Abstract
In this paper, I offer an original account of meaning in life, which I call the passionate yearning theory. Within the framework of the passionate yearning theory, meaning is understood as the intrinsically derived yearning, and passionate striving, for something (an ideal, or a state of affairs) that possesses some plausible objective claim to truth or facticity, which makes it worth pursuing for its own sake. To properly delineate the view, I present the various criteria that serve as the foundation for the passionate yearning view. These include the truth/facticity criterion, the lack of immorality, intrinsic subjectivity, passion, yearning and striving. I then show how these criteria coalesce into the passionate yearning theory and how exactly the theory works. Finally, I motivate the passionate yearning theory by addressing some possible criticisms and objections that can be raised against the view and also differentiate it from similar competing views.
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Notes
Metz (2013) provides robust reasons regarding how monist theories fail to account for certain aspects of meaning. I will not try to rehash those arguments here as that is not my present concern in this paper.
The African-inspired conversational philosophy, for instance, is fully invested in the idea that through creative struggle between seemingly opposed ideas from different contexts (and, perhaps, those that hold said ideas), and the shedding of implausible beliefs through that creative struggle, we can arrive at some semblance of truth (See, for instance: Chimakonam, 2021; Attoe 2021).
Stephen Cambell and Sven Nyholm (2015) have also theorized quite robustly about a similar idea that they call “anti-meaning”. Anti-meaning (and anti-matter) is distinguished from meaninglessness in that while the latter informs an absence of meaning, the former implies a deliberate attempt at pursuing evil/harmful goals.
Gratitude to Fionn O’Donovan for this critique.
Again, gratitude to Fionn O’Donovan for this critique. Steven Luper’s views about meaning would also endorse this sort of critique (Luper, 2014).
This reply is honed out my discussion with Jonathan Chimakonam regarding this critique. I also thank Mihlali Faltein, Segun Samuel, Abiola Azeez and Oyekan Adeolu for also engaging me in this particular debate.
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Attoe, A.D. Passionate Yearning Theory as a Theory of Meaning in Life. Philosophia 50, 1579–1599 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-022-00489-w
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-022-00489-w