In what way do the corporatist and authoritarian legacies that modelled some Latin American labor institutions influence the opportunities for and restrictions on organizing workers in a new context? To what extent did institutional designs, together with other economic and political factors, influence the characteristics that currently distinguish the union organizations in the countries of the region? Taking into consideration the existence of a broader debate about the consequences of globalization and political democratization for unions, the contribution of historical institutionalism and previous research, in this Article I compare the institutional and organizational dynamics of unions in four countries with authoritarian legacies and corporatist traditions (Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico). The Article argues that in spite of these shared traditions, the differences in the institutional designs — which have scarcely been considered in the specialized literature — have historically imposed distinctive features on the associational power of workers and unions. These features not only persist to the present day, but also translate into dissimilar trajectories of the labor movement and opportunities for organizing workers in the last decade.
- Abbreviations
- CGT
General Confederation of Labour
- Coparmex
Employers′ Confederation of the Mexican Republic (Confederación Patronal de la República Mexicana)
- CROC
Revolutionary Confederation of Peasants and Workers (Confederación Revolucionaria de Obreros y Campesinos)
- CROM
Regional Confederation of Mexican Workers (Confederación Regional de Obreros Mexicanos)
- CTA
Argentinean Workers Center (Central de Trabajadores Argentinos)
- CTM
Confederation of Mexican Workers (Confederación de Trabajadores Mexicanos)
- CUT (Chile) CUT (Brazil)
The Workers’ United Center of Chile (Central Unitaria de Trabajadores)) Unified Workers’ Central ( Central Única dos Trabalhadores)
- ILO
International Labour Organization (Organización internacional del trabajo)
- PRI
Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional)
- STPS
Secretariat of Labor and Social Welfare (Secretaría del Trabajo y Previsión Social)
- UNT
National Workers’ Union (Unión Nacional de Trabajadores)
Appendix
Latin America Rates[59]
| Unionization rates | Collective bargaining rates | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year | Wage Employees (%) | Total Employees (%) | Year | Wage Employees (%) | Total employees (%) | |
| Argentina | 2006 | 37.6 | --- | 2006 | 60.0 | --- |
| Brazil | 2007 | 20.9 | 17.8 | 2006 | 60.0 | --- |
| Chile | 2007 | 11.5 | 13.6 | 2007 | 9.6 | 6.5 |
| Mexico | 2008 | 17.0 | 11.2 | 2007 | 10.5 | 6.9 |
Earnings Participation in GDP[60]
| Around 1990 (a) | Around 2000 (b) | Around 2009 (c) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Argentina | 44.7 | 40.5 | 42.9 |
| Brazil | 53.5 | 47.1 | 51.4 |
| Chile | 38.7 | 46.5 | 45.4 |
| Mexico | 32.3 | 34.5 | 32.2 |
Theoretical Inquiries in Law [Vol. 16:131
Similarities and Differences in Associational Power[61]
| Union regime | Brazil (“soft corporatism”) | Chile (from autonomy to microcorporatism post-transition) | Argentina (“strong corporatism”) | Mexico (“rigid corporatism”) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ratification ILO Convention | 98 | 87 and 98 | 87 and 98 | 87 | |
| Critical aspects | Compulsory union tax and unity in each jurisdiction | Severe restrictions on collective bargaining and right to strike | Restrictions on unions with recognition but without “personería gremial” | Discretional choice of union partner in collective bargaining by employer | |
| Union unity vs pluralism | Compulsory unity (industry or professional level in each jurisdiction: local, state or country) but highly fragmented and competitive in practice | Pluralism but highly fragmented in practice | Compulsory unity at the industrial level | Formally pluralism but with monopoly of representation via closed-shop | |
| Union registration authority | Civil authorities but Labor Ministry determines which union has the monopoly of representation and obtains the compulsory union tax. | Labor Inspection | Ministry of Labor. Monopoly of collective bargaining is recognized for the most representative union. | Ministry of Labor (federal jurisdiction) or Conciliation and Arbitration Boards (local jurisdiction) | |
| Protection against antiunion practices | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | |
| Collective bargaining | Decentralized at firm level or collective convention for compulsory jurisdiction (different categories at local level ) | Decentralized at firm level and informal collectives conventions without right to strike | Centralized at industry or sector level; firm level. | Decentralized at firm level and few law-contracts (industry or sector). | |
| Right to access to information before collective bargaining | No | No | No | No | |
| Other negotiators (different unions) | No; if no unions, federation or confederation can negotiate | Yes, bargaining groups supported by the firm | No | No | |
| Dispute resolution by the State | Judicial power can intervene in collective conflicts | Yes | Yes | Only if both parties agree | |
| Scope of right to strike | Wide, arbitration on request of one party | Limited, with replacement of strikers | Wide, arbitration on request of one party | Wider than the others. Unlimited duration. Arbitration only on request of both parties | |
| Union Resources | Collective bargaining effects | Erga omnes | Unionized workers. Benefits can extend to nonunionized workers if the employer decides and they pay 75% of union’s fees, | Erga omnes Non-members could be obligated to pay fees to the union with a monopoly of representation. | Erga omnes. |
| Union workplace representation (strong resource for unionization) | Must be negotiated with the employer. | No | By law in places with ten or more workers, and by collective bargaining | Exceptional by law and collective bargaining | |
| Sources of funding | Compulsory union tax for all waged workers | Union’s fees | Union’s fees and employer contributions stipulated in collective agreements. Union-managed scheme of healthcare provision for all waged workers | Compulsory fees and employer contributions stipulated in collective agreements | |
| Affiliation and Incentives to recruit members | Voluntary; Positives; | Voluntary; Positives but scarce | Voluntary; Union-managed healthcare provision for waged workers, and services (tourism, sports, legal advice and others) | Compulsory and negatives (closed shop) | |
| Political activities | Permitted | Prohibited | Permitted | Permitted | |
| Tripartite instances of participation | Yes Example: National Labor Forum, 2003, to discuss a new labor code | Yes | Yes (Example: Wages Councils) | Yes (Administrative, like CNSM and Labor justice) | |
Strength of Union Regimes (Regulation of Collective Rights)[62]
| Index | Argentina | Brazil | Chile | México |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Union Power | 0.60 | 0.80 | 0.60 | 1 |
| Collective autonomy | 0.67 | 0.50 | 0.83 | 0.5 |
| Internal democracy | 0.75 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.25 |
| Scope of right to strike | 0.42 | 0.33 | 0.33 | 0.50 |
| Union representatives at the shop floor level | 1.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Total | 3.44 | 2.63 | 2.76 | 2.25 |
![Figure 1 Labor Productivity and Minimum Wage in Latin America, 2010Source: Juan C. Moreno Brid et al., Salario Mínimo en México [Minimum Wage in Mexico], 11 REV. ECO. 33, 78-89 (2014).](/document/doi/10.1515/til-2016-0006/asset/graphic/j_til-2016-0006_fig_001.jpg)
Labor Productivity and Minimum Wage in Latin America, 2010[63]
Evolution of the Real Minimum Wage (Index, Base 2000=100)[64]
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