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Notes
All quotations are from the Preface to G. E. Moore'sPrincipia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903). Cf. also pp. 21, 22–25 in the same volume; and Moore's Ethics (London: Oxford University Press, reset impression of 1947), pp. 18–20.
The Right and the Good (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1930), p. 31, 41–42.
Ibid., p. 42.
Ibid., p. 31.
Cf.Ethics and Language (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944), Chap. VII.
This article is an abridged version of one chapter of a forthcoming book on “The Nature of Morality.” In that book, moral judgments are more fully discussed.
Cf. in this connection J. Austin's contribution to the symposium “Other Minds,” in theAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 1946; A. Prior,Logic and the Basis of Ethics (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1949), Chap. V; and S. E. Toulmin,The Place of Reason in Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950), pp. 146, 150.
“Knowledge and Belief,” Mind, April 1952.
Cf. K. Baier, “S. Hampshire: Fallacies in Moral Philosophy, A Note,”Mind, April 1950, pp. 226–27; and K. Baier, “Decisions and Descriptions,”Mind, April 1951, p. 187, sec. 3.
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Baier, K. Proving a moral judgment. Philos Stud 4, 33–44 (1953). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02292858
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02292858