Abstract
The problem of skepticism is often understood as a paradox: a valid argument with plausible premises whose conclusion is that we lack justification for perceptual beliefs. Typically, this conclusion is deemed unacceptable, so a theory is offered that posits conditions for justification on which some premise is false. The theory defended here is more general, and explains why the paradox arises in the first place. Like Strawson’s (Introduction to logical theory, Wiley, New York, 1952) “ordinary language” approach to induction, the theory posits something built into the very notion of justification: it is loaded with a bias towards the proposition that we are not massively deceived. Beyond the paradox, remaining skeptical problems consist of metaphysical and practical questions: whether we are massively deceived, or why we should use our loaded notion rather than some other. Such challenges have profound epistemological significance, but they are not problems that an a priori theory of justification can solve.
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Notes
The term ‘notion’ is intended to be synonymous with ‘concept’ while carrying a salient implication—especially in the context of a discussion of skepticism—that the thing of which we have a notion may not actually exist. See Merriam Webster’s Dictionary of Synonyms for an explanation of the subtle differences between ‘notion’, ‘concept’, and some other related terms.
I use italics for emphasis, to introduce a new term, and, in other cases, such as this, to denote the notion expressed by the italicized term.
Alston (1993) surveys many of these difficulties.
For example, Avnur (2012).
For example, Pryor (2004).
There is another, Wittgenstein-inspired approach to the paradox, recently termed ‘hinge epistemology” (see Coliva and Moyal-Sharrock 2016; Avnur 2018 for some discussions), according to which propositions that are relevantly like ~sk (“hinge” propositions) get special treatment by our general epistemic principles. On this view, the way we use the notion of justification implies that it cannot apply to ~sk. It is not clear to me how exactly this relates to the claim, defended here, that justification favors ~sk. One might think that hinge epistemology does not posit a bias in favor of ~sk (thanks to Annalisa Coliva for helpful discussion here). Rather, on such views, it makes no sense at all to assess whether or not belief that ~sk is justified; ~sk is entirely left out of the picture. If so, then the theory developed here is an alternative to a hinge epistemological, Wittgenstein-inspired approach to justification. Two important developments of the “hinge” approach to the paradox are Coliva (2015) and Pritchard (2016). I myself have defended this kind of view in Avnur (2012). One advantage of developing the loadedness approach I favor here is that most other theories of justification can be seen as versions of loadedness, but not of hinge epistemology. So, loadedness should have broader appeal.
Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing this point.
Cohen cites Strawson in a footnote there, but doesn’t explicitly detail the connection.
See McCullagh (2011) for an alternative version of inferentialism, which does not require endorsement of any inference as a necessary condition on concept possession.
Of course, loading the notion of justification, even in this externalist way, does not make our perceptual beliefs true or objectively probably true. In a world in which sk is true, this externalist sort of loaded notion will have no extension, presumably. So, such a strategy does not answer the question whether sk is true, or whether our perceptual beliefs are generally or probably true. Rather, it shows that our notion of justification does not commit us to a paradox or contradiction, which is what the skeptical paradox challenges us to do. Below, in Sects. 4 and 5, I address the relation of this challenge to the challenge of establishing whether, in fact, our perceptual beliefs are objectively likely to be true.
For example, Silins (2005) holds that, while our perceptual justification is immediate, we also have default justification to believe ~sk.
Thanks to Dustin Locke for helpful discussion on this point.
What follows is a brief discussion of Goldman’s view, as an example of a theory according to which justification is loaded. The idea that what we believe about things determines the meaning of term we use to refer to them needs more discussion than can be offered here for a full defense. A major issue is how to decide which beliefs about a thing determine the meaning of the relevant term. Admittedly, on the way of understanding loadedness under discussion, this will be a major commitment and so the details will be important. For one recent approach to this question, applies to the problem of free will, see Turner (2013, section 3) on ‘conceptions’.
See Wright (2007) for discussion of the distinction between having and claiming justification, or warrant, for a belief in the context of Moore’s “proof” of an external world.
This is often discussed in terms of “transmission-failure” or “epistemic circularity,” which divides dogmatists (or “liberals”) and conservatives. Wright (2002) and Pryor (2004) are the classic examples of conservative and liberal views on transmission failure, respectively. Wright’s (2004) version of the view concerns the broader notions of “acceptance” and “trust,” instead of belief, but he is widely interpreted to hold that the relevant beliefs have a default warrant. There is also a third option, sometimes called ‘Moderatism’ (a term coined by Coliva 2012) which is defended in Avnur (2012) and Coliva (2012). This involves rejecting (2) in the paradox. The idea that justification is a loaded notion is neutral on all of these debates, and yet it still can explain why the inference from a simple perceptual premise to ~sk seems to fail (even if on reflection, we decide that it does not fail).
One might think that, since justification is loaded with a bias towards ~sk, it is the wrong notion to use when evaluating the skeptical argument, which crucially involves ~sk. Why do epistemologists use such a notion, given their aims? Answer: the argument concerns justification. Appealing to our loaded notion of justification is not an option that epistemologists choose when confronting the paradox. Rather, the paradox, or skeptical argument, is about our notion of justification, which is loaded with a bias towards ~sk.
This is exactly what happens when Goldman and Cohen theorize, as we’ve seen above.
Above, I noted the most obvious exceptions to this, namely those who present an a priori argument for ~sk. They do not attempt to solve the paradox by appealing to a theory of justification. Many, though, are not in this camp. This includes some externalists, such as Goldman (1986, 1993) since even on that account, what counts as a “normal world,” or what assumptions we make about which faculties are reliable, while knowable from the armchair, does not constitute an argument that ~sk is true. This point is made by Stich (1990, p. 95). Beyond discussion of Goldman, Stitch call theories of justification as I am understanding them “analytic epistemology,” and his discussion is similar to this one in some ways, though the aim is different (Stitch 1990, pp. 91–93).
Alston (1993) reaches a similar conclusion.
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Acknowledgements
For comments and discussion over many years on various versions of this paper, I would like to thank David James Barnett, Paul Boghossian, Annalisa Coliva, Kit Fine, Dustin Locke, James Pryor, Karl Schafer, Stephen Schiffer, Dion Scott-Kakures, and Rivka Weinberg, as well as other participants at a Skepticism conference at UC Irvine, the New Perspectives on External World Scepticism conference at the Munich Centre for Mathematical Philosophy, the European Epistemology Network Conference in Bologna, Italy, a seminar at New York University, and a Work in Progress seminar at the Claremont Colleges.
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Avnur, Y. Justification as a loaded notion. Synthese 198, 4897–4916 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02375-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02375-7