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Intentionality and belief de re

A Critical Study of Searle's Representative Internalism

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References

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Bar-Elli, G. Intentionality and belief de re. Erkenntnis 41, 65–85 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01128911

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01128911

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