Abstract
A variety of thought experiments suggest that, if the standard picture of practical rationality is correct, then practical rationality is sometimes an obstacle to practical success. For some, this in turn suggests that there is something wrong with the standard picture. In particular, it has been argued that we should revise the standard picture so that practical rationality and practical success emerge as more closely connected than the current picture allows. In this paper, I construct a choice situation—which I refer to as the Newxin puzzle—and discuss its implications in relation to the revisionist approach just described. Using the Newxin puzzle, I argue that the approach leads to a more radically revisionist picture of practical rationality than current debate suggests.
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Notes
Note that there is some debate concerning the coherence of Newcomb’s problem. Some—including, for example, Stephen Maitzen and Garnett Wilson (2003)—have dismissed the problem as ill-formed. A defense of the coherence of the problem is beyond the scope of this paper.
Note that since different deliberative procedures can prompt different practical conclusions, even given the same views concerning the facts of the situation, the pragmatic standard of evaluation for actions provided by P does not necessarily go hand in hand with a pragmatic standard of evaluation for beliefs. Rather than relying on ‘convenient’ beliefs, effective practical deliberation can instead involve deliberating from the facts of a situation in a ‘convenient’ way.
Presumably, one cannot resolve to drink the toxin if one is confident that one will not stick to one’s resolution when the time for action arrives. One might, however, resolve to drink the toxin without forming a clear judgment (or belief) concerning (the far-from-trivial question of) whether one’s situation and motivations combined will be conducive to one’s actually sticking to one’s resolution when the time for action arrives. For an extended discussion concerning this possibility, see (Andreou 2004).
References
Andreou, C. (2004). Instrumentally rational myopic planning. Philosophical Papers, 33(2), 133–145
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Kavka, G. S. (1983). The toxin puzzle. Analysis, 43, 33–36.
Maitzen, S., & Wilson, G. (2003). Newcomb’s hidden regress. Theory and Decision, 54, 151–162.
McClennen, E. (1997). Pragmatic rationality and rules. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 26(3), 210–258.
Nozick, R. (1993) The nature of rationality. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Acknowledgments
My thanks to Donald Bruckner, Elijah Millgram, Mike White, and an anonymous referee for valuable comments on earlier drafts of this piece.
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Andreou, C. The Newxin puzzle. Philos Stud 139, 415–422 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-007-9131-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-007-9131-y