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I am indebted for their valuable comments to Susan Hurley, Bruno Miconi, Reinhard Selten, Hyun Shin, David Soskice, Rainer Trapp and, most of all, Robin Cubitt and Elizabeth Fricker.
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Bacharach, M. A theory of rational decision in games. Erkenntnis 27, 17–55 (1987). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00169710
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00169710