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Rejecting the order of public reason

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Notes

  1. Gaus (2011). Page numbers enclosed in parentheses of the text refer to this book. For John Rawls on public reason, see especially his A Theory of Justice (1999); also Rawls (1996).

  2. Anscombe (1981, p. 52).

  3. Cf. Rousseau (1987).

  4. On the need for distinct and separate levels of moral thinking, (see Hare 1981). Hare speaks of intuitive and critical thinking. I would suppose the levels include one of fundamental moral principles, one of public morality, one of informal social rules, another of enforced legal rules and policies. Hare writes from a consequentialist standpoint, but the point he is making is not sectarian: both consequentialists and nonconseqentialists will need to distinguish various levels of moral thinking.

References

  • Anscombe, G. E. M. (1981). War and murder. Reprinted in her Ethics, religion, and politics (pp. 51–61). Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

  • Gaus, G. (2011). The order of public reason: A theory of freedom and morality in a diverse and bounded world. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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  • Hare, R. M. (1981). Moral thinking: Its levels, method, and point. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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  • Rawls, J. (1996). Political liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press.

  • Rawls, J. (1999). A theory of justice, rev. ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

  • Rousseau, J.-J. (1987). The social contract. In The basic political writings (Ed. and Trans: Cress D.) (pp. 139–227). Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, University of California at San Diego, 9500 Gilman Dr., La Jolla, CA, 92093-0119, USA

    Richard Arneson

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  1. Richard Arneson
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Correspondence to Richard Arneson.

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Arneson, R. Rejecting the order of public reason . Philos Stud 170, 537–544 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0268-6

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