Abstract
The problem of economic justice is the division and distribution of income and wealth. Is a just distribution an equal distribution, or are some unequal distributions just, and if so which ones? We critically examine what the ideal theories of justice of Aristotle and Rawls say or imply about a just distribution of wealth and income in the best of circumstances. Rawls’ contractarian view takes strict equality to be the benchmark of justice; Aristotle’s teleological theory claims that the equality appropriate to distributive justice is proportional, equality of ratios among persons’ shares of a good and their respective merits for that good. The applications of the two theories result in different distributional outcomes. Aristotle’s justice principle will result in unequal outcomes if the merits of persons are unequal and in equal outcomes if the merits are equal. An example of the latter is his best polis and constitution--its ideal citizens will have superlative and equal merits and they will justly receive equal political and economic shares. Although he supports reducing economic inequalities in actual cities, serious inequalities in resources will remain. Rawls’ basic principle of justice will produce equal shares. But democracies allow great inequalities in wealth and income, presumably recognizing that some inequalities promote the common good; everyone is better off when some economic incentives are rewarded. But which economic inequalities are just? Rawls in his second principle of justice identifies the most widely held way of answering this question.
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Notes
- 1.
Piketty (2014), p. 20; see especially, ch. 8, Two Worlds, and chs. 9–11, especially pp. 418–22.
- 2.
Rawls (1971), pp. 74–75.
- 3.
- 4.
See, e.g. Piketty (2014), ch.11, Merit and Inheritance in the Long Run.
- 5.
Rawls (1971), ch. II, section 14.
- 6.
Ibid., ch. III.
- 7.
Ibid., p. 41.
- 8.
Unless made clear by the context, citations that do not identify a work by Aristotle are from his Politics. Translations of quoted passages from the Politics (sometimes slightly modified) are from C.D.C. Reeve (1998).
- 9.
Aristotle states that ruling is necessary in any association; it is implied by his Principle of Rulership which he views as a law of nature applying to all composite things, one kind of which is associations (I.5.1254a30). Cf. Keyt (2017a, b), pp. 139–164, who argues that Aristotle’s own principles imply anarchism.
- 10.
On Aristotle’s arguments in support of his claim that women are permanent subjects, see Dorothea Frede (2018).
- 11.
Aristotle sees the supposed connection between democracy and poverty as being so strong that in some of the passages just cited, he speaks as if the latter is an essential property of the former.
- 12.
- 13.
- 14.
- 15.
Plato in the Republic (V.450a, VI.498c–d) presents even Thrasymachus as having been persuaded by the Socratic arguments and as being in agreement with the Socratic (or Platonic) view on justice.
- 16.
Cf. Rawls (2001), pp. 9, 15, 32, who claims that reasonable pluralism and the fact that citizens have conflicting religious, philosophical, and moral views make agreement on a comprehensive moral doctrine impossible but that justice as fairness does not need it.
- 17.
- 18.
(Keyt, 1991), p. 248.
- 19.
For this classification of the types of ends, see Keyt (2017b), pp. 74–75.
- 20.
For a more detailed discussion of this matter, see Anagnostopoulos (2018), especially pp. 186–90.
- 21.
For slaves being a kind of wealth, see also Pol II.7.
- 22.
Serious doubts about the need and usefulness of an ideal theory of justice have been recently raised by Amartya Sen (2006).
- 23.
Aristotle’s distribution of political shares has been seen as evidence that he had a conception of political rights. Fred Miller (1995) has provided the most systematic, rigorous, and persuasive arguments in support of this position. In ch. 5 of that work he gives compelling arguments that the political community in Aristotle is understood as a community of citizens who have political rights.
- 24.
- 25.
Cf. Rawls (2001), p. 60, who also understands his primary goods as what free and equal persons need as citizens.
- 26.
R.F. Stalley correctly notes that Aristotle (Pol II.6.1265b25–26) is critical of Plato’s proposal to give to each citizen plots of land in two different locations because of the supposed inefficiency of living in two different locations (Ernest Barker and R.F. Stalley [1995], p. 491). But Aristotle may not be inconsistent. His citizens, unlike Plato’s, are not expected to farm the plots themselves—slaves will do the task—or to live outside the polis.
- 27.
Perhaps Aristotle makes an ideal assumption about uniform productivity of the territory that is consistent with his proviso of not assuming anything impossible. After all, the area of the territory is expected to be relatively small—“it can be easily surveyed as a whole”, (VII.4.1326b23)—and it could be uniformly productive.
- 28.
See Fred Miller (2018) for a fine analysis and criticism of Aristotle’s position on the supposed incompatibility of virtue and occupations of the marketplace.
- 29.
Rawls (1971), ch. II.
- 30.
Ibid., p. 62.
- 31.
Barry (1989), pp. 217–26.
- 32.
Rawls (1971), pp. 7, 74–75, 92.
- 33.
- 34.
See Thomas Piketty (2014), ch. 8, Two Worlds, and chs. 9, 10, and 11, especially pp. 418–22.
- 35.
Rawls (1971), pp. 62, 92.
- 36.
Piketty (2014), p. 480.
- 37.
Rawls (1971), ch. II, section 12.
- 38.
Ibid., p.73.
- 39.
Ibid., pp. 83–90.
- 40.
Ibid., p. 67.
- 41.
Ibid., p. 71 and note 10 where Rawls cites economists agreeing that efficiency must be supplemented by equity.
- 42.
Ibid., p. 98.
- 43.
Ibid., p. 75.
- 44.
Barry (1989), pp. 226–34.
- 45.
Rawls (1971), p. 80.
- 46.
Ibid., p. 82.
- 47.
Barry (1989), pp. 231–34.
- 48.
See, e.g. the great article by Leif Wenar (2021).
- 49.
Knight (1897).
- 50.
Rawls (1993), pp. 227–49.
- 51.
Rawls (1971), p. 96.
- 52.
Ibid., ch. IV, section 31, The Four-Stage Sequence.
- 53.
Piketty (2014), p. 22.
- 54.
Ibid., pp. 484–87.
- 55.
Ibid., ch. 14, for significant data and analysis.
- 56.
- 57.
This paper had its origin in a philosophy seminar on “Plato’s and Aristotle’s Ideal Theories of Justice” I taught on several occasions at the University of California, San Diego. Knowing of his lifelong interest and expertise in the ethical and political theories of Plato, Aristotle, and Rawls, I invited the late Professor Gerasimos (Jerry) Santas to join me in the teaching of the seminar. He enthusiastically accepted the invitation, and what ensued was one of the most rewarding collaborations in my career. The extreme economic inequalities in our times and the publication of Thomas Piketty’s timely book led us to devote sessions of the seminar to justice and wealth inequalities. Jerry thought highly of Piketty’s book, finding the exhaustive data it provided on wealth inequalities and the author’s account of their causes and suggestions for moderating them most impressive. He thought that Piketty’s proposals for moderating wealth inequalities were consistent with and echoed Rawls’ views on this issue. So, we decided to write a paper on Aristotle’s and Rawls’ views on justice and economic inequalities. And when the editors of this volume invited each one of us to contribute a paper to a festschrift for Fred Miller, we immediately decided to contribute the joint paper on Aristotle and Rawls and started sketching out the parts and subtopics of the paper as they presently are. Since Jerry was facing some serious health problems at the time, we concentrated on first completing Parts A and C, which were essentially completed before Jerry’s passing in June 2021. As one might expect, Fred Miller’s writings on Aristotle, especially Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristotle’s Politics, figured prominently in our seminar and private discussions. Indeed, we invited Fred to give a guest lecture at the seminar. Both of us considered it an honor to be asked to contribute a paper for a volume dedicated to Fred Miller, and I want to thank the editors for inviting us to do so.
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Anagnostopoulos, G., Santas, G. (2024). Aristotle and Rawls on Economic (In)equalities and Ideal Justice. In: Keyt, D., Shields, C. (eds) Principles and Praxis in Ancient Greek Philosophy. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 155. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-51146-2_16
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