Abstract
A major issue in political philosophy is the extent to which one or another version of nationalism or, by contrast, cosmopolitanism, is morally justified. Nationalism, like cosmopolitanism, may be understood as a position on the status and responsibilities of nation states, but the terms may also be used to designate attitudes appropriate to those positions. One problem in political philosophy is to distinguish and appraise various forms of nationalism and cosmopolitanism; a related problem is how to understand the relation of patriotism to each. Nationalists may tend to be patriots, but need not be; patriots may tend to be nationalists, but need not be. Like nationalism, patriotism may also be considered in propositional forms or in related attitudinal forms; but unlike nationalism and cosmopolitanism, patriotism can exist in the form of an emotion: roughly, love of one’s country. This paper characterizes nationalism, cosmopolitanism, and patriotism in both forms and argues for a conception of patriotism on which it is both distinct from nationalism and compatible with certain kinds of cosmopolitanism. It also suggests that, in qualified forms, nationalism and cosmopolitanism may overlap in what they require of their proponents.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
In the interest of space I omit consideration of how permanent residents and other residents of a country should figure in nationalism.
In this connection, I find it of great interest that in the Oath of Allegiance rendered on R-Day at the U.S. Military Academy (West Point), the Constitution of the United States is cited first, before allegiance to the “National Government;” and in the Commissioning Oath Rendered at Graduation, it is the Constitution that one swears to support and defend, and the National Government is not mentioned. We know well that a national government may go in a direction different from any indicated or even permitted by its legitimating constitution. This possibility is of major importance for leaders in the military who swear allegiance to both. My effort here is partly to cast light on how conscientious members of the military may reasonably and ethically deal with the kind of tension that can emerge between constitutional and governmental obligations. See Annex C—Oaths and the Officer of Commission, USMA Circular 1-101-1, 2007. It is also noteworthy that the Officer Commission statement, announcing appointment to the U.S. Army, does not mention the Constitution at all and stresses following orders of the president of the U.S.
To be sure a person may be without a country, and we might argue that a basic virtue should be possible for a person independently of contingent circumstances. One reaction is that such a virtue is possible for a countryless person. Another is that it is a contingent matter whether one makes any promises, so promissory virtue would not be basic either, if we insisted that virtues be such that good persons must possess them independently of their life circumstances.
As I characterize patriotism, it is in its most basic form a trait of character, though arguably the trait may be a suitably stable attitude rather than a structural feature of character. By contrast, David McCabe calls it “the doctrine that co-nationality is a morally significant relationship that may impose special duties and sanction special treatment” (McCabe 1997, p. 203). I am inclined to think that the trait tends to carry acceptance of this doctrine, and the doctrine is important in any case. Some of this paper bears on the doctrine, but see McCabe’s paper for a careful analysis of the doctrine in comparison with liberal universalism—a view closer to what I call “moderate cosmopolitanism.”
For a richly illustrated and informative discussion of nationalism and patriotism—one quite different from, if mainly compatible with, mine—see George Orwell’s “Notes on Nationalism,” originally published in Polemic (London: May 1945) and reprinted in his England Your England and Other Essays’ (1953).
An interesting implication of the strict hierarchy conception is that every virtue must be capable of conflicting with some other; else we could have a virtue of an indeterminate level: it could not even be said to be of the same level of any other, since location in a level requires dominance relations. One might think, however, that the notion of two virtues being at the same level is not definable on the hierarchy picture, but that is not so. Two could differ conceptually, but each bear the same dominance relations (positive or negative) to the same other virtues. Loyalty and steadfastness might in some forms be an example.
For a case that free democracy is morally grounded, see Audi 2005.
For detailed discussion of cosmopolitanism and a case for a strong kind leading to world government see Pojman (2006). An indication of some of the problems and prospects for international governmental institutions is provided by David Copp in his wide-ranging “International Justice and the Basic Needs Principle” (Copp 2005).
This characterization contrasts with the kind described by Gillian Brock and Harry Brighouse (and attributed to various others), on which “Weak cosmopolitanism just says that there are some extra-national obligations that have some moral weight. Strong cosmopolitanism, by contrast, claims that… there are no society-wide principles of distributive justice that are not also global principles of distributive justice; and that… we have no right to use nationality (in contrast with friendship, or familial love) as a trigger for discretionary behavior” (Brock and Brighouse 2005, p. 3). I find both characterizations usefully suggestive; but the first characterization is too indefinite in specifying neither what kinds of obligations are in question nor any limit on their weight, and the second is indefinite in its first clause and highly vague in its second, negative clause.
For an informative discussion of the elements that must be considered to achieve a proper balance between patriotic and cosmopolitan concerns, see Richard Miller (Miller 2005). Another valuable discussion of the requirements for a proper balance here is Soniewicka (forthcoming).
The importance of rationality, motivation, and sentience for grounding moral status is considered in some detail in Audi 2001.
An interesting comparison might be made between moderate cosmopolitanism as characterized here and the position of Thomas Pogge, who argues, regarding the prosperous industrialized nations, that “by shaping and enforcing the social conditions that, foreseeably and avoidably, cause the monumental suffering of global poverty, we are harming the global poor” (Pogge 2005, p. 93). The upshot is that we have violated negative moral duties toward them and are not merely failing to fulfill positive ones. This view does not entail what I call “extreme cosmopolitanism;” and given the desirable institutional reforms he describes (Pogge 2005, p. 103), it appears that his position does not commit him to that.
An earlier draft of this essay was written for presentation at the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, in memory of Louis P. Pojman, who taught there from 1986 through the spring of 1995. It has benefitted from discussion with that audience and the audience at the Helsinki School of Economics and from comments by Igor Primoratz and Marta Soniewicka. The essay is dedicated to the memory of Louis Pojman.
References
Audi, R. 2001. The architecture of reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Audi, R. 2005. Moral foundations of liberal democracy, Secular reasons, and liberal neutrality toward the good. Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy 19: 197–218.
Brock, G., and H. Brighouse, eds. 2005. The political philosophy of cosmopolitanism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Copp, D. 2005. International justice and the basic needs principle. In Brock and Brighouse, 39–54.
McCabe, D. 1997. Patriotic Gore again. The Southern Journal of Philosophy 35: 203–223.
Miller, R. W. 2005. Cosmopolitan respect and patriotic concern. In Brock and Brighouse, 127–147.
Orwell, G. 1945. Notes on nationalism. London: Polemic.
Pogge, T. 2005. A cosmopolitan perspective on the global economic order. In Brock and Brighouse, 92–109.
Pojman, L. P. 2006. Terrorism, human rights, and the case for world government. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.
Soniewicka, M. Forthcoming. Patriotism and justice in the global dimension—A conflict of virtues?
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Audi, R. Nationalism, Patriotism, and Cosmopolitanism in an Age of Globalization. J Ethics 13, 365–381 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-009-9068-9
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-009-9068-9