Abstract
It is widely acknowledged that epistemic modals admit of inter-subjective flexibility. This paper introduces intra-subjective flexibility for epistemic modals and draws on this flexibility to argue that fallibilism is consistent with the standard account of epistemic modals.
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Notes
The ‘for S’ makes S’s epistemic perspective the perspective relevant for determining the truth or falsity of the might claim. The most common use of the epistemic modal is such that the relevant perspective is speaker-inclusive. But as Hawthorne (2004, p. 27) notes, there are deviant uses that are not speaker-inclusive. For example, when I know that the way out of the maze is on the left, but you are in the maze and do not know the way out, I can say to you, ‘the way out might be on the right.’ In such circumstances, my utterance is consistent with the know-might principle because I speak with your epistemic perspective in mind, not mine.
Even David Lewis, who argued that fallibilism sounds mad, admits that we cannot rule out all error possibilities—we must ignore some.
As I understand fallibilism, it is merely committed to the view that some of our knowledge is fallible. The extent to which particular fallibilists are committed to CKAs will depend on how much of our knowledge they take to be fallible. If, for example, one holds that knowledge of tautologies is infallible, then one will not be committed to CKAs for tautologies. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for bringing to my attention the need to make this point clear.
The ‘might’ in CKAs should be read as an epistemic might, which is the natural reading.
Eavesdroppers cases are also prominent in the literature, and also focus on inter-subjective flexibility.
I will be construing the modal base as a set of propositions, though I am aware that it is a common—especially among semanticists—to think of the base as a set of possible worlds.
The example would be more apt if rather than making a mistake in calculation, the mate simply did not look carefully at the log and thereby overlooked an entry. A mistake in calculation leaves open the possibility that the mate’s total knowledge entails ~p. Thanks to John Hawthorne here.
Of course, this needs more precise spelling out. My purpose is merely to point out that there is some precedent to allow more than the speaker or relevant group’s knowledge to determine the truth or falsity of the modal utterance.
Although in the case the mate uses ‘it is possible that p’ rather than ‘might p,’ the substitution does not change anything germane to the example.
This is not intended to be an exhaustive list of options for epistemic modal restrictions. The base could be such that it both includes some unknown propositions and excludes some known propositions. Those inclined to allow that unknown propositions can be evidence will likely use a restriction of this sort.
Given the numerous dimensions of flexibility present in other kinds of modals, we should not be surprised that epistemic modals admit of various kinds of flexibility. For example, the set of norms salient for determining the truth of a deontic modal utterance does not always include all the norms that govern in any context, but could include only a subset. An action could be impermissible with respect to all the norms governing a context, but permissible with respect to a subset of those norms—an action could be immoral, but legal, for example. In this way, something analogous to the intra-subjective flexibility of epistemic modals is arguably exhibited in deontic modals. Additionally, deontic modals are flexible with respect to how much of what occurs in the actual world we hold fixed. If we hold fixed that Alice went to the party, we may judge that she ought to have driven Sally home. But if we do not hold fixed that Alice went to the party, we may not be inclined to say she ought to have driven Sally home. For further discussion see Kratzer (2012). Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting I draw attention to this point.
Removal of p is intended as a constraint on the relevant base, rather than an account of the base. Clearly the base will most often be restricted by removing more than just p. Exactly what the subset base will consist of will depend on one’s account of fallibilism. Attractive candidates are likely to be S’s evidence, basic knowledge, appearances, or what is obvious to S. My purpose in this section is merely to point out the availability of a base that does not include S’s total knowledge; I refrain from committing to any particular view regarding what the base consists of. Intra-subjective flexibility can accommodate various fallibilist positions.
A contextualist about knowledge may contest that there is no restriction of Harry’s epistemic base in this case since, given contextualism, Harry does not know ‘it’s a zebra’ once the mule possibility is raised. On this interpretation of Harry’s assertion the base of the modal in the first clause does not include p, yet the base is Harry’s total epistemic base. To explain why Harry could truly assert that he knows it’s a zebra in the second part of his utterance, the contextualist posits a mid-sentence context shift. Those willing to posit such context shifts can explain these utterances without intra-subjective flexibility. Although contextualists may not need intra-subjective flexibility to explain CKAs, it is needed to explain other utterances, such (3).
My use of ‘evidence’ here is intended to be neutral with respect to any particular theory of evidence, including E = K. For those inclined to E = K, the relevant base will consist of a subset of the subject’s evidence.
While in some cases we may be inclined to deny that one knows p when an error possibility is made salient, I contend that not every mention of a possibility of error results in a disinclination to utter ‘I know p.’ Speakers will not always retract the knowledge claim in the sorts of cases I have articulated above.
The clause ‘eliminate possibilities of error’ is a bit more nuanced than ‘might p’ or ‘possibly p’ clauses, but for my purposes here the difference is not relevant.
Once again, the relevant base will involve more than merely the removal of p, but for the purposes of contrasting K-p uses of the modal with the ordinary use of the modal—that is, KT uses—p removal will suffice, as it constitutes the most salient difference between the two uses.
Stanley (2005, pp. 126–128) makes it explicit that this is his reading of CKAs.
Indeed, on this way of thinking, we are saddled with an error theory for many ordinary uses of epistemic modals.
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Acknowledgments
For helpful comments on this paper I am grateful to John Greco, Joe Salerno, and especially John Hawthorne. Thanks also to audiences at Northwestern University and the 2012 Central APA where this material was presented.
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Anderson, C. Fallibilism and the flexibility of epistemic modals. Philos Stud 167, 597–606 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0115-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0115-9