Abstract
Multiple criteria decision problems with one decision maker have been recognized and discussed in the recent literature in optimization theory, operations research and management science. The corresponding concept with n-decision makers, namely multicriteria n-person games, has not yet been extensively explored.
In this paper we first demonstrate that existing solution concepts for single criterion n-person games in both normal form and characteristic function form induce domination structures (similar to those defined and studied by Yu [39] for multicriteria single decision maker problems) in various spaces, including the payoff space, the imputation space and the coalition space. This discussion provides an understanding of some underlying assumptions of the solution concepts and provides a basis for generalizing and generating new solution concepts not yet defined. Also we illustrate that domination structures may be regarded as a measure of power held by the players.
We then illustrate that a multicriteria problem can naturally arise in decision situations involving (partial) conflict among n-persons. Using our discussion of solution concepts for single criterion games as a basis, various approaches for resolving both normal form and characteristic function form multicriteria n-person games are proposed. For multicriteria games in characteristic function form, we define a multicriteria core and show that there exists a single ‘game point’ whose core is equal to the multicriteria core. If we reduce a multicriteria game to a single criterion game, domination structures which are more general than ‘classical’ ones must be considered, otherwise some crucial information in the game may be lost. Finally, we discuss a parametrization process which, for a given multicriteria game, associates a single criterion game to each point in a parametric space. This parametrization provides a basis for the discussion of solution concepts in multicriteria n-person games.
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Bergstresser, K., Yu, P.L. Domination structures and multicriteria problems in n-person games. Theor Decis 8, 5–48 (1977). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00133085
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00133085