Abstract
The goal of this essay is to put forward an original theory of artifact function, which takes on board the results of the debate on the notion of biological function and also accommodates the distinctive aspects of artifacts. More precisely, the paper develops and defends the Dual-Aspect Theory, which is a monist account according to which an artifact’s function depends on intentional and reproductive aspects. It is argued that this approach meets a set of theoretical and meta-theoretical desiderata and is superior to alternative views.
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Notes
The Essential/accidental desideratum is sometimes understood as suggesting that a theory of function should not only distinguish functional from non-functional effects, but also differentiate central from peripheral functions (e.g. Houkes & Vermaas, 2010: 5). In Sect. 5 I will argue the Dual-Aspect Theory also accommodates this feature.
Of course, it might be possible to accommodate all kinds of functions within a single comprehensive theory of mind and world. My point is simply that the four-line theories that are typically provided in the context of artifact functions are unlikely to account for all functional discourse.
Indeed, note that Relation is compatible with the same theory of function applying to both domains. Thus, one way of satisfying Relation is to provide a single account for biological and artifactual functions.
It could be replied that intentionalism and the standard etiological theory of biological functions have some important element in common, namely that both of them define functions as reasons for existence (Neander, 1991). Unfortunately, this analysis would render the theory too narrow and too broad at the same time, as I will argue in Sect. 4.3.
Let me stress that a fair assessment of Preston’s account as well as other approaches would require more space than the one I can offer here (some of these alternative views will be discussed in Sect. 4.3). In any case, please keep in mind that the main goal of the paper is to put forward an original theory of artifact function rather than providing a complete survey and exhaustive analysis of extant approaches.
Indeed, Preston (2003) agrees: she recognizes the intuitive force of phantom, but since she thinks no account can accommodate all desiderata, she gives this one up.
Interestingly, a virtue of Preston’s account (shared with other pluralist views) is that, although she presents a disjunctive theory, it applies to both biological and artifactual functions, so although it fails to satisfy Unification as I formulated it (because it multiplies the senses of artifactual function) it achieves some sort of unification across domains. In any case, as I argued in Sect. 2, I think this meta-theoretical desideratum is less important than the others, which her account fails to meet (e.g. Phantom), so even if some pluralist accounts provide some sort of unification, I their difficulties with the other desiderata of higher rank suggest that the Dual-Aspect Theory that I will present should be preferred to them.
The expression ’dual-aspect’ is reminiscent of the research program ’the dual-nature of technical artifacts’ (Krohs, 2009; Houkes & Vermaas, 2010; Kroes, 2012). Nonetheless, the goals of both projects differ significantly: whereas ’dual-nature’ refers to physical and intentional features, the dual-aspect approach seeks to exclusively analyze functions in terms of intentional and reproductive aspects (for reasons that will be provided below). No relation with the homonymous theory in philosophy of mind is intended.
Crucially, note that the suggestion is not that there are multiple concepts of ’Darwinian population’. The idea is that different aspects are relevant for establishing whether an entity qualifies as a central or peripheral instance of a Darwinian population. Similarly, my proposal is that the intentional and non-intentional aspects define two dimensions of artifactual functions, but that does not mean that we are defining multiple concepts of function.
One way of capturing the relationship between biological and artifactual functions is to consider ‘function’ a family-resemblance concept, as suggested by Carrara et al. (2011) and Vermaas (2013). Yet, I think that analysing ‘function’ along the paradigm-marginal axis is compatible with different views on the question of providing necessary and sufficient conditions (including certain views according to which the quest for necessary and sufficient conditions is pointless). My take on this issue is that this question remains a meaningful and important one, so my suggestion is that the two conditions of DAT are independently sufficient and satisfying one of them is necessary for artifactual functions. As a result, it probably does not fit the idea of ’family resemblance’, as it is usually understood.
Interestingly, it has been argued that even in the context of biological entities selection among variants is not required for a trait to have a function (Buller, 1998; Schwartz, 1999). Even if this is true, this is probably a marginal case of biological function (see Artiga, forthcoming), whereas here I am suggesting that it constitutes the paradigm case of artifact function.
Preston (2009, 2013, ch. 5) argues that intentionalist approaches cannot accommodate all phantom functions because in some cases what accounts for the reproduction of an item x is not that people intend to use x to F or even believe that it can perform F; reproduction might be due to tradition, authority, etc. However, this is only an objection against theories that assume that the intention establishing an artifact’s function has to explain why the item has been reproduced. This is not an assumption of DAT.
DAT requires non-intentional functions to be reproduced effects, so the first token of a new kind that has no intended function cannot have a function (not even a ’latent’ one). That seems correct to me. The examples of latent functions that one typically finds in the literature involve effects that partly explain why the item or practice has been maintained. It is not obvious why we should classify as a function a one-shot effect that has neither been intended by anyone nor explain the reproduction of the object or practice.
There are significant differences between Godfrey-Smith’s (2009) approach and mine: for one thing, he offers a multidimensional proposal, whereas DAT only appeals to two dimensions; for another, we are probably not engaged in the same kind of project (e.g. one of my main goals is to provide a monist account, whereas this is not even an issue in his proposal). Nonetheless, I also think there is an important analogy: I offer an analysis in terms of different dimensions and adopt the paradigm/marginal distinction, and in that respect my account is similar to his. Thus, if his proposal is not taken to multiply the senses of ‘Darwinian Population’, then this is an argument for interpreting my analysis in a similar way. I want to thank an anonymous reviewer for pressing me on this issue.
It is worth emphasizing, though, that DAT requires that in order to possess an artifact function some agent must be in control: artifact reproduction probably requires that some agent has control over the object, and I argued this is also true of the intentional aspect. As a result, most biological entities would not even possess a marginal instance of artifact function.
This argument assumes that some version of the etiological theory of biological function is on the right track. If this presupposition fails, then the extent to which DAT meets this Relation should be reassessed.
As a reviewer pointed out, DAT presupposes the general distinction between paradigm and marginal cases, so DAT cannot explain this distinction. Nonetheless, DAT makes specific predictions about particular cases and in this way I think it can shed some light on them. For example, intuitively the fact that hammers drive nails is a paradigmatic case of function and a very important explanatory property of them, whereas the protective function of amulets is somehow less paradigmatic and explanatory (see below). I think DAT can vindicate and explain these judgments.
Another interesting hybrid account is the ICE-Theory, developed by Houkes and Vermaas (2010). Nonetheless, their proposal is primarily an account of the justified ascription of functions, rather than a theory of function possession (Houkes & Vermaas, 2010: 78). Since it is a different sort of project from the theoretical definition intended here (see Sect. 1), a comparison with the present account is not straightforward.
Certainly, some of these theories could be modified so as to include the marginal-paradigmatic distinction (the same could be said of other pluralist approaches, such as Preston’s or the ICE theory). I think that would definitely be a move in the right direction. Nonetheless, some of the arguments I presented would still support my proposal overs these refined versions.
As a response, Houkes and Vermaas (2010, ch. 5) suggest that in this sort of cases fulfilling the support desideratum depends on whether the object can be repaired. This is an interesting suggestion but, unfortunately, I think it raises more problems than it solves. For one thing, reparation depends on the technology available; does that mean that the very same object can lose or acquire a function just by inventing a new way of repairing a particular kind of damage? Does not the very notion of ’repair’ presuppose that there is some function that the object possesses and should be recovered?
This discussion also shows that DAT is fully compatible with a distinction between central and peripheral functions (see footnote 1).
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Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Gloria Andrada, Samuele Chilovi, Manuel Heras-Escribano, Cristian Saborido, the audience at the UNED Seminar (October 2018) and two anonymous referees for their insightful criticisms and suggestions. Financial support was provided by the projects ‘la Complejidad de la Percepción: Un Enfoque Multidimensional’ (FFI2014-51811-P) and ‘Varieties of Information’ (PGC2018-101425-B-100).
Funding
Funding was provided by Ministerio de Economia y Competitividad (Grant No. FFI2014-51811-P), Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades (Grant No. PGC2018-101425-B-100).
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Artiga, M. A Dual-Aspect Theory of Artifact Function. Erkenn 88, 1533–1554 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-021-00414-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-021-00414-9