Context Change, Truth and Competence

Abstract

In this short paper I would like to display some of the basic ideas which justify an investigation of the notion of context change as one basic notion of linguistics. It is by far not the only important notion, but it is of special interest, because it connects with a series of other notions relevant for linguistics which tend to conflict with some traditional conceptions in linguistics and even in the philosophy of language. One of these notions context change connects with is the instrumental character of natural language. For, to conceive of language as an instrument, or more precisely as a set of instruments, is to disagree implicitly with (at least) two basic assumptions on which part of the linguists rely today, namely first with the possibility of a clean separation of competence and performance (or “langue” and “parole”) and, secondly with taking a theory of truth as fundamental for semantics and pragmatics. To deny a clean separation of competence and performance opposes a deeply rooted structuralist hypothesis which has been accepted also by most transformationalists. To deny that the notion of truth is fundamental for the semantics and pragmatics of natural language stands in opposition to the view of most logical grammarians. However, the work of certain transformationalists (cf. LAKOFF [8]) casts doubt on the competence performance distinction.

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