Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Counterpossibles and Normal Defaults in the Filioque Controversy

  • Published:
Logica Universalis Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

A counterpossible conditional, or counterpossible for short, is a conditional proposition whose antecedent is impossible. The filioque doctrine is a dogma of western Christian Trinitarian theology according to which the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son. The filioque doctrine was the principal theological reason for the Great Schism, the split between Eastern Orthodoxy and western Christianity, which continues today. In the paper, I review one of the earliest medieval defenses of the doctrine in Anselm of Canterbury, and I show that Anselm’s treatment of counterpossible conditionals concerning the procession of the spirit from the son in Trinitarian theology represent an early foray into default logic. Thus, the mutual estrangement of eastern and western positions on the matter may not lie fundamentally in a change in dogma, but rather in a change in logic.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. [8, 10, par. 32], [9, 128–129, par. 70], [25, pp. 61, 248], [26, III. 3. 38, pp. 727–731], [13, I. 8, 1st conclusion]. For a recent defense, see [27]. Williamson’s position is critiqued in [4].

  2. At the time of the Arian controversy, it was commonly accepted that the Christ had existed prior to being conceived and born of a Virgin, but rather had an existence as the word of God. Arianism represented an early attempt to make sense of the relation of the Father to the Son prior to the latter’s being incarnated in the flesh. Arianism held that Christ was less than divine, and akin to a kind of Platonic demi-urge, a created being who nevertheless served as a ruling intermediary between God and lower beings. Its distinctive theses were that Christ was of a like essence (homoiousios) to the Father; and that the Christ was a created being. Hence, though Christ existed prior to being incarnate, there was nevertheless a time when Christ did not exist.

  3. [1, ch. 57]. What is perhaps more notable is that there, Anselm appears to treat the doctrine as one derivable from reason alone.

  4. For introductions to non-monotonic reasoning, see [12, 15, 20, 23], and the collections in [7, 21]. For non-monotonic reasoning in Anselm, see [3].

  5. I am here taking procession in the generic sense of being from, which encompasses both spiration and filiation as more specific types.

  6. See [2, 470-471].

  7. Note the use here of a limited version of the principle of the Indiscernibility of Identicals - i.e. that (divine) persons identical (in nature) share the same predicates (excepting those connoting their constitutive relations to each other).

  8. If one were to remove the premise of the Son and Spirit’s non-identity from the premise set, a third extension, on which the Spirit is identical to the Son, would also be possible. Thomas Aquinas will use this possibility to advance the claim that if the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son, the Spirit is not distinct from the Son. Anselm, by contrast, assumes that the differences in mode of procession are sufficient to distinguish the persons from each other. Cf. [24, Bk. I, d. 11, q. 1, a. 2]. Anselm is later followed in his position by Henry of Ghent. See [10, V, q. 9]; [16].

  9. See [19, Part 1, par. 6].

  10. To avoid this consequence, Anselm posits a primitive distinction between these qualities of begetting and spiration: ‘The Son and the Holy Spirit exist from the Father - but in different ways. the one by being begotten, and the other by proceeding, so that for this reason they are distinct from each other’ [2, 474]. Given, however, the common assumption that divine operations are not distinct from the divine essence, and hence neither are they distinct from each other, this reply seems less than promising.

  11. This criterion ultimately goes back to Aristotle. For discussion, see [5].

References

  1. Anselm of Canterbury. Monologion. In: Migne, J.P. (ed.) Patrologia Cursus Completus. Series Latina, Vol. 158, pp. 1841-1855. Chadwyck-Healy, Paris

  2. Anselm of Canterbury. The procession of the holy spirit. In: Complete Philosophical and Theological Treatises. Trans. by Jasper Hopkins and Herbert Richardson, pp. 466–514 . Arthur J. Banning Press, Minneapolis (2000)

  3. Archambault, J.: Monotonic and non-monotonic embeddings of Anselm’s proof. Log. Univ. 11, 121–138 (2017)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  4. Berto, F., et al.: Williamson on counterpossibles. J. Philos. Log. 47(4), 693–713 (2018)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  5. Castagnoli, L.: Aristotle on the non-cause fallacy. Hist. Philos. Log. 37(1), 9–32 (2016)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  6. Eadmer of Canterbury. Vita Sancti Anselmi. In: Migne J.P. (ed.) Patrologia Cursus Completus. Series Latina, Vol. 158, pp. 49–118. Chadwyck-Healy, Paris (1841-1855)

  7. Ginsberg, M.L. (ed.): Readings in Nonmonotonic Reasoning. Morgan Kaufmann, San Francisco (1987)

    Google Scholar 

  8. Green-Pedersen, N.J.: Two early anonymous tracts on consequences. In: Cahiers de L’Institut du Moyen-Âge Grec et Latin, vol. 35, pp. 1–28 (1980)

  9. Green-Pedersen, N.J.: Walter Burley’s de consequentiis. An edition. In: Franciscan Studies, vol. 40, pp. 102–166 (1980)

  10. Henry of Ghent. Quodlibeta. Paris (1518)

  11. Horty, J.F.: Moral dilemmas and nonmonotonic logic. J. Philos. Log. 23(1), 35–65 (1994)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  12. Horty, J.F.: Nonmonotonic logic. In: Goble, L. (ed.) The Blackwell Guide to Philosophical Logic, pp. 336–361. Blackwell, Malden (2001)

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  13. John, B.: Treatise on Consequences. Trans. by Stephen Read. Fordham University Press, Bronx, NY (2015)

  14. Larchet, J.-C.: Maxime le Confesseur, médiateur entre l’Orient et l’Occident. Cerf (1998)

  15. Makinson, D.: Bridges from Classical to Nonmonotonic Logic. College Publications, London (2005)

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  16. Martin, C.J.: Formal consequence in Scotus and Ockham. Towards an account of scotus’ logic”. In: Boulnois, O., Karger, E., Sondag, G. (eds.) Duns Scotus in Paris, 1302–2002: Proceedings of the Conference of Paris, 2–4 September 2002, pp. 117–15 . Brepols, Turnhout (2004)

    Google Scholar 

  17. Martin, C.J.: William’s machine. J. Philos. 83, 564–72 (1986)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  18. Migne, J.P. (ed.): Patrologia Cursus Completus. Series Latina. Chadwyck-Healy, Paris (1841-1855)

  19. Photius of Constantinople. Mystagogy of the Holy Spirit. http://www.myriobiblos.gr/texts/english/photios_mystagogy.html

  20. Reiter, R.: A logic for default reasoning. Artif. Intell. 13, 81–132 (1980)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  21. Schurz, G., Leitgeb, H. (eds.): Synthese: Special Issue on Non-monotonic Reasoning, vol. 146.1 (2005)

  22. Sharpe, R.: Anselm as author: publishing in the late eleventh century. J. Med. Latin 19(1), 1–87 (2009)

    Google Scholar 

  23. Strasser, C., Aldo, A.G.: Non-monotonic logic. In: Zalta, E.N. (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University (2016). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/logic-nonmonotonic

  24. Thomas, A..: Scriptum Super Sententiis. Parma (1856). http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/snp1009.html

  25. Walter, B.: De Puritate Artis Logicae. Ed. by Philotheus Boehner. Franciscan Institute, St Bonaventure (1955)

  26. William of Ockham. Summa Logicae. In: Opera Philosophica. Ed. by Philotheus Boehner, Gedeon Gàl, and Stephen Brown. Vol. 1. Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure (1974)

  27. Williamson, T.: Counterpossibles. Topoi 37(3), 357–368 (2018)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Waystar, 888 W. Market St, Louisville, KY, 40202, USA

    Jacob Archambault

Authors
  1. Jacob Archambault
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Jacob Archambault.

Additional information

Publisher's Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Archambault, J. Counterpossibles and Normal Defaults in the Filioque Controversy. Log. Univers. 13, 443–455 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11787-019-00229-x

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11787-019-00229-x

Keywords

Mathematics Subject Classification

Search

Navigation