Climate Change, the Non-identity Problem, and the Metaphysics of Transgenerational Actions

Abstract

Why should one take action to move toward a greener world if doing so will cause the birth of a totally different group of future people? This chapter starts from the metaphysical evidence that many collective climate actions imply a change in the identity of future generations, as opposed to a counterfactual laissez-faire attitude. The climatic fallout from the non-identity paradox introduced by Derek Parfit is examined to determine if and how a principle of transgenerational responsibility can be defended against this metaphysical complexity. The paradox is divided into a moral argument, based on the person-affecting view of harm, and a metaphysical premise, treating non-identity as a result of variations in timing and pair combination of a person’s conception. Three strategies to circumvent the moral argument are explored: non-consequentialist accounts of harm, moral thresholds, and impersonal ethics. However, it is argued that all three strategies fall short or come with too high a cost. The metaphysical premise is then examined through the introduction of transgenerational actions in relation to the climate crisis. A principle of transgenerational responsibility applicable to climate change mitigation is inferred from the hypothetical consent to be obtained from those who will continue transgenerational actions in the future.

“Although the chapter was jointly conceived, the authors wrote different sections. Tiziana Andina wrote the following sections: “Challenging the Metaphysical Premise” (and relative sub-sections), and “From the Non-identity Problem to the Principle of Transgenerational Responsibility”. Fausto Corvino wrote the following sections: “The Structure of the Non-identity Paradox”, “Challenging the Moral Argument of the Non-identity Paradox” (and relative sub-sections), and “The Non-identity Problem From the Individualist to the Collectivist Perspective”.