Abstract
On stage theory, ordinary continuants are instantaneous stages which persist by exduring—by bearing temporal counterpart relations to other such stages. Exduring objects lack temporal extension and there is a sense in which they are wholly present at multiple instants. How then is exdurance different from endurance? I offer a definition of ‚exdurance’ that clearly sets it apart from other modes of persistence.
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Balashov, Y. Defining ‚exdurance’. Philos Stud 133, 143–149 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-006-9011-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-006-9011-x