Abstract
This paper aims to offer a preliminary explication of the role of and the relation between mental states, action, and blame in Medhātithi’s commentary on the most influential juridical text of the Sanskrit world – the jurisprudential text attributed to Manu. In defining what it means to act and what constitutes engaging in intentional and unintentional action, this paper makes three claims. First, enjoined actions (e.g., sacrifices) require particular mental states to be performed. Notwithstanding the role of mental states in enjoined actions, actions lacking the corresponding mental states can be blameworthy. In fact, unintentional actions (including also actions done intentionally, but under a description that foregoes what renders the conduct sanctionable) can indeed constitute blameworthy conduct. Second, although unintentional action still meets the threshold for constituting blameworthy conduct, mental states generally play an important role regarding the degree of blame assignable to a person. Third, there are several possible rules that make sense of the seemingly inconsistent use and impact of intention throughout Manu’s Code of Laws as Medhātithi’s commentary shows. The paper also sheds light on the relation between intentions and desires according to Medhātithi.
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Notes
See Sanghādisesa 1.2.1, which notes that ‘intentional emission of semen except during a dream is an offence’ and discussion of this passage in Gyatso, 2005 at 283.
As for the selection of texts we will focus on, the Dharmasūtras represent the older stratum of Sanskrit jurisprudence, composed in the last centuries BCE, and are therefore the unavoidable starting point of any historical investigation on the topic. The Mānavadharmaśāstra (for short ‘Manu’s Laws’ or ‘MDh’) is later (1st c. BCE), but it is the most influential Sanskrit jurisprudential text and it is the only one discussed extensively by authors of the main Sanskrit school dealing with deontics, namely the Mīmāṃsā school. See Olivelle’s discussion of the literary history of Dharmasūtras, their authorship and dates in Olivelle, 2000. On the MDh, see Olivelle, 2004. The dates proposed here are derived from Olivelle’s work, especially from Olivelle, 2016.
On expiations, see Lubin, 2007.
See for example, MDh 2.2-5, 2.220–222, 4.166, 4.207-222, 5.19-20, 8.350, 11.217, 11.90, 11.12, 11.45-47, 11.128, 11.147, 11.151, 11.163, 11.176; Āpastamba Dharmasūtra (hereafter referred to as ‘ĀpDh’) 1.26.6-7, 1.28.6, 1.30.2-4, 2.26.18-19; Gautama Dharmasūtra (hereafter referred to as ‘GDh’) 20.8-9, 25.7; Baudhāyana Dharmasūtra 3.5.5.
abuddhipūrvam alaṃkṛto yuvā paradāram anupraviśan kumārīṃ vā vācā bādhyaḥ || 18 || buddhipūrvaṃ tu duṣṭabhāvo daṇḍyaḥ || 19 || (All quotations from ĀpDh and GDh derive from Olivelle, 2000).
paraparigraham avidvān ādadāna edhodake mūle puṣpe gandhe grāse śāka iti vācā bādhyaḥ || 10 || viduṣo vāsasaḥ parimoṣaṇam || 11 ||
yaḥ pramatto hanti prāptaṃ doṣaphalam || 2 || saha saṃkalpena bhūyaḥ || 3 || evam anyeṣv api doṣavatsu karmasu || 4 ||
ata ūrdhvaṃ tena saṃbhāṣya tiṣṭhed ekarātraṃ japan sāvitrīm ajñānapūrvam || 8 || jñānapūrvaṃ cet trirātram || 9 ||
yeṣv ābhiśastyaṃ teṣām ekāṅgaṃ chittvāprāṇahiṃsāyām || 6 || anāryavapaiśunapratiṣiddhācāreṣv abhakṣyābhojyāpeyaprāśane śūdrāyāṃ ca retaḥ siktvāyonau ca doṣavac ca karmābhisaṃdhipūrvaṃ kṛtvānabhisaṃdhipūrvaṃ vābliṅgābhir apa upaspṛśed vāruṇībhir vānyair vā pavitrair yathā karmābhyāsaḥ || 7 ||
It does not seem possible that one could correctly undertake the complex elements of nefarious rites unintentionally. Further, as will be discussed later in this paper, rituals require particular mental states.
akāmataḥ kṛte pāpe prāyaścittaṃ vidur budhāḥ | kāmakārakṛte ’py āhur eke śrutinidarśanāt || 45 || akāmataḥ kṛtaṃ pāpaṃ vedābhyāsena śudhyati | kāmatas tu kṛtaṃ mohāt prāyaścittaiḥ pṛthagvidhaiḥ || 46 || (All quotations from MDh derive from Olivelle, 2004).
chattrākaṃ viḍvarāhaṃ ca laśunaṃ grāmakukkuṣam | palāṇḍuṃ gṛñjanaṃ caiva matyā jagdhvā pated dvijaḥ || 19 || amatyaitāni ṣaḍ jagdhvā kṛcchraṃ sāṃtapanaṃ caret | yaticāndrāyaṇaṃ vāpi śeṣeṣūpavased ahaḥ || 20 || saṃvatsarasyaikam api caret kṛcchraṃ dvijottamaḥ | ajñātabhuktaśuddhyarthaṃ jñātasya tu viśeṣataḥ || 21 ||
Translation by EF. See section 4 for more on the nature of the filth at stake and on the degree of necessity below.
kurukṣetraṃ ca matsyāś ca pañcālāḥ śūrasenakāḥ | eṣa brahmarṣideśo vai brahmāvartād anantaraḥ || 19 || etad deśaprasūtasya sakāśād agrajanmanaḥ | svaṃ svaṃ caritraṃ śikṣeran pṛthivyāṃ sarvamānavāḥ || 20 || himavadvindhyayor madhyaṃ yat prāg vinaśanād api | pratyag eva prayāgāc ca madhyadeśaḥ prakīrtitaḥ || 21 ||
dravyāṇi hiṃsyād yo yasya jñānato ’jñānato ’pi vā | sa tasyotpādayet tuṣṭiṃ rājño dadyāc ca tat samam || 288 ||
Further, at times Manu appears to use ‘intentional’ or ‘unintentional’ even in contexts in which their mention would have been redundant, e.g., because ‘stealing’ can only be intentional (MDh 11.162) and eating ordures and urine can only be unintentional (MDh 11.150). As will be discussed below, Medhātithi regularly highlights these incongruities and explains that ‘intentional’ or ‘unintentional’ have been mentioned, but are in fact superfluous.
See also his commentary on MDh 11.40 (41 in Jhā’s translation) on the difference between wilful and unwilful wrongdoing (both are punished, but with different expiations). The Sanskrit word used is kāmakāra, ‘doing according to one’s wish’ (as in MDh 11.44).
For more on Medhātithi’s relation to Mīmāṃsā see, e.g., Yoshimizu, 2012 and Freschi, forthcoming.
That one can choose to do X over Y is assumed as a given, since otherwise Vedic commands asking people to perform actions would not make sense (since commands presuppose the ability to perform the action commanded and the possibility not to perform it).
kāmātmatā na praśastā na caivehāsty akāmatā | kāmyo hi vedādhigamaḥ karmayogaś ca vaidikaḥ || 2 || saṃkalpamūlaḥ kāmo vai yajñāḥ saṃkalpasaṃbhavāḥ || vratāni yamadharmāś ca sarve saṃkalpajāḥ smṛtāḥ || 6 || akāmasya kriyā kācid dṛśyate neha karhicit | yad yad dhi kurute kiṃcit tat tat kāmasya ceṣṭitam || 4 || teṣu samyag vartamāno gacchaty amaralokatām | yathāsaṃkalpitāṃś ceha sarvān kāmān samaśnute || 5 ||
tataś ca yad uktaṃ yāgasya kāmena vinā na svarūpaniṣpattir iti, tad anena vispaṣṭaṃ kṛtvā kathayati. saṅkalpo yāgādīnāṃ mūlaṃ, kāmasya ca. yāgādīṃś cikīrṣann avaśyaṃ saṅkalpaṃ karoti. saṅkalpe ca kriyamāṇe tatkāraṇena kāmena sannidhātavyam aniṣṭenāpi. yathāpākārthino jvalanaṃ kurvatas tatsamānakāraṇo dhūmo ’py aniṣṭo jāyate. tatra na śakyaṃ yajñādayaḥ kariṣyante kāmaś ca na bhaviṣyatīti. atha ko ’yaṃ saṅkalpo nāma yaḥ sarvakriyāmūlam. ucyate. yaccetaḥsandarśanaṃ nāma yadanantaraṃ prārthanādhyavasāyau krameṇa bhavataḥ. ete hi mānasā vyāpārāḥ sarvakriyāpravṛttiṣu mūlatāṃ pratipadyante. na hi bhautikā vyāpārās tam antareṇa sambhavanti. tathāpi prathamaṃ padārthasvarūpanirūpaṇam ayaṃ padārtha imām arthakriyāṃ sādhayatīti yaj jñānaṃ sa iha saṅkalpo ’bhipretaḥ. anantaraṃ prārthanā bhavati icchā. saiva kāmaḥ. katham aham idam anena sādhayāmīti icchāyāṃ satyām adhyavasyati karomīti niścinoti so ’dhyavasāyaḥ. tataḥ sādhanopādāne bāhyavyāpāraviṣaye pravartate. tathāhi bubhukṣita ādau bhujikriyāṃ paśyati, tata icchati bhujīyeti, tato ’dhyavasyati vyāpārāntarebhyo vinivṛttya bhojanaṃ karomīti, tataḥ karmakāraṇasthānādhikāriṇa āha sajjīkuruta, rasavatīṃ sañcārayateti. nanv evaṃ sati na yajñādayaḥ saṅkalpamātrād bhavanti api tu saṅkalpaprārthanādhyavasāyebhyaḥ; tatra kim ucyate yajñāḥ saṅkalpasambhavāḥ iti. saṅkalpasyādyakāraṇatvād adoṣaḥ. ata evottaratra nākāmasya kriyā kācid dṛśyata iti vakṣyati (Medhātithi, commentary on MDh 2.3). Here and below, Medhātihi’s text has been translated by EF and the text is from Jhā, 1924–9.
See his commentary on PMS 6.2.19—20.
mānasaḥ saṃkalpo vratam ucyate: “śāstravihitam idaṃ mayā kartavyam idaṃ vā na kartavyam” ity evam | (Medhātithi, commentary on MDh 4.13).
saṃkalpaviśeṣo hi mānasas tatropadiśyate “idaṃ mayā na kartavyam” iti (Medhātithi, commentary on MDh 11.44).
nivṛttis tu saṃkalpo “na kartavyaḥ punaḥ” iti (Medhātithi, commentary on MDh 11.230).
This dual aspect is present also in the work of another major commentator of Dharmaśāstra, namely Aparārka, in his commentary on Yājñavalkya 1.7. Olivelle translates the relevant passage as follows: “Intention is the mental act: ‘Being proper—that is, keeping the eye on the object of the treatise—I will accomplish this by means of this’ ” (Olivelle, 2016, Chap.8, Sect.2.2, p. 147).
I am very grateful to a reviewer who suggested reading saṅkalpa only cognitively as ‘cognition of the means-end relationship’ and adhyavasāya only volitionally as ‘intention’. I have explained above why I think that the volitional aspect is necessarily part of saṅkalpa. The plural in Medhātithi’s commentary (ete…) shows that saṅkalpa and adhyavasāya are not synonyms. The cognitive aspect of adhyavasāya is evident in other occurrences within Medhātithi’s commentary, e.g. “Thus, they ascertain only adharma as dharma” (ato ’dharmam eva dharmatvenādhyavasyantīti, commentary on MDh 2.1); “There is negation [of the Veda] if one ascertains the falsity of the goals known through the Veda” (vedapramāṇakānām arthānāṃ mithyātvādhyavasāye nāstikyam, commentary on MDh 4.163). Nonetheless, the connection of adhyavasāya and vrata in the commentary on MDh 2.3 (see below and fn. 31) and its connection to the undertaking of an action in the commentary on MDh 5.5.1 (yo ’yaṃ kriyāṃ kartuṃ adhyavasitas…) show that also adhyavasāya is not just cognitive. Still, the cognitive aspect is usually predominant in adhyavasāya and the volitional one in saṅkalpa.
Paul claims that “we can come to know what we intend by making a decision about what to do and self-ascribing the content of that decision as our intended action” (Paul, 2012, 327). Paul’s main focus in on how we know about our intentions, rather than on the connection between intention and desire. Yet, her insight is useful insofar as it suggests a different causal sequence than the one one would usually consider (cognition of X —>desire of X—>intention to get X), with intention as the starting point (‘we can come to know what we intend’ suggests that intentions pre-exist the awareness thereof).
See Sergio Tenenbaum on instrumental rationality applying in the case of the “extended nature of our agency”: ‘[P]rinciples of instrumental rationality apply primarily to actions that extend through time’ (2016, 2).
Kumārila speaks therefore of a long time of performance (dīrghaḥ […] kriyamāṇa[…]kālaḥ, Tantravārttika ad 3.8.21, in Subbāśāstrī 1929?34).
tasyeha trividhasyāpi tryadhiṣṭhānasya dehinaḥ | daśālakṣaṇayuktasya mano vidyāt pravartakam || Concerning moving during sleep, it is noteworthy that Medhātitihi, while commenting a different passage, explains that desires motivate actions only in the state of wake (jāgradavasthāyām, commentary on MDh 2.4).
vratāni mānaso ’dhyavasāyo vratam. idaṃ mayā yāvajjīvaṃ kartavyam iti yad vihitam. yathā snātakavratāni. yamadharmāḥ pratiṣedharūpāḥ ahiṃsādayaḥ. kartavyeṣu pravṛttiḥ nisiddhebhyo nivṛttiḥ nāntareṇa saṅkalpam asti (Medhātithi, commentary on MDh 2.3).
Further examples of necessity are discussed in the commentary on MDh 11.16—17 and MDh 11.28. The first passage allows the theft of enough food for one day only; the second allows for a simplified sacrifice-performance in extreme times.
Medhātithi, commentary on MDh 11.46.
This conclusion further aligns with the view espoused by Mīmāṃsā authors. See Freschi, 2013.
There are a few exceptions, such as MDh 9.282, according to which sanctions accrue to one who dirties a street with faeces or urine, “except in dire necessity”. Medhātithi feels the need to spell out which kind of necessity is so strong as to prevent any sanction: ‘the exorbitant speed of the expulsion’. Still, even in such cases (MDh 9.283 lists also pregnant women, children and elderly people) the person will at least be reprimanded and the filth will need to be cleaned (by the culprits or by people of low caste if the former are not known). Translations by EF.
See MDh 6.68: ‘To protect living creatures, he should walk always—whether at night or during the day—only after inspecting the ground even at the cost of bodily discomfort’ (saṃrakṣaṇārthaṃ jantūnāṃ rātrāvahani vā sadā | śarīrasyātyaye caiva samīkṣya vasudhāṃ caret ||). The verse figures within a group of verses meant for ascetics, whose standard of conduct is higher than that of common human beings.
Medhātithi’s commentary on MDh 11.45.
yāvato grasate piṇḍān havyakavyeṣṿ amantravit | tāvato grasate pretya dīptāñ chūlarṣṭyayoguḍān ||
yajñārtham arthaṃ bhikṣitvā yo na sarvaṃ prayacchati | sa yāti bhāsatāṃ vipraḥ kākatāṃ vā śataṃ samāḥ ||
parakīyanipāneṣu na snāyād dhi kadācana | nipānakartuḥ snātvā tu duṣkṛtāṃśena lipyate || 201 || yānaśayyāsanānyasya kūpodyānagṛhāṇi ca | adattāny upayuñjāna enasaḥ syāt turīyabhāk || 202 || nadīṣu devasvāteṣu taḍageṣu saraḥsu ca | snānaṃ samācaren nityaṃ gartaprasravaṇeṣu ca || 203 ||
śūdrāṃ śayanam āropya brāhmaṇo yāty adhogatiṃ | janayitvā sutaṃ tasyāṃ brāhmaṇyād eva hīyate || 17 || daivapitryātitheyāni tatpradhānāni yasya tu | nādanti pitṛdevās tan na ca svargaṃ sa gacchati || 18 || vṛṣalīphenapītarasya niḥśvāsopahatasya ca | tasyāṃ caiva prasūtasya niṣkṛtir na vidhīyate ||
āmantritas tu yaḥ śrāddhe vṛśalyā saha modate | dātur yad duṣkṛtaṃ kiṃcit tat sarvaṃ pratipadyate ||
brāhmaṇasya rujaḥkṛtyaṃ ghrātir aghreyamadyayoḥ | jaihmyaṃ puṃsi ca maithunyaṃ jātibhraṃśakaraṃ smṛtam || 68 || kharāśvoṣṭramṛgebhānāmajāvikavadhas tathā |saṃkarīkaraṇaṃ jñeyaṃ mīnāhimahiṣasya ca || 69 ||
gurutalpo ’bhibhāsyainas tapte svāpyād ayomaye | sūrmīṃ jvalantīṃ vāśliṣyen mṛtyunā sa viśudhyati || 104 || svayaṃ vā śiśnavṛṣaṇāv utkṛtyādhāya cāñjalau | nairṛtīṃ diśam ātiṣṭhed ā nipātād ajihmagaḥ || 105 || khaṭvāṅgī ciravāsā vā śmaśrulo nirjane vane | prājāpatyaṃ caret kṛcchram abdam ekaṃ samāhitaḥ || 106 ||
For instance, in his commentary on MDh 11.117, Medhātithi notes that ‘no stress is meant to be laid’ on the specification of ‘unintentionally’ ‘as is clear from the heaviness of the expiation’.
muṇḍo vā jaṭilo vā syād athavā syāc chikhājaṭaḥ | nainaṃ grāme ’bhinimlocet sūryo nābhyudiyāt kvacit || 219 || taṃ ced abhyudiyāt sūryaḥ śayānaṃ kāmakārataḥ | nimloced vāpy avijñānāj japann upavased dinam || 220 || sūryeṇa hy abhinimluktaḥ śayāno ’bhyuditaś ca yaḥ | prāyaścittam akurvāṇo yuktaḥ syān mahatainasā || 221 ||
Consider the case of Jainism, which prescribes non-violence and requires individuals to ensure they take all precautions so as not to kill, including filtering water and wearing a mask, so as to avoid swallowing or inhaling small insects (on Jainism see also section 1).
There are other similar instances in Chap.8 in which intention or lack thereof does not alter the consequences. For example, see MDh 8.352-353, 8.279-282. On the distinction between legal and religious rules in Dharmaśāstra, see Lubin forthcoming.
A useful tool for the study of penances is the MA thesis by Zrenner, 2015.
Cf. Mele, 2006: “‘Functions plausibly attributed to intentions include initiating and motivationally sustaining intentional actions, guiding intentional action, helping to coordinate agents’ behaviour over time and their interaction with other agents, and prompting and appropriately terminating practical reasoning” (see Brand 1984, Bratman 1987, McCann 1998, Mele 1992, and Searle 1983). Intentions, like many psychological states, have both a representational and an attitudinal dimension. The representational content of an intention may be understood as a plan. The intending attitude towards plans may be termed an executive attitude. Plans, on one conception, are purely representational and have no motivational power of their own’. One is in this sense reminded of Augustine’s struggle in the Confessions, exemplarily analyzed by Laura W. Ekstrom, 2010 as a ‘volitional discord’.
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Acknowledgements
We would like to acknowledge the generous help of the anonymous peer reviewer who made several interesting comments, especially concerning the translations of saṅkalpa, adhyavasāya and rasavatī.
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Research for this article has been partly funded by the WWTF, grant no. MA16_028. We would like to express our gratitude to the anonymous peer-reviewer and their helpful comments.
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Baron, E., Freschi, E. Action, Intention, and Negligence: Manu and Medhātithi on Mental States and Blame. J Indian Philos 51, 25–47 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-022-09526-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-022-09526-0