Abstract
This paper argues that, notwithstanding the remarkable popularity of Woodward’s (2003) interventionist analysis of causation, the exact definitional details of that theory are surprisingly little understood. There exists a discrepancy in the literature between the insufficient appreciation of the logical details of interventionism, on the one hand, and the amount of theoretical work interventionism is expected to do, on the other. The first part of the paper distinguishes four significantly different readings of the logical form of Woodward’s analysis and identifies the two readings that best capture Woodward’s intentions in (2003) and (2008a), respectively. In the second part, I show that these different readings are not clearly kept apart in the literature, and, moreover, that neither of them can do all the work that interventionists would like the theory to do.
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Notes
The italics are mine. They are intended to emphasize the logical constants in (M). Note that Woodward is very explicit about the fact that he sees (M) to be a definition of direct causation (cf. e.g. Woodward 2003, 55, 60–61). We can confine our discussion to Woodward’s notion of direct causation, because it is the core notion of his theory. Indirect (or contributing) causation is then defined based on direct causation.
Plainly, there also is an “or” in (M). This disjunction is intended to ensure that the theory is applicable to both deterministic and probabilistic structures. As this is of no relevance to the present context, I am not going to explicitly formalize that disjunction.
In modal systems containing the Barcan Formula (BF) \(\Diamond\exists x Fx\) is even equivalent to \(\exists x \Diamond Fx\). For details see e.g. Hughes and Cresswell (1996, 246). Irrespective of whether BF is presupposed, I take a de dicto reading of (M) that sidesteps metaphysical questions as to the manner of existence of possibilia to be more in line with the basic non-metaphysical approach followed in Woodward (2003). The subsequent discussion, however, in no way hinges on this preference of a de dicto reading of (M). That is, whoever prefers a de re reading may simply substitute \( \exists i \Diamond Iixy\) for \(\Diamond \exists i Iixy\) in what follows.
This restriction could, of course, easily be formally expressed. To keep the formalizations as simple as possible I abstain from doing so here.
More specifically, condition (IV.3) of Woodward’s (2003, 98) notion of an intervention cannot be met.
This problem could be averted by adding a constraint to (M) that requires X and Y to be different variables. Yet, under reading 1, a version of (M) that is supplemented in that vein would still entail that non-manipulability is sufficient for causation, which is a very counterintuitive consequence.
Strevens (2007, 243) contends that Woodward’s (2003, 98) definition (IV) of an intervention variable is implicitly relativized to a variable set. To this, Woodward (2008b) replies, correctly in my view, by insisting that (IV) defines the notion of an intervention variable not by drawing on the relativized notion of causation provided by (M), but by drawing on a de-relativized notion of causation simpliciter which is defined via existential generalization of (M). In response, Strevens (2008) argues that this de-relativization of (M) gets the interventionist account involved in a vicious circle. I cannot enter this discussion here. For the purposes of this paper, I simply interpret Woodward’s definition (IV) in the way that is most faithful to its wording, that is, in the non-relativized way.
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Acknowledgements
I am grateful to Delphine Chapuis Schmitz, Wolfgang Spohn, Jim Woodward and one anonymous reviewer for helpful comments and suggestions. Moreover, I thank the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) for generous support of this work (project CausaProba).
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Baumgartner, M. The Logical Form of Interventionism. Philosophia 40, 751–761 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-012-9369-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-012-9369-2