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Bedeutungsverstehen als Kennzeichen des Mentalen

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Summary

In his paper „Machines and the Mental“ Fred Dretske claims that there is a difference on principle between men on the one and animals and machines on the other side which arises from the fact that men are able to respond to the meaning of symbols whereas animals and machines can only respond to the symbols that have the meaning. In this paper it is argued that this claim does not bear closer scrutiny. Mainly for two reasons: 1. The mere having of a certain meaning does not rank among the possible causal properties of a symbol, not even in the case of men; for it is not the having of the meaning that may have certain effects on the behavior of a person, but the fact that the personassociates this meaning with the symbol. 2. Even animals are capable to associate a meaning with a symbol, i. e. even animals can learn to come to believe thatp if they become aware of a symbol which has the meaning thatp.

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Literatur

  1. Vgl. besonders J. Searle, „Minds, Brains, and Programs“, inBehavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1980), 417–424 u. 450–456 sowie ders.,Geist, Hirn und Wissenschaft, Suhrkamp: Frankfurt/M. 1986.

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  5. Siehe z. B. St. Stich, „Do Animals have Beliefs“, inAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 57 (1979), 15–28 und ders.,From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science — The Case Against Belief, MIT Press: Cambridge, Mass. 1983.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Philosophisches Seminar der Georg-August-Universität, Platz der Göttinger Sieben 5, D-3400, Göttingen

    Ansgar Beckermann

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  1. Ansgar Beckermann
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Beckermann, A. Bedeutungsverstehen als Kennzeichen des Mentalen. Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 20, 132–145 (1989). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01801408

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01801408

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