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The Unfairness of Risk-Based Possession Offences

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Abstract

This is a study of possession offences, with the focus on those intended to penalise the risk of a serious harm. Offences of this kind are examined in the light of basic doctrines of the criminal law, and in the light of the proper limits of endangerment offences. They are found wanting in both respects, and are also found to pose particular sentencing problems. The conclusion is that many risk-based possession offences are unfair, save those that require proof of a further intent or those aimed at a failure properly to safeguard a dangerous object.

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Notes

  1. See e.g. O’Malley (2004), Ericson (2007), and Zedner (2009).

  2. Dubber (2001); see also Dubber (2005).

  3. Husak (1995).

  4. Simester and von Hirsch (2009). They use the term ‘non-constitutive’ to refer to offences in which ‘the ultimate harm that justifies such crimes is remote from the crime itself; ‘constitutive crimes’ are those where the very harm that justifies criminalization is part of the definition of the crime (e.g. murder).

  5. Zedner (2007).

  6. See e.g. Gardner (2005), Simester and von Hirsch (2009).

  7. Dubber (2001).

  8. Jacobs (2002), 19–35.

  9. Firearms Acts 1968–1997 (U.K.).

  10. For the current law, see Blackstone (2010), B12.

  11. Terrorism Act 2000 (U.K.), s. 57(1); see also the offence under s. 58 of the same Act, possessing a document likely to be useful to a person preparing an act of terrorism, analysed in AY [2010] EWCA Crim 762.

  12. Jacobs (2002), 33–35.

  13. Stuntz (2001), 538.

  14. For earlier discussions, see Dubber (2001), pp. 915–918; Husak (1995) and (2004), Simester and von Hirsch (2009), Baker (2007) and (2009).

  15. In Robinson v. California (1962) 370 U.S. 660 the U.S. Supreme Court held that it was unconstitutional to criminalize addiction, that being a mere state of affairs.

  16. Moore (1993), Chap. 1.

  17. Husak (1998), Duff (2007), 99 and 106–107.

  18. American Law Institute (1985), Part 1, 224.

  19. The English offence of possession for terrorist purposes relies on presumptions, rather than stipulations, to reduce the potency of the act requirement: Terrorism Act 2000 (U.K.), s. 57(3).

  20. Duff (2007), 107. See also Glazebrook (1978), 111, and also at 118, that Parliament should never ‘provide that a person who has neither done anything nor been at fault in not doing something should incur criminal liability.’

  21. Duff (2007), 106.

  22. For discussion of the complicated English case-law on this, see Simester and Sullivan (2010), pp. 161–163.

  23. R v. Miller [1983] 2 A.C. 161.

  24. Du Cros v. Lambourne [1907] 1 K.B. 40.

  25. Dubber (2005), 104.

  26. Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, s. 5(4)(a) and (b).

  27. R v. Pommell [1995] 2 Cr. App. R. 607; for U.S. cases, contrast People v. E.C. (2003) 761 N.Y.St.2d 443 with United States v. Teemer (2005) 394 F.3d 59.

  28. Simester and Sullivan (2010), 161.

  29. For discussion of the details, see e.g. Dubber and Kelman (2005), 263–272.

  30. This is a tentative distillation of the House of Lords judgments in Warner v. Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [1969] 2 A.C. 256. Warner’s story (not accepted by the courts) was that he believed the box contained scent. In fact it contained drugs.

  31. As in the offence of possessing unsafe consumer goods for supply, contrary to s. 10 of the Consumer Protection Act 1987, which provides the defence that the possessor ‘neither knew nor had reasonable grounds for believing that the goods failed to comply with the general safety requirement.’

  32. See the English examples at n. 30 (drugs) and n. 11 (terrorism). This is also why Fletcher regards such offences as objectionable, since they embody a presumption of guilt: Fletcher (1978), 198–199.

  33. See the discussion of the New York case of State v. Marrero (1987) 507 N.E. 2d. 1068 by Robinson and Cahill (2006), 28–31; more generally, see Ashworth (2011a).

  34. Ashworth and Blake (1996).

  35. The prevailing view among the contributors to Simester (2005).

  36. For discussion and analysis, see Ashworth (2011b).

  37. The leading decision is In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358.

  38. For elaboration, see Ashworth (2006), and Stumer (2010).

  39. Wigmore (1985), 2486; cf. the argument based on duties of citizenship put forward by Duff (2005a, b), 141.

  40. Model Penal Code, s. 5.01(1)(c).

  41. Criminal Attempts Act (U.K.) 1981, s. 1(1).

  42. See Model Penal Code, s.5.01.1; Criminal Attempts Act (U.K.) 1981, s.1(1).

  43. The leading study of attempts is Duff (1996); for a briefer overview, see Ashworth (2011c).

  44. Cf. the discussion of this aspect of the writings of Guenther Jakobs by Ohana (2010), at 726.

  45. Model Penal Code, s.5.01(2)(e) and (f).

  46. von Hirsch (1996), 266–267; see also Baker (2007), at 372–373.

  47. I leave out of account here the problem of D’s liability for doing an act that foreseeably encourages another to commit an offence: see the discussion of Glanville Williams’ views by Baker (2007), 383–386, and also in Baker (2009), 179–181.

  48. Simester and von Hirsch (2009), at 99.

  49. Dubber (2001), at 864, 896.

  50. Some American figures are given by Dubber (2001), 835–836, suggesting that one-fifth of prison sentences in New York in 1998 were for possession offences (mostly drugs).

  51. This terminology is employed by Moore (1997), 783–784, and by Alexander et al. (2009), 310–311.

  52. Simester and von Hirsch (2011), Chap. 4.2.

  53. See Husak (2008), 172.

  54. Cf. Husak’s first two limiting principles for offences of risk-creation, ibid, 161–162.

  55. New York Times, 27 September 2010, A10.

  56. Moore (1997), 784.

  57. Simester and von Hirsch (2011), Chap. 4.4B.

  58. The second point might lead to the conclusion in some high-crime neighbourhoods that everyone might be justified in carrying a weapon because everyone might justifiably fear attack; this would create a serious problem for law and legitimacy, among other things.

  59. Duff (2007), 165; cf. Ohana (2007), 123, arguing that a responsible legislator would take account of the probability of a renunciation (presumably, by regarding it as improbable in most cases?).

  60. Duff (2007), 163–165.

  61. Ibid., 164.

  62. Von Hirsch (1996), 267.

  63. Simester and von Hirsch (2009), 99, also citing Duff (2005a, b), 64.

  64. Simester and von Hirsch (2009), 101–102.

  65. See n. 45 above and accompanying text for the situations in which possession may of itself amount to a substantial step under the Code.

  66. Cf. the nuanced discussion by Simester and von Hirsch (2011), Chap. 3.2C.

  67. Law Commission (2010), Proposition 10 (para. 4.61), summarising the argument in Part 4 of the paper.

  68. The offence is committed even if the possessor does not realize that the gun is prohibited, thinking that it is an antique or is a permitted article: see Howells [1977] Q.B. 614 and Hussain (1981) 72 Cr. App. R. 143.

  69. Accord: Ohana (2007), 136.

  70. E.g. Deyemi and Edwards [2008] 1 Cr. App. R. 25; Rehman and Wood [2006] 1 Cr. App. R. (S) 404; Beard [2008] 2 Cr. App. R. (S) 232.

  71. Three decades ago, moderate fines for the offence were not unusual: see Howells and Hussain, above, n. 66.

  72. See Jacobs (2002), 220.

  73. Stuntz (2001), 558: ‘Proving burglaries may be costly; proving possession of burglars’ tools will be much easier (and the latter charge will therefore tend to generate more guilty pleas).’

  74. Simester and von Hirsch (2009), 98.

  75. Slobogin (2003), at 58–62.

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  1. University of Oxford, Oxford, UK

    Andrew Ashworth

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  1. Andrew Ashworth
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Correspondence to Andrew Ashworth.

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A version of this paper was given as the Lockhart lecture at the University of Minnesota Law School in September 2010. I am grateful to Richard Frase, Fionnuala ni Aolain, Darryl Brown, Andrew Simester, Patrick Tomlin and Lucia Zedner for comments, and also to members of the Oxford Criminal Law Discussion Group. The research forms part of a three-year AHRC project on ‘Preventive Justice’, AH/H015655/1.

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Ashworth, A. The Unfairness of Risk-Based Possession Offences. Criminal Law, Philosophy 5, 237–257 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-011-9112-2

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