiences). Involuntary actions that are performed entirely under the influence of saṁskāra are also called bhoga (Āraṇya, 1983). Adṛṣṭajanma vedanīya effects are of three kinds: jāti (birth in a particular species), āyu (given life span in that birth), and bhoga (possibilities of pleasure and pain during that life span). These three kinds of possible effects of karmāśaya create their own saṁskāra called as vāsanā: jāti vāsanā, āyu vāsanā, and bhoga vāsanā. Karmāśaya causes vāsanā to manifest as memory. Memories due to bhoga vāsanā include an urge for seeking pleasurable or avoiding unpleasant experiences. Bhoga vāsanā also manifests as urges to engage in the corresponding classes of actions when they become one of the probable choices.
puruṣārtha eva hetur na kenacit kāryate karaṇam (SK.31) (J. Shastri, 2010).
aniyataviṣayo dvārī niyataviṣayāṇi dvārāṇi — YD (SK.35) (Wezler & Motegi, 1998).
pratiniyamāt, pratyekaniyamādityarthaḥ — Gauḍapāda (SK.18) (J. Shastri, 2010).
yadā tu yogī bahūn kāyān nirmimīte tadā kim eka manaskāste bhavantyathāneka manaskā iti — YS (IV.4) (Āraṇya, 1983).
asmitāmātraṁ cittakāraṇamupādāya nirmāṇa cittāni karoti, tataḥ sacittāni bhavantīti — YS (IV.4) (Āraṇya, 1983).
ādividvān nirmāṇacittamadhiṣṭhāya kāruṇyādbhagavān paramarṣirāsuraye jijñāsamānāya tantraṁ provāca — YS (I.25) (Āraṇya, 1983).
pravṛttibhede prayojakaṁ cittamekamanekeṣām — YS (IV.V) (Āraṇya, 1983).
Vyāsa (YS, I.2) defined citta in terms of its three functions: prakhyā (cognition), pravṛtti (activity), and sthiti (retention) (Āraṇya, 1983). He YS (I.4) mentioned the Sāṁkhya principle that restricts the prakhyā function exclusively to buddhi – ekam eva darśanaṁ khyātir eva darśanam (Āraṇya, 1983).
It may be possible to substantiate this conclusion in the light of the Sāṁkhya Sūtra (II.42) provided an extant commentarial dispute gets resolved. Aniruddha (Garbe, 1888) held that the Sāṁkhya Sūtra (II.42) — tathā' śeṣa saṁskārā' dhāratvāt — is about manas, whereas Vijñānabhikṣu considered it to be about buddhi as the repository of all saṁskāra (Garbe, 1895). The idea of nirmāṇa citta may be useful for examining these two views. The Mokṣadharmaparva (CCC.26–27) of the Mahābhārata says that yogī can variously conduct themselves through thousands of their bodies created by the power of yoga; they can engage in sensory pleasures and perform intense austerities through those bodies and then, like the sun withdraws its rays, absorb them all within themselves (Vyāsa, 1953). If manas were the repository of all saṁskāra, then each nirmāṇa citta or at least the principal nirmāṇa citta must retain the saṁskāra of the experiences and actions taken through it. In that case, the dissolution of nirmāṇa citta would mean the dissolution of all karmāśaya and vāsanā generated through the created bodies. In other words, the yogī would neither be able to obtain results of actions performed through the dissolved bodies nor have any memories of them.
One may argue that such a condition would be desirable for the yogī who acts without attachment to results for the sole purpose of self-purification (BG, V.11). Such a condition would help speedy purification through exhausting existing karma without retaining newly formed saṁskāra. However, this argument would be inappropriate since the power to create multiple bodies and minds is attributed not only to the yogī seeking liberation but also to such beings as rākṣasa — a kind of lower celestial beings. For example, the Ghaṭotkacavadhaparva (CLXXV.106) of the Droṇaparva of the Mahābhārata mentions the creation of multiple bodies by the rākṣasa Ghaṭotkaca during the war (Vyāsa, 1953). There is little reason to think that such beings have a motive to create multiple bodies for the sole purpose of self-purification. One may argue that such beings can perform desired actions through their created bodies; just that thus created saṁskāra would dissolve with the dissolution of the created bodies. However, even this argument cannot obviate the necessary implication of losing all memory concerning created bodies upon their dissolution. It would be at variance with scores of such examples present in the epics and the Purāṇa texts. For example, the Kuṇdalāharaṇaparva (CCCVI.10) of the Vanaparva of the Mahābhārata mentions that Sūrya made his two forms through yoga (Vyāsa, 1953). He gave a son to the princesses Kuntī through the body thus created and remembered it all through. None of these difficulties would arise if buddhi is considered as the repository of all saṁskāra since the same buddhi would retain the saṁskāra generated through any number of bodies for the yogī.
puruṣādhiṣṭhitaṁ pradhānaṁ pravartate (Gauḍapāda, SK.17) (J. Shastri, 2010).
tasya sarva viṣayādhyavasāyarūpatvāt, asya tu svātma pratyavamarśāt YD (Sk.24) (Wezler & Motegi, 1998). The term self-awareness need not be confused with “Self” in the sense of puruṣa.
aham adhikṛtaḥ, śaktaḥ khalu ahamatra, madarthā evāmī viṣayāḥ, matto nānyoatrādhikṛtaḥ kaścidasti, atoahamasmi Vācaspati (SK.24) (Bhattacharya, 2010).
adhyavasāyo buddhiḥ (SK.23) (J. Shastri, 2010).
tatra rūpapravṛttiphalalakṣaṇaṁ vyaktam YD (SK.2) (Wezler & Motegi, 1998).
From a Sāṁkhya perspective, bhūtabhāva can be read as bhūtānām bhāvāḥ — the eightfold bhāva of embodied beings. The definition can be meaningfully read as (a) bhūtabhāvodbhavakaro visargaḥ and (b) bhūtabhāva udbhavakarḥ bhūtabhāva visargaḥ. In the former reading, the word udbhava may be taken in the sense of “expression,” whereas in the latter reading, it may be taken in the sense of “production.” Similarly, the word visarga may be taken in the sense of “grant” in the former reading, whereas in the latter reading, it may be taken in the sense of “release.” Thus, karma may be defined as a) granting expression to bhāva and b) producing as well as releasing bhāva. The first definition is about any thought, feeling, or action that expresses the underlying bhāva. It includes both the ascertainment of what an experience is as well as what to do regarding that experience. In that sense, karma is a much broader concept than action. The definition also implies that only buddhi vṛtti as such or vṛtti of other karaṇa accompanied by buddhi vṛtti qualify as karma.
Further, the term visarga indicates that bhāva as causes are not continuous with karma as effects. Since material causation requires continuity between cause and effect (Wezler & Motegi, 1998), the term visarga implies that bhāva and karma can only be related through efficient causation. The second definition includes the first one while factoring the saṁskāra produced. The YD (SK.23) says that karma produces āśaya or saṁskāra that constitute bhāva (Wezler & Motegi, 1998). For example, while describing dharma, it says that it is the sāttvika saṁskāra residing in buddhi as a result of the performance of the actions prescribed in the scriptures — tatra śrutismṛtivihitānāṁ karmaṇāṁ anuṣṭhānād buddhyavasthaḥ sattvāvayava āśayabhūto dharma iti ucyate (Wezler & Motegi, 1998). Karma and saṁskāra form a beginningless causal chain (Mishra, 1953). Thus, it is a fuller definition that underlines karma as a) an effect of bhāva through efficient causation and b) the cause of saṁskāra (karmāśaya) through material causation.
ye me karma kariṣyanti YD (SK.46) (Wezler & Motegi, 1998).
dharmādharmābhyāṁ vyavacchettuṁ vāsanāyāḥ svarūpamāha Vācaspati (YS, II.13) (Agashe, 1904).
jñānādyaṅgabhūtaś ca prathamaḥ YD (SK.23) (Wezler & Motegi, 1998).
vṛttimātre hi mahato dharmādyupacāraḥ YD (SK.23) (Wezler & Motegi, 1998).
sahaiva kāryakaraṇābhyāṁ jñānam abhiniṣpadyate pradīpaprakāśavat iti ataḥ sāṁsiddhikam YD (SK.43) (Wezler & Motegi, 1998).
yasya sattvapradhānaṁ kāryakaraṇaṁ sa paramarṣiḥ YD (SK.15) (Wezler & Motegi, 1998).
jātikṛtaś ca viśeṣaḥ haṁsānāṁ śauklyaṁ tittirimayūrādīnāṁ citracchadatvam iti YD (SK.43) (Wezler & Motegi, 1998).
tatastadvipākānuguṇānāmevābhivyaktir vāsanānām YS (IV.8) (Āraṇya, 1983).
Both Nandī and Nahuṣa were born humans who were, from that very body, transformed into respectively a deva with the boon of Śiva and a python with the curse of Agastya. Thus, both were cases of change of karaṇa prakṛti — respectively from human to deva and python — in a single life. As a consequence, the YD (SK.43) says that Nandī developed aiśvarya, whereas Nahuṣa developed dharma (Wezler & Motegi, 1998). Aiśvarya of Nandī is cited as an example of prākṛtika bhāva because it reflects the karaṇa prakṛti of a deva. The Skanda Purāṇa (1.2.LV.93–94) says that each of the eight categories of deva is endowed with divine powers of various kinds (Vyāsa, 1959). Since, as per the YD (SK.43), sāṁsiddhika aiśvarya is only for the mahātmya śarīra (Wezler & Motegi, 1998), the aiśvarya naturally present in all other kinds of deva must be prākṛtika.
adharmo yakṣarakṣaḥprabhṛtīnām YD (SK.43) (Wezler & Motegi, 1998).
aṣṭaupūrvā imācāṣṭau rākṣasānāṁpure smṛtāḥ Skanda Purāṇa (1.2.LV.99) (Vyāsa, 1959).
sattvasyāpaṭutvāt kālāntareṇa prakṛtyabhiṣyandād yad drag iti bhavati kṛṣṇasarpadarśanavat tat prākṛtam YD (SK.43) (Wezler & Motegi, 1998).
yadā tu keṣāṁcid indriyāṇāṁ paripakvaṁ sā vyatirekasaṁjñā YD (SK.23) (Wezler & Motegi, 1998).
rāgo’jñānaṁ ca paramarṣivarjyānām YD (SK.43) (Wezler & Motegi, 1998).
saṁsāro bhavati rājasād rāgāt SK(45) (J. Shastri, 2010).
madhye tiṣṭhanti rājasaḥ BG (XIV.18) (Bolle, 1979).
atyantaṁ kriyāpravṛttatvāt YD (SK.54) (Wezler & Motegi, 1998).
It may be formally defined as prākṛtikāḥ vaikṛtikāḥ ca bhāvānāṁ sanniveśaviśeṣaḥ svabhāvaḥ.
viparyayeṇāpyadharmo dharmaṁ bādhate tataścāśuddhipariṇāma iti, tatrāpi nahuṣājagarādaya udāhāryāḥ Vyāsa (YS, IV.3) (Āraṇya, 1983).
nahuṣasyāgastyasamparkād dharma YD (SK.43) (Wezler & Motegi, 1998).
itihāsapurāṇābhyāṁ vedaṁ samupabṛṁhayet // bibhetyalpaśrutād vedo māmayaṁ prahariṣyati / Anukramaṇikāparva (I.267–268) (Vyāsa, 1953).
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Acknowledgements
I extend my gratitude to Profs. Bauanand Jha and Gerald J. Larson for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this article.
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This study was supported by the Most Promising Doctoral Dissertation Award given by the Management, Spirituality, and Religion interest group of the Academy of Management, USA.
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Alok, K. Svabhāvo’dhyātmam ucyate: Defining Human Personality Through Sāṁkhya. DHARM 4, 115–133 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s42240-021-00101-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s42240-021-00101-6