Kant on the Apriority of Causal Laws

Abstract

Kant famously rejected an empiricist account of causal claims, because it cannot account for the necessity and universality of causal laws. He then concludes that causal claims must have an a priori basis:¹

the concept of cause cannot arise in this [empiricist] way at all, but must either be grounded in the understanding completely a priori or else be entirely surrendered as a mere fantasy of the brain. For this concept always requires that something A be of such a kind that something else B follows from it necessarily and in accordance with an absolutely universal rule. Appearances may well offer cases from which a rule is possible in accordance with which something usually happens, but never a rule in accordance with which the succession is necessary; thus to the synthesis of cause and effect there belongs a dignity that can never be expressed empirically, namely that the effect does not merely come along with the cause, but is posited through it and follows from it. [A 91/B 123-4]

So much is clearly Kant’s view, and as long as we remain with the vague formulation that causal generalizations have some a priori ground or other, commentators agree.

The audience at HOPOS 2000, where this material was presented, provided extremely helpful questions and comments. Thanks are also due to Richard Creath, Michael Friedman, Paul Guyer, Ken Reisman, Alan Richardson, Pat Suppes, and Ken Taylor for useful conversations about the issues discussed.