Abstract
“Moore–Wittgenstein controversy” on the problem of certainty should be understood and studied from two perspectives—one from philosophical use of ordinary language (Moore) and the other from using ordinary language for normal linguistic exchange (Wittgenstein). To study it from one and only one perspective—either Moorean or Wittgensteinean—is narrow and biased. Looked at from the normal linguistic exchange, Wittgenstein’s arguments are convincing and Moore’s truisms seem rather odd. But when looked at from philosophical discourse and his defence of common sense, Moore’s truisms are interesting and not faulty.
References
Baldwin, T. (Ed.). (1993/2013). G.E. Moore: Selected writings. London: Routledge.
Coliva, A. (2010). Moore and Wittgenstein: Scepticism, certainty, and common sense. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Prasad, S. (2003). Wittgenstein’s Criticism of Moore’s propositions of certainty: Some observations. Journal of Indian council of Philosophical Research (JICPR),20, 3.
Russell, B. (1946/1961). History of western philosophy. London; George Allen & Unwin Ltd.
Stroll, A. (1994). Moore and Wittgenstein on certainty. New York: Oxford University Press.
Vedaparayana, G. (2015). Discussion and comments: A response to Prof. Prasad’s Wittgenstein’s criticism of Moore’s propositions of certainty. JICPR,32(1), 143–155.
Wittgenstein, L. (1969/1974). On certainty. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
Publisher's Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Bandaru, S.P. A Response to Prof. G. Vedaparayana’s Comments on My Paper “Wittgenstein’s Criticism of Moore’s Propositions of Certainty…”. J. Indian Counc. Philos. Res. 37, 159–165 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-019-00186-2
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-019-00186-2