Abstract
What Do the Data Tell Us? Justification of scientific theories is a three-place relation between data, theories, and background knowledge. Though this should be a commonplace, many methodologies in science neglect it. The article will elucidate the significance and function of our background knowledge in epistemic justification and their consequences for different scientific methodologies. It is argued that there is no simple and at the same time acceptable statistical algorithm that justifies a given theory merely on the basis of certain data. And even if we think to know the probability of a theory, that does not decide whether we should accept it or not.
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Bartelborth, T. Wofür sprechen die Daten?. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 35, 13–40 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:JGPS.0000035150.90850.c1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:JGPS.0000035150.90850.c1