Abstract
We must, therefore, in every reasoning form a new judgement, as a check or controul on our first judgement or belief; and must enlarge our view to comprehend a kind of history of all the instances, wherein our understanding has deceived us, compar’d with those, wherein its testimony was just and true.
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References
Lehrer, K: 1996Self Trust A Study of Reason Knowledge and AutonomyOxford University Press.
Lehrer, K:2000a, Theory of KnowledgeSecond Edition, Westview Press.
Lehrere, K: 2000b, “Discursive Knowledge,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. LK, No.3, 637–653.
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© 2003 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Bender, J.W. (2003). Skepticism, Justification and the Trustworthiness Argument. In: Olsson, E.J. (eds) The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 95. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0013-0_17
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0013-0_17
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