Abstract
Many Christians who argue against Christian materialism direct their arguments against what I call ‘Type-I materialism’, the thesis that I cannot exist without my organic body. I distinguish Type-I materialism from Type-II materialism, which entails only that I cannot exist without some body that supports certain mental functions. I set out a version of Type-II materialism, and argue for its superiority to Type-I materialism in an age of science. Moreover, I show that Type-II materialism can accommodate Christian doctrines like the Resurrection of the Body, the Incarnation, and the “intermediate state” (if there is one).
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Baker, L.R. Christian materialism in a scientific age. Int J Philos Relig 70, 47–59 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-010-9283-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-010-9283-0